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Financial Services Law Insights and Observations

Eighth Circuit Holds Oral Promise to Postpone Foreclosure Sale Is Not Enforceable under Minnesota Law

Lending

On May 21, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that an oral promise to postpone a foreclosure sale is not enforceable under the Minnesota Credit Agreement Statute (MCAS). Brisbin v. Aurora Loan Services LLCNo. 11-2218, 2012 WL 1813435 (8th Cir. May 21, 2012). At issue was a provision of the MCAS that prohibits a debtor from "maintain[ing] an action on a credit agreement unless the agreement is in writing, expresses consideration, sets forth the relevant terms and conditions, and is signed by the creditor and the debtor.” The borrower alleged that a promise to postpone a foreclosure sale does not fall within the definition of “credit agreement” because it is not a “financial accommodation” and, therefore, is not subject to this restriction. “Credit agreement” is defined in part as “an agreement to lend or forbear repayment of money . . . or to make any other financial accommodation.” The court rejected the borrower's argument, first noting that “financial accommodation” includes a financial accommodation in the nature of a forbearance agreement and that "forbearance" includes refraining from enforcing a debt. The court reasoned that because foreclosure is a means of enforcing a debt, a promise to postpone a foreclosure sale falls squarely within the plain meaning of a forbearance agreement—therefore, a promise to postpone a foreclosure sale is a “credit agreement” under the MCAS. The court also rejected the borrower’s arguments that there was a genuine question of material fact as to whether the borrower detrimentally relied on the promise to postpone the sale of her home, as well as whether the borrower triggered the notice of postponement required by the Minnesota foreclosure-by-advertisement statute. The court reasoned that the borrower did not make a concrete statement of how she would have repaid the debt had the foreclosure sale been postponed, and that the foreclosure-by-advertisement statute only applies when a foreclosure sale actually is postponed by the mortgagee, which was inapplicable in this case.