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Ninth Circuit Invalidates Online Marketing Company Consumer Contract, Arbitration Agreement
On December 16, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an online marketing company cannot compel arbitration in a suit brought by a putative class of consumers who claim they were improperly charged for a subscription service they never intended to purchase. Lee v. Intelius, Inc. No. 11-35810, 2013 WL 6570899 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2013). The named plaintiffs sued a company that performs background checks after noticing regularly monthly charges for a report they allegedly did not intend to purchase. The background check company added an online marketing firm as a third-party defendant, arguing it was that firm whose subscription service the consumers were allegedly misled into purchasing. The district court explained that the background check company provided the marketing company space on its website and used the now illegal “data pass” method of sharing credit card information to assist the marketing company in enrolling consumers in free trial subscription offers, which converted to a monthly billed subscription without cancellation. The district court held that the consumers entered into a contract for the subscription service, but denied the marketing company’s motion to compel arbitration. On appeal the Ninth Circuit disagreed, determining that the subscription service website to which consumers were directed after purchasing background reports was designed to deceive consumers. The appellate court reasoned that under Washington law, a contract requires mutual assent to its essential terms—including the names of the parties—in order to be binding, and in this case the web page through which the consumers allegedly purchased the subscription service did not sufficiently identify the marketing company as the contracting entity. The court expressed skepticism that the consumers assented to the contract by providing their email addresses and clicking a “yes” button, but given that Washington law is not settled on whether a website “click” can constitute an electronic signature, the court did not rest its conclusion on whether the consumers objectively manifested consent to the contract. Further, the court held that even on the assumption that consumers did enter a contract to purchase the subscription service by clicking on the “yes” button, they did not agree to arbitration because the arbitration terms were included in a separate hyperlink that consumers did not click.
Alabama State Appellate Court Upholds Electronically Executed Agreement
Recently, the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama upheld an agreement executed electronically, overturning a trial court’s order invalidating a divorce agreement on the grounds that the agreement filed with the court was executed electronically. Ex parte Mealing, No. 2120973, 2013 WL 5776053 (Ala. Civ. App. Oct. 25, 2013). In this case, a husband asked the trial court to vacate a divorce agreement he had willingly entered without legal representation, claiming that his wife’s attorney orchestrated an agreement more favorable to the wife. The trial court decided that the divorce agreement was invalid because it was signed electronically. The appellate court disagreed and held that the trial court erred in relying on an alternative basis—one not even presented by the husband—in an attempt to create for itself an opportunity to render equitable judgment of the matter. The court explained that relevant court rules allow for electronic signatures, and that there was no contention from the husband that the electronic signatures were shams or false. The appellate court directed the trial court to set aside its order and reinstate the electronically signed divorce agreement.
New TCPA Express Written Consent Requirement Takes Effect
On October 16, new rules took effect that require businesses to obtain express written consent before making certain telemarketing calls to customers. The rules arise from a February 2012 Report and Order issued pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), in which the Federal Communications Commission (FCC): (i) required that businesses obtain prior express written consent for all autodialed or prerecorded telemarketing calls to wireless numbers and residential lines, (ii) allowed consumers to opt out of future robocalls during a robocall, and (ii) limited permissible abandoned calls on a per-calling campaign basis. While the consumer opt-out and abandoned calls limitations are already in effect, compliance with the express written consent requirement was not mandated until now. The rules require that the written consent be signed and be sufficient to show that the customer: (i) receives “clear and conspicuous disclosure” of the consequences of providing the requested consent and (ii) having received this information, agrees unambiguously to receive such calls at a telephone number the consumer designates. In addition, the rules require the written agreement to be obtained “without requiring, directly or indirectly, that the agreement be executed as a condition of purchasing any good or service.” The FCC rule allows electronic or digital forms of signatures obtained in compliance with the E-SIGN Act—e.g. agreements obtained via a compliant email, website form, text message, telephone keypress or voice recording—to satisfy the written requirement. The FCC also removed an exemption that allowed businesses to demonstrate consent based on an “established business relationship” between the caller and customer.
Oregon Updates Notary Regulations, Allows Electronic Notarization, Journals
On October 1, the Oregon Secretary of State published a final rule to implement numerous changes to the state’s notaries public regulations, including providing for electronic notarizations and electronic journals. The Secretary also released a summary of the changes. Notaries may notarize documents electronically after informing the Secretary of State of the format the notary will use by submitting notice via email, using the Electronic Notarization Notice form, along with an example of an electronic notarization. Any change to the way a notary conducts electronic notarizations—e.g. new vendor, new technology, changed appearance—requires a notary to provide notice of the change to the Secretary of State. A notary also may document an electronic notarization in either a paper or electronic journal, or both. The new rules took effect on September 1, 2013.
NIST Releases Minor Updates to Digital Signature Standard
On July 23, the National Institute of Standards and Technology released a revised digital standard used to ensure the integrity of electronic documents and the identity of the signer. The revised standard includes no major changes, but does update the standard to align it with other publications so that all NIST documents offer consistent guidance regarding the use of random number generators. Another revision concerns the use of prime number generators, which requires random initial values for searching for prime numbers.
Fourth Circuit Relies on E-Sign Act to Hold Electronic Agreement May Effect A Valid Transfer of Copyright
On July 17, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that under the E-Sign Act, an electronic transfer may satisfy the requirements for transfer of a copyright under the Copyright Act, even though the Copyright Act itself does not define the “writing” or “signature” required to effectuate a transfer. Metro. Reg. Info. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Home Realty Network, Inc. No. 12-2102, 2013 WL 3722365 (Jul. 17, 2013). In this case, the company that operates the online real estate listing service MLS sued a competitor real estate referral service, contending that the referral service collected and used information without authorization – including photographs of listed properties – that MLS compiled for its customers. In order to submit photos to the MLS, customers are required to click a button and agree to certain terms of use. The court agreed with the MLS operator that its customers’ acceptance of the terms of use operated as a transfer of copyrights in any photograph provided to the MLS, and that as such the competitor service may have violated the Copyright Act through its unauthorized use of the materials. Noting the paucity of case law applying the E-Sign Act to instruments conveying copyrights, the court looked to cases in which circuit courts have applied the E-Sign Act to the Federal Arbitration Act’s protections that pertain only to written arbitration agreements, including the Second Circuit’s holding in Specht v. Netscape Comms. Corp., 605 F.3d 17 (2nd Cir. 2002). Based on the analysis in those cases, the court explained that “[t]o invalidate copyright transfer agreements solely because they were made electronically would thwart the clear congressional intent embodied in the E-Sign Act.” The court held that an electronic agreement may effect a valid transfer of copyright interests under the Copyright Act. As such, the court affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction prohibiting MLS’s competitor from displaying the MLS photographs.
Texas Appeals Court Affirms Holding that Certain Emails Read Together Can Be Construed as One Contract
On March 7, the Texas Court of Appeals of the Thirteenth District affirmed a trial court’s holding that the essential terms of an option contract for the purchase of real estate were present when three e-mail messages exchanged by the parties were read together. Dittman v. Cerone, No. 13-11-00196-CV, 2013 WL 865423 (Mar. 7, 2013). The defendant sued for specific performance pursuant to the terms of the three emails, and the trial court ultimately concluded that the e-mails constituted a valid option contract and ordered the plaintiffs to convey the property. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s holding that the option contract complied with the statute of frauds because (i) the emails construed together provided the essential terms of the contract, (ii) the property was sufficiently identified and confirmed by extrinsic evidence, (iii) the parties’ actions evidenced an intent to conduct certain business electronically, and (iv) the real estate broker had authority to act for the sellers.
Virginia Publishes Electronic Notarization Standard
On January 21, the Virginia Secretary of the Commonwealth released the Virginia Electronic Notarization Assurance Standard. Citing challenges faced by notaries to “preserve and strengthen the role of the notary in the rapidly emerging digital economy and to ensure reliability and cross-border recognition of notarized electronic documents in a global economy,” the standards are intended to support transition of notaries in Virginia to performing electronic notarizations that have the same legal effect as traditional notarizations. They set forth registration and performance requirements, electronic signature and seal requirements, online notarization procedures, and notarized electronic document requirements. According to the Secretary, the Virginia standards (i) reflect the National Association of Secretaries of State Electronic Notarization Standard for Document Security; (ii) incorporate aspects of standards previously adopted by seven other states; and (iii) are consistent with the federal ESIGN Act, the UETA, and the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act.
President Signs Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments
On January 10, President Obama signed H.R. 6671, which amends the Video Privacy Protection Act to facilitate compliance for modern video service providers. The Act was originally passed in 1988 to limit the disclosure of information about consumers’ “video tape rental or sales records,” and its application to certain modern video service providers (e.g. Netflix) is not clear. The amendments allow such providers to obtain consumer consent to disclosure through electronic means using the Internet. Such consent must be in a form distinct and separate from any form setting forth other legal or financial obligations of the consumer. Consumers can provide consent in advance, but not for more than two years or until consent is withdrawn by the consumer, and service providers must provide an opportunity for the consumer to withdraw consent on a case-by-case basis or to withdraw from ongoing disclosures, at the consumer's election.
Tenth Circuit Enforces Electronic Agreement Entered Into on an Installation Technician's Laptop
On December 11, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims concerning AT&T’s U-Verse services, based on forum selection and arbitration clauses in the agreements between the parties. Hancock v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 11-6233, 2012 WL 6132070 (10th Cir. Dec. 11, 2012). In support of the motion to dismiss, AT&T offered declarations from its employees concerning its standard practices for entering into agreements with customers obtaining U-Verse services. Under those practices, customers purchasing U-Verse TV and Voice services agreed to terms of service (TV Terms) that included a forum selection clause. The TV Terms were provided to customers in writing by the installation technician at the time the services were installed. The customers agreed to the TV Terms by clicking on an acknowledgement and acceptance box on the technician’s laptop after being given the printed terms – the acknowledgement and acceptance stated that the customer had received and reviewed the TV Terms. Details of each acceptance were captured and stored on AT&T’s servers at the time of acceptance. Also under AT&T’s standard practices, customers purchasing U-Verse Internet Services agreed to separate terms of service (Internet Terms) during the online registration process – to complete registration, customers had to click on an “I Agree” button underneath the Internet Terms. For two of the plaintiffs, the Internet Terms included a mandatory arbitration clause at the time of registration. For another plaintiff, the mandatory arbitration clause was added after a notice of amendment, describing the new arbitration clause, was provided to the plaintiff via email. On appeal, the court held that the declarations concerning AT&T’s standard practices were admissible in evidence, and since they were not contradicted by the plaintiffs’ affidavits, the district court did not abuse its discretion by accepting the declarations as true. The court went on to hold that under AT&T’s standard practices both the TV Terms and the Internet Terms were clearly presented, and that enforceable contracts were formed between the plaintiffs and AT&T. The court also concluded that the e-mail notification process used to add the arbitration clause to the Internet Terms was sufficient to make the amendment effective.