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District Court finds SEC acted in bad faith and orders it to pay defendant’s attorney fees partially
On March 18, the U.S. District Court in Utah ordered the SEC to pay a defendant’s attorney fees and legal costs partially after the Commission was found to have engaged in “gross abuse” and acted in bad faith on how it presented evidence as part of a temporary restraining order (TRO). Additionally, the court denied the SEC’s motion to dismiss the case without prejudice.
The SEC had filed suit against the defendant, a cryptocurrency company, for allegedly making false and misleading statements to investors, specifically how the company wished to move its assets to the United Arab Emirates in an online video to purportedly “evade law enforcement.” The court had agreed with the SEC and eventually froze the defendant’s assets. In reply, the defendants contended the SEC’s representations were “highly misleading” as they were in response to a viewer’s question posed in a comment as weighing the benefits of operating in the UAE compared to a U.S. regulatory environment. Despite the SEC “affirmatively and repeatedly” asserting that the defendants were moving funds and assets overseas, the court found no evidence to support that claim and had decided to grant the SEC a TRO because of these misrepresentations.
The court emphasized that it does not take its authority to issue TROs lightly, since this authority invokes extreme powers of the federal judiciary. The court now found the SEC made false statements, and despite having multiple opportunities to correct them, proceeded to make additional “layers of false statements” demonstrating “subjective bad faith.”
The court refused to write these issues off as mistakes. In its reply, the SEC stated that its attorneys made inaccurate statements, failed to correct them, and improperly labeled an inference as fact. The court acknowledged that the SEC’s attorneys “fell short” of the responsibility entrusted to it by Congress. On reply, the Commission “deeply regrets” its errors but argued it does not deserve any sanctions since it had not engaged in any “bad faith conduct.” The court disagreed, noting “companies were seized, assets were frozen, and lives were upended.”
Further, the SEC argued that sovereign immunity barred it from any monetary sanctions; the court disagreed. The court admonished the SEC: “[W]hen an attorney makes a false statement of material fact to a court, the lawyer is required to correct it.” The court found the SEC’s explanations unsatisfactory. It also denied the SEC’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. The court sided with the defendants eventually after they asserted the SEC sought to “evade” the court’s oversight. While weighing the decision to impose a greater sanction, the court decided against imposing fees and costs for the entire court case, but directed the Defendants to submit a fee request, if they would like. In all, the court found with “clear evidence” there was a “complete lack of color and an improper purpose on the part of the government.”
8th Circuit affirms almost $20 million in damages and attorney’s fees in RMBS action
On February 2, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court order requiring a mortgage lender to pay $5.4 million in damages and $14 million in attorney’s fees for selling mortgages that did not meet agreed-upon contractual representations and warranties to a now-defunct company that packaged and resold the loans to residential mortgage-back securities (RMBS) trusts. The now-defunct company was sued by the RMBS trusts after loans underlying the securitizations began defaulting at a high rate during the 2008 financial crisis. A liquidating trust was established to oversee wind-down measures after the company filed for bankruptcy. The liquidating trust later began suing originators for indemnification over the allegedly defective mortgages. In 2020, the district court ruled in favor of the liquidating trust and entered judgment for $5.4 million in damages, $10.6 million in attorney’s fees, $3.5 million is costs, $2 million in prejudgment interest, and $520,212 in “post-award prejudgment interest.” The district court found, among other things, that the lender had breached its client contracts, and that in doing so, contributed to the now-defunct company’s “losses, damages, or liabilities within the scope of the contractual indemnity.” The court also found the liquidating trust’s damages methodology to be reasonable and nonspeculative. The lender appealed, disagreeing with how the underlying contracts were interpreted, as well as the allocation of multi-party damages and the post-trial award of fees, costs, and interest.
On appeal, the 8th Circuit disagreed, concluding that the terms of the parties’ contract made the lender liable. The appellate court also rejected the lender’s contention that it should not be expected to pay the claims against the now-defunct company because they were extinguished in bankruptcy, and that the methodology used to calculate the damages was inaccurate. In awarding $5.4 million in indemnification damages, the appellate court held that the district court properly found that the expert’s “‘calculation of damages was reasonable and non-speculative,’ and that his methodology produced a reasonably certain measure of [the liquidating trust’s] indemnifiable damages.” The 8th Circuit further concluded that the fee award was fair and that the district court had accounted for the complexity of the case and the importance of conducting a detailed loan-by-loan analysis. The appellate court also accused the lender of relitigating already decided issues and driving up the costs. However, the 8th Circuit did order the district court to recalculate the post-judgment interest award using guidance under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) rather than the 10 percent prejudgment interest rate under Minnesota law.
California Supreme Court: FTC Holder Rule does not limit attorney’s fees
On May 26, the California Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s ruling that the FTC’s Holder Rule does not limit liability for attorney’s fees. According to the opinion, the plaintiff bought a used vehicle from the dealership (defendant) pursuant to an installment sales contract, which was subsequently assigned to a bank that became the “holder” of the contract. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant and the bank, alleging misconduct by the dealership in the sale of the car regarding advertised features she needed due to a disability. A jury found for the plaintiff on one of her causes of action — breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and awarded her $21,957.25 in damages. The plaintiff filed a posttrial motion seeking attorney’s fees in the amount of $169,602 under the Song-Beverly Act. The bank argued that it could not be liable for attorney’s fees based on the provision of the Holder Rule limiting recovery to the “amount[] paid by the debtor.” The trial court disagreed and granted the plaintiff’s motion.
The California Supreme Court granted review to resolve a split among the appellate courts on whether ‘“recovery’ under the Holder Rule includes attorney’s fees and limits the amount of fees plaintiffs can recover from holders to amounts paid under the contract.” The opinion noted the divide among the state’s appellate courts on this issue, citing on the one hand Pulliam v. HNL Automotive Inc. (holding that the Holder Rule does not limit the attorney’s fees a plaintiff may recover), and on the other hand, Lafferty v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (stating that a debtor cannot recover damages and attorney fees for a Holder Rule claim that collectively exceed the amount paid by the debtor under the contract) and Spikener v. Ally Financial, Inc., (finding that the Holder Rule preempts California Civil Code section 1459.5, which authorizes a plaintiff to recover attorney fees on a Holder Rule claim even if it results in a total recovery that exceeds the amount the plaintiff paid under the contract, covered by InfoBytes here).
On appeal, the California Supreme Court unanimously concluded that “the Holder Rule does not limit the award of attorney’s fees where, as here, a buyer seeks fees from a holder under a state prevailing party statute,” as opposed to seeking fees under the Holder Rule itself. Specifically, “[t]he Holder Rule’s limitation extends only to ‘recovery hereunder.’” The California Supreme Court continued that “[t]his caps fees only where a debtor asserts a claim for fees against a seller and the claim is extended to lie against a holder by virtue of the Holder Rule. Where state law provides for recovery of fees from a holder, the [Holder] Rule’s history and purpose as well as the Federal Trade Commission’s repeated commentary make clear that nothing in the Rule limits the application of that law.”
Florida Court of Appeal: Bank may seek attorney’s fees as a condition of loan reinstatement
On May 4, the Florida Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that a borrower cannot sue a law firm for sending a letter seeking to collect attorney’s fees because the mortgage contract gave the bank the right to seek attorney’s fees from a prior foreclosure action as a condition of reinstating the loan. Previously, a trial court had awarded the borrower attorney’s fees following dismissal of a prior foreclosure action. The bank later brought a new foreclosure action against the borrower concerning the same property, and the law firm representing the bank sent the borrower a reinstatement letter requiring payment of attorney’s fees incurred by the bank in the prior foreclosure action in order to reinstate the loan. The trial court, citing a 2019 decision in U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Leigh, granted summary judgment in favor of the law firm on the grounds that “the law firm was entitled to immunity under the litigation privilege because the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA) claim was based on the reinstatement letter the law firm sent during the foreclosure proceedings” and because the borrower lacked standing.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed with the law firm that it was entitled to collect attorney fees and costs and that the borrower lacked standing to bring his FCCPA claim. According to the Court of Appeal, a provision in the mortgage contact included language that “if the borrower defaulted and the lender accelerated the loan, the borrower would have the right to reinstate the loan if certain conditions were met.” Among these conditions was that the borrower would agree to “pay all expenses incurred in enforcing this Security Instrument, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys’ fees.” Applying the rationale of Leigh, the Court of Appeal found “that the law firm did not violate the FCCPA because it sought to recover a legitimate expense it was entitled to recover pursuant to a contract, that being the expense of attorney’s fees the lender incurred in the prior foreclosure action.”
FTC clarifies Holder Rule provision
On January 20, the FTC issued an advisory opinion addressing the FTC’s Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Preservation of Consumers’ Claims and Defenses’ impact on consumers’ ability to recover costs and attorneys’ fees. Commonly known as the Holder Rule, the provisions protect “consumers who enter credit contracts by preserving their right to assert claims and defenses against any holder of certain loans and credit sales contracts, even if the loans or contracts are assigned to a third party.” Because a seller’s use of practices to foreclose these rights constitutes an unfair practice under Section 5 of the FTC Act, the Holder Rule requires sellers to include a notice in credit contracts of a consumer’s right to claims and defenses related to a seller’s misconduct. While courts have addressed the issue of whether consumers are able to recover costs and attorneys’ fees from the holder of a credit contract, the FTC noted that some courts and finance companies have misinterpreted previous FTC statements to suggest that the Holder Rule preempts state laws that authorize attorney fee awards against loan holders. According to the advisory opinion, the “Holder Rule does not eliminate any rights the consumer may have as a matter of separate state, local, or federal law. Consequently, whether costs and attorneys’ fees may be awarded against the holder of the credit contract is determined by the relevant law governing costs and fees.” Noting that “[n]othing in the Holder Rule states that application of such laws to holders is inconsistent with Section 5 of the FTC Act or that holders should be wholly or partially exempt from these laws,” the FTC added that “if the applicable law requires or allows costs or attorneys’ fee awards against a holder, the Holder Rule does not impose a cap on such an award.” While it is not clear how much deference courts would give to the advisory opinion, companies may choose to consider the Commission’s statement.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court says state mortgage law does not apply retroactively
On August 18, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed a lower court’s decision, holding that 2008 amendments to the Pennsylvania Loan Interest and Protection Law (also known as “Act 6”), which raised the mortgage principle-amount ceiling from $50,000 to nearly $215,000, do not apply retroactively to loans executed prior to 2008. According to the opinion, in May 2002, homeowners executed a mortgage for $74,000. In 2008, the homeowners defaulted on their mortgage and in 2009, their bank—through its counsel—filed a mortgage foreclosure complaint, which included $1,300 in attorneys’ fees. In 2012, while their foreclosure was still pending, the homeowners filed a class action against the bank’s counsel, alleging the counsel violated Act 6’s limit on attorney’s fees. The trial court sustained the counsel’s demurrer, concluding that the homeowners’ mortgage was not “a ‘residential mortgage’ as Act 6 defined that term in 2002.” The superior court affirmed.
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the superior court, noting not only the “presumption against finding statutes retroactive,” but the state’s General Assembly’s “explicit instruction that courts should avoid applying legislation retroactively unless the statute clearly and manifestly states otherwise.” Because Act 6 does not expressly state that the 2008 increased mortgage-ceiling should apply to mortgages executed prior to the amendment, the Court concluded there was “no basis allowing for application of the updated law to the [homeowners]’ mortgage,” and thus, the counsel was not subject to Act 6’s limitation on attorneys’ fees.
District court approves MDL data breach settlement
On July 21, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California issued an order approving a $117.5 million class action settlement, including $23 million in attorneys’ fees, with a global internet company to resolve multidistrict litigation concerning the exposure of class members’ sensitive information stemming from multiple data breaches. The settlement approval follows a fairness hearing, as the court originally denied preliminary approval due to several identified deficiencies (covered by InfoBytes here), including that the settlement inadequately disclosed the sizes of the settlement fund and class, as well as the scope of non-monetary relief, and “appear[ed] likely to result in an improper reverter of attorneys’ fees.” Last July, the court preliminarily signed off on a revised settlement, conditionally certifying a class of U.S. and Israeli residents and small businesses with accounts between 2012 and 2016 that were affected by the breaches. These class members have been certified in the final approved settlement, which requires the company to provide class members with either two years of credit monitoring services or alternative compensation for members who already have credit monitoring. Among other things, the company will allocate at least $66 million each year to its information security budget until 2022, will increase the number of full-time security employees from current levels, and will “align its information security program with the National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework” and “undertake annual third-party assessments to ensure compliance” with the framework.
California Court of Appeal: FTC Holder Rule preempts state law authorizing recovery of certain attorney fees
On June 9, the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District affirmed a trial court’s judgment in favor of a bank (defendant), holding that the FTC’s Holder Rule preempts California Civil Code section 1459.5, which authorizes a plaintiff to recover attorney fees on a Holder Rule claim even if it results in a total recovery that exceeds the amount the plaintiff paid under the contract. According to the court, the plaintiff sued the defendant (who was assigned the vehicle credit sale contract) after he discovered that the seller failed to disclose that the vehicle had been in a major collision, thus reducing its value. The parties settled for a sum equal to the vehicle’s purchase price, and the plaintiff filed a motion for attorney fees. The trial court denied the motion, determining that the plaintiff was not entitled to fees under a holding in Lafferty v. Wells Fargo Bank, which stated that a debtor cannot recover damages and attorney fees for a Holder Rule claim that collectively exceed the amount paid by the debtor under the contract. The plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court, determining that it did not need to resolve the parties’ dispute as to whether Lafferty correctly construed the Holder Rule’s limitation on recovery because the FTC’s construction of the Holder Rule is entitled to deference. The Court of Appeal referenced the FTC’s 2019 confirmation of the Holder Rule (Rule Confirmation), after Lafferty issued, which addressed, among other things, several comments related to whether the Holder Rule’s “limitation on recovery to ‘amounts paid by the debtor’ allows or should allow consumers to recover attorneys’ fees above that cap.” The FTC provided the following statement within the Rule Confirmation: “We conclude that if a federal or state law separately provides for recovery of attorneys’ fees independent of claims or defenses arising from the seller’s misconduct, nothing in the Rule limits such recovery. Conversely, if the holder’s liability for fees is based on claims against the seller that are persevered by the Holder Rule Notice, the payment that the consumer may recover from the holder—including any recovery based on attorneys’ fees—cannot exceed the amount the consumer paid under the contract.”
9th Circuit upholds TCPA liability for reassigned number
On June 2, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s judgment in a TCPA action against a bank, concluding that consent from the person intended to call does not exempt the bank from liability under the TCPA. According to the opinion, the bank’s vendors made over 180 automated calls to a child’s cell phone in attempt to collect past-due payments from a customer who used to have the same cell phone number, which had since been reassigned to the child’s mother. The customer of the bank had given consent to be called, but the mother and child had not. After a three-day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the TCPA claim, concluding that the bank could not escape liability under the TCPA because the customer it intended to call had given consent, and awarding $500 in statutory damages for each of the 189 unwanted calls, for a total of $94,500.
On appeal, the 9th Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment after the jury trial. The appellate court noted it was “agreeing with other circuits,” on liability when it concluded that the district court “properly instructed the jury that consent from the intended recipient of the call was not sufficient.” Moreover, the appellate court held that the district court properly instructed the jury on the definition of “automatic telephone dialing system,” based on the panel’s decision in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC (covered by InfoBytes here). Lastly, the appellate court also issued an opinion affirming the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff.
District court approves $2.3 million class settlement resolving violations of Massachusetts debt collection laws
On March 23, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued an order granting final approval to a nearly $2.3 million class action settlement, reached through mediation, to resolve allegations that a subsidiary of a large U.S. retailer (defendant) made excessive debt collection calls to Massachusetts consumers. The named plaintiff claimed that the defendant violated the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act and state debt collection regulations by calling consumers more often than twice in a seven-day period. The order also lowered the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees because, according to the court, the case was not as risky as the attorneys claimed and not complex enough to warrant taking approximately one-third of the settlement fund.