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  • Judge orders student loan servicer to comply with CFPB CID


    On February 28, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted the CFPB’s petition to enforce a Civil Investigative Demand (CID) issued against a student loan servicer. According to the opinion, the student loan servicer filed a petition with the CFPB to set aside a June 2017 CID because the statutorily-mandated Notification of Purpose did not comply with the Bureau’s notice requirements under 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c)(2). The loan servicer argued that the CID’s list of activities under investigation—i.e., processing payments, charging fees, transferring loans, maintaining accounts, and credit reporting—failed to provide the servicer with fair notice as to the nature of the investigation because it “merely categorize[s] all aspects of a student loan servicing operation.” The CFPB denied the petition, and in November 2017, filed a petition in court to enforce the CID. In granting the Bureau’s petition, the court found that the Notification of Purpose met the statutory notice requirements because nothing in the law bars the CFPB “from investigating the totality of a company’s business operations.” Moreover, the court also found that the CID’s Notification of Purpose met the necessary requirements regarding administrative subpoenas set forth by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit, concluding that the investigation is for a “legitimate purpose,” the information requested is relevant and not already known by the Bureau, and the request is not unreasonably broad or burdensome.

    Courts CFPB Student Lending CIDs Appellate Third Circuit

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  • 3rd Circuit holds payday lender’s arbitration clause unenforceable


    On February 27, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit held that an arbitration clause is unenforceable if the corresponding forum selection provision designates a forum that does not actually exist. According to the opinion, in 2012 the plaintiff obtained a $5,000 loan from the defendant, an online loan servicer. An arbitration provision accompanying the loan agreement stated that arbitration would be conducted by an authorized representative of a specific tribal nation. The plaintiff subsequently sued the defendants for allegedly violating the federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, and various New Jersey state laws. The defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the lower court denied. In affirming the lower court’s decision, the 3rd Circuit concluded that the tribal arbitration forum referenced in the loan agreement does not actually exist and “because the loan agreement’s forum selection clause is an integral, non-severable part of the arbitration agreement,” the entire arbitration agreement is unenforceable.

    As previously covered by InfoBytes, in January, a district court judge ordered the same online loan servicer and its affiliates to pay a $10 million penalty for offering high-interest loans in states with usury laws barring the transactions. The penalty was based on a September 2016 finding that online loan servicer was the “true lender” of the loans issued through entities located on tribal lands. The penalty was significantly reduced from the CFPB’s request of over $50 million. 

    Courts Arbitration Third Circuit Payday Lending Appellate

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  • 3rd Circuit rules settlement offer for time-barred debt could violate FDCPA


    On February 12, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit held that a collection letter offering a settlement on a time-barred debt could violate the prohibition against "any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt” of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). According to the opinion, the plaintiff filed a class action complaint against the debt collector after receiving a letter stating that the debt collector would accept a partial “settlement” of the delinquency amount, which was past the New Jersey six-year statute of limitations. The lower court granted the debt collector’s motion to dismiss, finding that the letter did not contain a threat of legal action by the use of the word settlement and therefore, did not violate the FDCPA. In reversing the lower court’s decision, the 3rd Circuit concluded that the “least-sophisticated debtor could be misled into thinking that ‘settlement of the debt’ referred to the creditor’s ability to enforce the debt.” In its conclusion, the appellate court also noted that settlement offers of time-barred debts “do not necessarily constitute deceptive or misleading practices” under the FDCPA and remanded the case back to the lower court for review.

    Courts Third Circuit Appellate FDCPA Debt Collection

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  • District Court Order Dismissing TCPA Claim Reversed on Appeal


    On July 10, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a single telemarketing call to a consumer established a concrete injury sufficient to support a Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) suit against a New Jersey-based fitness company. The appellate court reversed the District Court’s dismissal of the suit “because the TCPA provides [the consumer] with a cause of action, and her alleged injury is concrete.”

    The appellate court considered two questions in the appeal: (i) was the alleged robocall a violation of the TCPA? If so, (ii) is the alleged injury concrete enough to provide Article III standing to sue under the United States Constitution? The court answered the first question by noting that the TCPA prohibits robocalls and prerecorded messages to cellular phones and that it “does not limit—either expressly or by implication—the statute's application to cell phone calls.” In answering the second question, the court determined that the alleged injury is exactly the kind of injury the TCPA was created to prevent: a nuisance or invasion of privacy.

    The Third Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with their findings.

    Courts Appellate Third Circuit TCPA Federal Issues Litigation

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  • Debt Collector Liable for Violating FDCPA and TCPA


    On July 3, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed that a debt collector violated the Telephone Consumer Practices Act (TCPA) when it called a consumer’s cell phone without the consumer’s consent, resulting in a damages award of $34,500. Additionally, the appellate court reversed the district court’s decision regarding a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claim for sending a collection letter to the consumer without taking proper precautions to ensure the consumer’s account number would remain private. The debt collector put forth the defense of bona fide error regarding its alleged violations of the FDCPA. The appellate court, citing Supreme Court precedent, rejected the defense, holding that bona fide error could be claimed only in the case of a clerical or factual error, but a “mistaken interpretation of the law is inexcusable under the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense.” The Third Circuit remanded the FDCPA claim to the district court to enter judgment for the consumer and calculate the damages the debt collector must pay.

    Courts Privacy/Cyber Risk & Data Security Third Circuit Debt Collection TCPA FDCPA Appellate

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  • Third Circuit Vacates New Jersey District Court's Dismissal of TCPA-related Case

    Privacy, Cyber Risk & Data Security

    On October 14, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled the recipient – intended or not – of a prerecorded call has standing under the TCPA, so long as the recipient has sufficient ties to the number called. Leyse v. Bank of America NA, No. 14-4073 (3rd. Cir. Oct. 14, 2015). In 2011, a roommate of the intended recipient sued a financial institution after answering a prerecorded telemarketing call seeking to advertise credit cards on behalf of the financial institution. In 2014, the District Court of New Jersey dismissed the case on the grounds that the plaintiff was not the intended recipient of the call and, therefore, lacked standing. The Third Circuit vacated that ruling, holding that the TCPA’s “zone of interests encompasses more than just the intended recipients of the prerecorded telemarketing calls” and that “[l]imiting standing to the intended recipient would disserve the very purposes Congress articulated in the text of the Act.”

    TCPA Third Circuit

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  • Third Circuit Affirms Whistleblowers Must Arbitrate Under Dodd-Frank

    Consumer Finance

    On December 8, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that application of Dodd-Frank’s Anti-Arbitration provision did not apply to causes of action asserted under the Anti-Retaliation Dodd Frank Provision due to the limiting language of the arbitration law. Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp, No. 14-1689 (3rd Cir. Dec.8, 2014). In 2013, the plaintiff filed suit in the District of New Jersey alleging that he had been fired in the preceding year for whistleblowing. According to the complaint, the retaliation occurred after the plaintiff questioned a supervisor about the pricing of a financial product that did not comply with relevant securities regulations. The District Court ruled that Dodd Frank’s Anti-Arbitration Provision did not prohibit the enforcement of arbitration agreements that were signed before the enactment of Dodd-Frank. Rather than deciding on the timing issue, however, the Court of Appeals upheld the decision on statutory construction grounds based on the limiting language of the Anti-Arbitration provision indicating that it only applied to causes of action contained within the same section, and not all allegations under Dodd-Frank.

    Dodd-Frank Arbitration Third Circuit

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