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CFPB: Lenders cannot discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity
On March 9, the CFPB issued an interpretive rule to clarify that ECOA’s prohibition against sex discrimination includes sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination. “This prohibition also covers discrimination based on actual or perceived nonconformity with traditional sex- or gender-based stereotypes, and discrimination based on an applicant’s social or other associations,” the Bureau stated. In 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, holding that “the prohibition against sex discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 encompasses sexual orientation discrimination and gender identity discrimination.” Following the Court’s decision, the Bureau issued a request for information (RFI) seeking, among other things, feedback on ways to provide clarity under ECOA and/or Regulation B related to the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of a sexual orientation or gender identity. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) Consistent with the Bostock decision and supported by many comments received in response to the RFI, the Bureau issued the interpretive rule to address any regulatory uncertainty that may still exist regarding the term “sex” under ECOA/Regulation B in order to protect against discrimination and ensure fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory access to credit for both individuals and communities. The interpretive rule is effective upon publication in the Federal Register.
The Bureau also announced plans to review—and update as needed—publication and examination guidance documents to reflect the interpretive rule, and intends to take appropriate enforcement action against financial institutions that violate ECOA.
9th Circuit: Debt collector can invoke bona fide effort defense in time-barred suit
On March 9, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of an FDCPA lawsuit, holding that while “strict liability” under the statute applies when a debt collector threatens litigation or files a lawsuit seeking to collect time-barred debt, the debt collector can avoid liability by invoking the bona fide error defense. In the case that gave rise to the plaintiff’s FDCPA claim, the plaintiff contested the debt collector’s state court lawsuit, arguing that it was filed outside the four-year statute of limitations applicable to sale-of-goods contract claims. The debt collector countered that Oregon’s six-year statute of limitations for other contract claims applied. After the state court ruled for the plaintiff, the plaintiff filed a putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon against the defendants alleging violations of Sections 1692e and 1692f of the FDCPA. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss ruling that the plaintiff failed to state a claim because the state statute of limitations was unclear when the defendants attempted to collect the debt.
On appeal, the 9th Circuit disagreed with the district court, concluding that because the “FDCPA takes a strict liability approach to prohibiting misleading and unfair debt collection practices, [] a plaintiff need not plead or prove that a debt collector knew or should have known that the lawsuit was time barred to demonstrate that the debt collector engaged in prohibited conduct.” However, the 9th Circuit held that the defendants may be able to avoid liability through the FDCPA’s affirmative defense for bona fide errors. The appellate court distinguished its holding from a 2010 U.S. Supreme Court case, Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, which held that mistakes about the FDCPA’s meaning are excluded from the bona fide error defense. Instead, the 9th Circuit found that “a mistake about the time-barred status of a debt under state law could qualify as a bona fide error within the meaning of the FDCPA” because it is a mistake of fact and not of law.
Court dismisses credit repair association’s suit against CFPB, FTC
On March 9, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed a credit repair industry association’s challenge against the CFPB and the FTC for exceeding their constitutional authority in promulgating the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR). In 2020, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit on behalf of two member companies that were subject to TSR enforcement actions, seeking judgments (i) against the FTC for exceeding “its statutory authority in promulgating the TSR,” (ii) against both agencies on the basis that the TSR, as applied, “is an unconstitutional content-based restriction on protected speech,” and (iii) against both agencies on the basis that the TSR “is underinclusive and not narrowly tailored.” The plaintiff also alleged, among other things, that the Bureau was increasing its application of the TSR by “encouraging consumer reporting agencies not to investigate disputes submitted by credit repair organizations” that are reasonably determined to be “frivolous or irrelevant.” The agencies filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedures Act’s (APA) six-year statute of limitations and that the plaintiff failed to state a claim.
In granting the agencies’ motion to dismiss, the court ruled that the lawsuit was filed far beyond the APA’s six-year statute of limitations as the TSR first appeared in the Federal Register in 1995; thus all procedural attacks on the TSR were time barred. The court also ruled that because sending a civil investigative demand or filing a complaint is not considered “a final agency action,” the plaintiff failed to allege a final agency action taken by the agencies against the plaintiff’s members. Further, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s argument regarding the Bureau’s position on investigating frivolous or irrelevant disputes, ruling that the Bureau’s April 2020 Statement on Supervisory and Enforcement Practices Regarding the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Regulation V in Light of the CARES Act (covered by InfoBytes here) is just “a policy statement that has nothing to do with the TSR at issue in this case and is not a final agency action.”
States urge Department of Education to protect student loan borrowers
On March 9, NYDFS sent a letter on behalf of a multi-state coalition of financial regulators inviting recently confirmed Department of Education Secretary Dr. Miguel Cardona to partner with the states to ensure protections for student loan borrowers. Specifically, the letter urges Secretary Cardona to reverse two policies instituted by former Secretary Betsy DeVos that the coalition claims “undermine state supervision of private companies that service federal student loans.” The first is a 2018 interpretation (covered by InfoBytes here), which takes the position that state regulation of servicers of loans made under the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program and the Federal Family Education Loan Program is preempted by federal law. The coalition argues that the Department’s 2018 preemption interpretation has made “state-level oversight of student loan servicers more burdensome.” As such, the coalition urges Secretary Cardona to promulgate a regulation rejecting federal preemption of state consumer protection laws to ensure borrowers can “benefit from state oversight of student loan servicers.” The letter also discusses former Secretary DeVos’s attempt to use the Privacy Act of 1974 “as a shield from necessary state oversight”—an action the coalition claims leaves states “with no choice but litigation” to obtain documents needed for industry oversight.
New York reaches settlement with bank over check-cashing program
On March 1, the New York attorney general entered into an agreement with an Ohio-based bank resolving an investigation into the bank’s alleged deceptive advertising practices. According to the AG, the bank introduced a check-cashing program advertised to consumers in the state as a method to cash government and payroll checks at a low cost. The program, which was intended to assist the underbanked and unbanked in low- and middle-income (LMI) communities, allowed consumers who did not have deposit accounts with the bank to participate in the program. The AG alleged, however, that the program was not being implemented as promoted and was not available in branches where it was advertised, nor was it allegedly available to testers who tried to use the program. While neither admitting nor denying the allegations, the bank has agreed to provide $5 million to be used as down payment and home-closing cost assistance for LMI New Yorkers, and it will apply to become a participating lender with the State of New York Mortgage Agency. The bank has also agreed to originate $145 million in mortgage loans to LMI homebuyers in the state over the next five years and will waive certain fees associated with the loans.
6th Circuit: Delegation clause in arbitration agreement keeps case out of court
On March 4, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that a district court “exceeded its authority” when it ruled that an arbitration agreement was unenforceable in a case disputing an allegedly predatory loan. According to the 6th Circuit opinion, the plaintiff claimed she was the victim of an illegal “rent-a-tribe” scheme when she accepted a $1,200 loan with an interest rate exceeding 350 percent from an online lender owned and organized under the laws of a federally recognized Montana tribe. The loan contract the plaintiff signed included a provision stating that “‘any dispute. . .related to this agreement will be resolved through binding arbitration’ under tribal law, subject to review only in tribal court.” The plaintiff filed suit, alleging, among other things, that the arbitration agreement violated Michigan and federal consumer protection laws. The defendant moved to compel arbitration, arguing that because the plaintiff agreed to arbitrate issues regarding “the validity, enforceability, or scope” of the arbitration agreement through a “delegation clause,” the court should stay the case and compel arbitration. The district court denied the defendant’s motion, “maintaining that the enforceability of the arbitration agreement ‘has already been litigated, and decided against [the defendant], in a similar case from the 2nd Circuit.’” The defendant appealed, arguing that the district court disregarded the delegation clause.
On remand, the 6th Circuit stated that its decision does not bear on the merits of the case but merely addresses who resolves the plaintiff’s challenges to the arbitration agreement. “It’s not even about whether the parties have to arbitrate the merits. Instead, it’s about who should decide whether the parties have to arbitrate the merits,” the appellate court wrote. Focusing on the delegation clause—which states that the parties agreed that an arbitrator, and not the court, would decide “gateway arbitrability issues”—the appellate court held that “[o]nly a specific challenge to a delegation clause brings arbitrability issues back within the court's province,” which was a challenge that the plaintiff failed to make.
Fed clarifies MDI definition guidance
On March 5, the Federal Reserve Board issued clarifying guidance regarding definitions for minority depository institutions (MDIs), expanding the definition of an MDI to include women-owned financial institutions. In addition to statutory provisions—which define the term “minority” to mean any African American, Native American, Hispanic American, or Asian American, and “states that an MDI is any depository institution where a majority of the voting stock is owned by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals”—the Federal Reserve System’s definition of an MDI will now recognize women’s depository institutions, and will provide these depository institutions with the same resources as other MDIs. According to the Board, the definition of a “women’s depository institution” is consistent with how the term is defined under the Community Reinvestment Act. Additionally, the Board highlighted resources available for MDIs through its Partnership for Progress program, which helps MDIs operate in a safe and sound manner and meet supervisory standards.
FTC, multiple states halt charitable telefunding operation
On March 4, the FTC, together with state attorneys general from 38 states and the District of Columbia, the secretaries of state from Colorado, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Tennessee, the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, and the Utah Division of Consumer Protection (collectively, “plaintiffs”), announced settlements with a telefunding operation whose charitable fundraising calls allegedly collected over $110 million using deceptive solicitations. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged, among other things, that the defendants engaged in deceptive fundraising by placing more than 1.3 billion prerecorded robocalls to convince consumers to donate to “practically nonexistent charitable programs.” The charitable organizations then paid the defendants typically 80 to 90 percent of every donation, the complaint states, noting that certain defendants knew that almost none of the donations would be spent supporting the charitable programs. The plaintiffs contended that these false or misleading actions violated the FTC Act. Moreover, in many instances, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants knowingly violated the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) by using soundboard technology to place the telemarketing calls. Using pre-recorded messages in calls to first-time donors is a violation of the TSR, the plaintiffs stated, as is using soundboard technology in calls to prior donors without first disclosing to recipients that they may opt-out of all future calls and providing them with a mechanism to do so.
Proposed settlements (see here, here, and here) reached with one group of defendants will, among other things, permanently ban them from engaging in any fundraising activities, conducting telemarketing to sell goods or services, or using existing donor information. The defendants will also be required to pay $110,063,848 each, which is either partially or fully suspended due to the defendants’ inability to pay.
Additionally, proposed settlements reached with the two fundraising company defendants and their senior managers (see here, here, and here) will permanently prohibit them from engaging in any fundraising activities or consulting on behalf of a charitable organization or nonprofit organization claiming to work on behalf of causes similar to those noted in the complaint. These defendants will also be banned from using robocalls connected to telemarketing, engaging in abusive calling practices, or making misrepresentations about a good, service, or contribution. The defendants will further be required to disclose when a donation is not tax deductible. The individual defendants also are required to pay $110,063,843 each, which is partially suspended due to the defendants’ inability to pay, while the two corporate defendants, along with two of the individual defendants, are subject to a partially suspended monetary judgment of $1.6 million.
Virginia issues new guidance for electronic notaries
On March 11, the Virginia secretary of state will require every electronic notarial certificate to include: (i) county/city within Virginia where the electronic notary public was physically located at the time the notarization was performed; and (ii) whether the notarization was done in person or by remote notarization. The requirement follows the passage of HB2064, which amends and reenacts certain provisions of the Virginia Code, relating to electronic notary and remote notarization. HB2604 is effective March 11, 2021.
FHFA extends Covid-19 flexibilities until April 30
On March 11, the FHFA announced the extension of several loan origination guidelines put in place to assist borrowers during the Covid-19 pandemic. Specifically, FHFA extended until April 30 existing guidelines related to: (i) alternative appraisal requirements on purchase and rate term refinance loans; (ii) alternative methods for documenting income and verifying employment before loan closing; and (iii) the expanded use of power of attorney to assist with loan closings. The extensions are implemented in updates to Fannie Mae Lender Letters LL-2021-03 and LL-2021-04, and Freddie Mac Guide Bulletin 2021-10 and Selling FAQs.