InfoBytes Blog
Filter
Subscribe to our InfoBytes Blog weekly newsletter and other publications for news affecting the financial services industry.
California regulator reminds debt collectors of rental protections
On April 9, the California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation issued a bulletin reminding debt collectors of protections associated with “Covid-19 rental debt,” which includes unpaid rent or other unpaid financial obligation of a tenant that came due between March 1, 2020 and June 30, 2021 (see previous coverage here). Starting July 1, creditors are prohibited from charging or attempting to collect late fees for Covid-19 rental debt if the renter has submitted the requisite declaration of financial distress, among other restrictions. Actions to recover Covid-19 rental debt cannot be commenced before August 1, 2021, and any action to recover such debt that was pending on January 29, 2021, is stayed until August 1.
OFAC issues new Syria sanctions FAQs
On April 5, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published two new Syria Frequently Asked Questions, FAQs 884 and 885. FAQ 884 relates to non-U.S. persons’, including nongovernmental organizations’ (NGOs) and foreign financial institutions’ exposure to U.S. secondary sanctions pursuant to the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (Caesar Act) for activities that would be authorized under the Syrian Sanctions Regulations (SySR), while FAQ 885 governs whether U.S. and non-U.S. persons (including NGO and foreign financial institutions) may facilitate certain humanitarian assistance to Syria without the risk of sanctions. OFAC clarified, among other things, that “non-U.S. persons, including NGOs and foreign financial institutions, would not risk exposure to sanctions under the Caesar Act for engaging in activity, or facilitating transactions and payments for such activity, that is authorized for U.S. persons under a general license (GL) issued pursuant to the SySR.” With respect to certain humanitarian assistance, OFAC explained that “[t]he export of U.S.-origin food and most medicines to Syria is not prohibited and does not require a Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) or OFAC license, and therefore non-U.S. persons would not risk exposure to sanctions under the [Caesar Act] for engaging in such activity.”
Court rules debt purchaser qualifies as a “debt collector” and “collector” under federal and state law
On April 2, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland denied a defendant debt purchaser’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the company qualifies as a “debt collector” and “collector” under the FDCPA, the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act (MCDCA), and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). The plaintiff had filed suit against three entities, including the defendant, alleging the entities violated the FDCPA, MCDCA, and MCPA by (i) threatening to file criminal charges; (ii) falsely implying that she committed a crime for which charges could be filed; and (iii) revealing information about the debts to her daughter and on voice mails with her employer. The defendant, who relied on the two other entities to conduct the actual debt collection, argued that it does not qualify as a debt collector under the FDCPA, and that it is not a “collector” under the MCDCA, and therefore cannot be held liable under the MCPA. The defendant further argued that, “regardless of whether it meets one these statutory definitions,” it cannot be held vicariously liable for actions taken by the other two entities.
The district court disagreed, ruling that the defendant qualifies as a debt collector under the “principal purpose” prong of the FDCPA and cannot evade liability “simply by outsourcing the specific collection activities to third parties.” With respect to whether it qualifies as a “collector” under the MCDCA and MCPA, the court noted that while the defendant argued that “it [did] not itself, or through in-house debt collectors, undertake any actions to collect [the plaintiff’s] debts, the definition of ‘collector’ is not limited only to persons or entities that directly engage with consumers to collect the debt.” As such, because the defendant qualifies as a debt collector and collector under federal and state law, it could be held vicariously liable. Moreover, the court stated there is “genuine dispute of material fact” regarding whether the defendant had a “principal-agent relationship” with the other two entities that subjects it to vicarious liability. In particular, contracts entered between the three entities allowed the defendant to, among other things, “exercise a great degree of control over consumer complaints” regarding collection actions.
11th Circuit: Arbitration provision survives termination of subscriber agreement
On April 5, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that an arbitration provision survived the termination of a subscriber agreement between a defendant cable company and a customer. According to the opinion, the plaintiff obtained services from the defendant in December 2016, and signed a subscriber agreement containing an arbitration provision covering claims that arose before the agreement was entered into and after it expired or was terminated. The plaintiff terminated the defendant’s services in August 2017, but later called the defendant in 2019 to inquire about pricing and services. The plaintiff filed a putative class action, alleging the defendant violated the FCRA when it accessed his credit report during the call without his permission, thus lowering his credit score. The defendant moved to compel arbitration, which the district court denied, ruling that while the parties may have intended for the arbitration provision to survive termination of the subscriber agreement, the plaintiff’s claim fell outside the scope of the subscriber agreement because “no reasonable person would believe that the Arbitration Provision was so all-encompassing as to apply to all claims regardless of when they occurred or whether they related to the agreement.” Moreover, the district court ruled that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) “could only compel [the plaintiff] to arbitrate his FCRA claim if it ‘arose out of’ or ‘relate[d] to’ the 2016 subscriber agreement, which the district court held it did not.
On appeal, the appellate court disagreed, concluding that the plaintiff’s FCRA claim relates to the 2016 subscriber agreement since the defendant was only able to conduct the credit check during the phone call because of its previous relationship with the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued that he was calling to obtain new services and not to reconnect services, but the appellate court countered that the “reconnection provision” contained within the subscriber agreement provides broad language that defines terminate, suspend, and disconnect as not necessarily being mutually exclusive. However, the 11th Circuit clarified that its holding is narrow, and that because it concluded that the plaintiff’s claim did arise out of the subscriber agreement the court did not need to and was not making a determination about whether the “broad scope” of the arbitration provision in the subscriber agreement is enforceable under the FAA.
11th Circuit affirms dismissal of RESPA suit
On March 31, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of an action for failure to state a claim against a mortgage servicer, agreeing with the district court that the consumer failed to plausibly allege a “causal link” between the alleged RESPA violation and actual damages. According to the opinion, the plaintiff alleged he never received notice of a foreclosure sale on his deceased mother’s property, although he was the administrator of her estate. He filed suit, claiming the servicer failed to respond to his qualified written requests within 30 days as required under RESPA, and that as a result of the foreclosure, he allegedly “suffered actual damages from the loss of his mother’s home, loss of her belongings, and his mental anguish.” The servicer countered that the alleged “actual damages” did not result from the servicer’s failure to respond properly to the plaintiff’s letters, but rather were a result of the estate’s failure to pay the mortgage and the resulting foreclosure. In affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims, the 11th Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiff never asked the servicer to rescind the foreclosure sale (noting that under RESPA, a borrower is not authorized to request rescission of a foreclosure sale), and that, moreover, the servicer’s failure to do what the plaintiff actually asked it to do—provide information about the mortgage—did not cause his damages.
5th Circuit: Oral agreement to accept past-due mortgage payments is unenforceable under statute of frauds
On March 26, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a national bank, upholding its foreclosure sale in a 2-1 opinion. According to the opinion, after the borrowers missed several payments the bank foreclosed on their property. The borrowers filed suit alleging, among other things, that the bank “violated the deed of trust and the Texas Property Code” by failing to send proper notices prior to the foreclosure of their home, and also violated the Texas Debt Collection Act (TDCA). The bank argued that it had properly served notice, and the district court agreed, granting summary judgment on the foreclosure-sale claims, concluding “that there was no genuine dispute over whether [the bank] properly sent notice in compliance with both the deed of trust and the Texas Property Code.” The district court also agreed with the bank that an oral agreement between the borrowers and a bank representative to accept a $14,000 payment “to bring the loan current” was “unenforceable under the statute of frauds because it modified the terms of the loan agreement.”
On appeal, the majority opinion considered, among other things, whether the statute of frauds barred consideration of the alleged oral agreement under the TDCA. The majority concluded that alleged oral agreement “cannot alone” sustain the borrowers’ claims under the TDCA. In order for the $14,000 to be considered “an actual, enforceable acceptance” as either part of the repayment plan or to bring the loan current, the agreement would have to be in writing under Texas law, the majority held. The dissenting judge argued, however, that the bank violated the TDCA by “misrepresenting, in a March 2017 phone call, that $14,000 would be automatically deducted from the [borrowers’] account to pay off the bulk of their past-due mortgage payments.” According to the dissent, “the phone call plausibly muddled the [borrowers’] understanding of whether they had a past-due mortgage debt, how much they owed, and whether they were in default,” thus creating a false sense of security about their mortgage—the kind of conduct the TDCA is intended to guard against.
CFPB proposes delaying effective date for recent debt collection rules
On April 7, the CFPB proposed to extend the effective date of two recent debt collection rules to allow affected parties additional time to comply due to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) delays the effective date by 60 days of the two final rules issued under the FDCPA, which were scheduled to take effect on November 30 but are now proposed to take effect January 29, 2022. The proposed delay would give stakeholders affected by the pandemic more time to examine and implement the rules. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the first debt collection rule, issued in October 2020, addressed debt collection communications and prohibitions on harassment or abuse, false or misleading representations, and unfair practices. The second debt collection rule, issued in December 2020, clarified the information debt collectors must provide to consumers at the outset of collection communications and provided a model validation notice containing such information (covered by InfoBytes here).
5th Circuit: Law firm may send debt dispute letters on behalf of clients
On April 1, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a district court’s ruling in favor of defendant credit repair organizations (including a law firm), holding that plaintiff data furnishers failed to provide sufficient evidence supporting their claims of fraud and fraud by nondisclosure. The plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the defendants were sending dispute letters that appeared to have come directly from the defendants’ debtor clients. Under the FCRA and the FDCPA, the plaintiffs are obligated to investigate disputed debts that come directly from debtors. Letters from law firms, the plaintiffs argued, do not trigger such requirements. According to the plaintiffs, the disputes they were receiving were costing them money to investigate, which they would not have spent if had they known the letters were coming from a law firm. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs on their claims of fraud and fraud by non-disclosure and awarded them roughly $2.5 million. The district court ultimately vacated the jury’s verdict, however, explaining that the evidence failed to show that the defendants made any false misrepresentations, material or otherwise, when they signed their clients’ names on letters mailed to the plaintiffs. The law firm defendant “had the legal right to sign its clients’ names on the correspondence it sent on their behalf to data furnishers who reported inaccurate information about the clients’ credit,” the district court wrote.
On appeal, the 5th Circuit determined, among other things, that the plaintiffs did “not provide any precedential support or explanation for their assertion that these facts demonstrate Defendants committed fraud and fraud by non-disclosure beyond the observation that the jury found for them on those claims.” Moreover, the appellate court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ argument that the engagement agreements that clients signed with the defendant law firm, which allowed it to send dispute letters on a client’s behalf, were fraudulent because the defendant law firm did not discuss the letters with the consumers first. According to the appellate court, the existence of any such discussion was immaterial because the engagement agreements allowed the defendant law firm to send letters on a client’s behalf. However, the appellate court noted that “[w]hile we do not hold today that there are no situations in which a third party may act fraudulently when it mails dispute letters (and leave for another day what those situations may be), we can safely say that this is not one of them.”
Special Alert: CFPB proposes to halt foreclosure starts from August 31 until 2022 and create new loss mitigation requirements for servicers
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau on Monday issued a proposal that would broadly halt foreclosure initiations on principal residences from August 31, 2021 until 2022, and change servicing rules to promote consumer awareness and processing of Covid-relief loss mitigation options. Although the proposal would give servicers some flexibility in streamlining the modification process, most already have been offering many of these types of modifications since the early days of the pandemic. The proposal also would create new and detailed obligations for communicating with borrowers to ensure they are aware of their loss mitigation options for pandemic-related hardships.
The CFPB indicated that a final rule implementing the proposal will take effect Aug. 31 — a tight timeline to address public comments, which are due May 10. The proposal comes as the housing market is strengthening, loans in Covid-related forbearance are dropping, the unemployment rate is ticking down, and the nation’s vaccination program is gathering momentum.
Restrictions on foreclosure initiation through Dec. 31 for principal residences
The CFPB proposes prohibiting servicers from making the first notice or filing for foreclosure from the effective date on Aug. 31, 2021 until after Dec. 31, 2021, on all principal residences, regardless of whether the loan default was related in any way to the Covid-19 pandemic. Regulation X currently requires a servicer to generally refrain from making the first notice or filing to initiate foreclosure until the borrower reaches the 120th day of delinquency. Although the CFPB has previously taken the position that a borrower generally is not obligated to make a lump sum payment upon expiration of the forbearance period (See for example: Slides - Housing Counseling Webinar Forbearance Options and Resources - March 22, 2021 (hudexchange.info)), the proposal acknowledges that borrowers who enter forbearance programs and do not make payments during the forbearance period become increasingly delinquent on their mortgage obligation. As a result, without additional action, servicers likely would have a right under Regulation X to initiate foreclosure in the event a borrower comes off of a forbearance plan and does not cure the delinquency through reinstatement, deferral, or some other loss mitigation alternative to foreclosure. The proposal said a temporary foreclosure prohibition would address this concern.
The CFPB indicated it is considering creating exemptions from this restriction that would allow for the commencement of foreclosure proceedings if the borrower is not eligible for any nonforeclosure loss mitigation options or has failed to respond to servicer outreach.
It is possible that loan investors who had expected to instruct servicers to foreclose on defaulted loans will raise a legal challenge to the broad proposed foreclosure restriction, which appears to be principally based upon the CFPB’s authority to issue regulations creating mortgage servicer obligations as “appropriate to carry out [the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act’s] consumer protection purposes.” It is an open question whether a blanket prohibition on foreclosures — including those unrelated to the pandemic — and applicable to all mortgage servicers is within the CFPB’s statutory authority under RESPA or the Dodd-Frank Act
Modifications based on evaluation of an incomplete loss mitigation application
The proposal also would allow servicers to offer borrowers with a Covid-19 related hardship a loan modification based on an incomplete application, as long as the modification met the following criteria:
- Term and payment limitations: The modification may not cause the borrower’s principal and interest payment to increase and may not extend the term of the loan by more than 480 months from the date of the modification.
- Non-interest-bearing deferred amounts: Any amounts that the borrower may delay paying until the loan is refinanced, the property is sold, or the loan modification matures, must not accrue interest.
- Fee restrictions: No fees may be charged for the loan modification and all existing late charges, penalties, stop-payment fees, and similar charges must be waived upon acceptance (the CFPB said it was aware that certain agencies, including the Federal Housing Administration, only require waiver of fees incurred after the beginning of the pandemic, and that such modifications would not fall within this safe harbor).
- Covid-related hardship: The loan modification is made available to borrowers experiencing a Covid-19-related hardship, which is very broadly defined in the regulation as “a financial hardship due, directly or indirectly, to the Covid-19 emergency.”
- Delinquency cure: The modification must be designed to end any preexisting delinquency.
Interestingly, investors and agencies have largely eliminated documentation requirements in response to the pandemic, and servicers have been successfully offering streamlined loan modifications under Regulation X’s current requirements. The lack of documentation requirements has seemingly blurred the lines of what constitutes a complete loss mitigation application.
Additional borrower outreach required
The proposed rule would require servicers, for one year after the effective date, to give borrowers Covid-forbearance-related information regarding the current Regulation X early intervention requirements, as follows:
- For borrowers not currently in forbearance, when live contact is made with the borrower, and the investor makes available to that borrower a Covid--related forbearance program, the servicer must inquire whether the borrower has a Covid-related hardship, then list and briefly describe available programs and actions the borrower must take to be evaluated for them. The CFPB noted that this could include listing federal, state, and/or investor-specific options.
- If the borrower is on forbearance, during the last live contact made pursuant to the early intervention rules prior to the program’s expiration, the servicer must inform the borrower of the date on which the current forbearance period ends and each type of post-forbearance option that is available to the borrower to resolve the post-forbearance delinquency, along with the actions that must be taken to be evaluated for such options. Importantly, this list would include all available loss mitigation options—not simply Covid-specific options.
The proposed rule would also require a servicer to contact the borrower no later than 30 days before the end of the forbearance period to determine if the borrower wishes to complete the loss mitigation application and proceed with a full loss mitigation evaluation. If the borrower requests further assistance, the servicer must exercise reasonable diligence to complete the application before the end of the forbearance program period.
The compliance requirements the proposal contemplates seems likely to present additional complexity and liability for mortgage servicers as they gear up to address the upcoming wave of delinquent borrowers who will be coming out of Covid-related forbearances.
If you have any questions regarding the CFPB’s proposal, please visit our Mortgages practice page or our Covid-19 Legal Resources & Capabilities page or contact a Buckley attorney with whom you have worked in the past.
Special Alert: Supreme Court narrows TCPA autodialer definition
On April 1, the United States Supreme Court issued its long-awaited opinion in Facebook Inc. v. Duguid. The 9-0 decision narrows the definition of what type of equipment qualifies as an autodialer under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), a federal statute that generally prohibits calls or texts placed by autodialers without the prior express consent of the called party.
The TCPA defines an autodialer as equipment with the capacity both “to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator,” and to dial those numbers. The question before the Supreme Court in Facebook was whether that definition encompasses equipment that can “store” and dial telephone numbers, even if the device does not use “a random or sequential number generator.” The Court held it does not. Rather, to qualify as an “automatic telephone dialing system,” the Court held that a device must have the capacity either to store or produce a telephone number using a random or sequential generator. In other words, the modifier “using a random or sequential number generator” applied to both terms “store” and “produce.”
Background
In 2014, Noah Duguid received text messages from Facebook alerting him that someone attempted to access his Facebook account. However, Duguid alleged that he never provided Facebook his phone number and did not have a Facebook account.
Duguid was unable to stop the notifications and eventually brought a putative class action against Facebook, alleging that Facebook violated the TCPA by maintaining technology that stored phone numbers, and sent automated texts to those numbers each time the associated account was accessed by an unrecognized device or web browser.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Duguid’s amended complaint with prejudice, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding Duguid stated a claim under the TCPA by alleging Facebook’s notification system automatically dialed stored numbers. The Ninth Circuit held that an autodialer as defined under the TCPA, need not have the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator, but that it need only have the capacity to store number to be called and to dial those numbers automatically.
Holding
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that to “qualify as an ‘automatic telephone dialing system,’ a device must have the capacity either to store a telephone number using a random or sequential generator or to produce a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator.”
In reaching this decision, the Court explained that “expanding the definition of an autodialer to encompass any equipment that merely stores and dials telephone numbers would take a chainsaw” to the nuanced problems Congress sought to address with the TCPA. It further explained that Duguid’s interpretation of an autodialer—the one adopted by the Ninth Circuit—“would capture virtually all modern cell phones, which have the capacity to store telephone numbers to be called” and “dial such numbers.” “TCPA’s liability provisions, then, could affect ordinary cell phone owners in the course of commonplace usage, such as speed dialing or sending automated text message responses.”
And while the Court acknowledged that interpreting the statute in the manner it did may limit its application, the Court reasoned that it “cannot rewrite the TCPA to update it for modern technology,” and that its holding reflected the best reading of the statute.
If you have any questions regarding the Supreme Court’s decision regarding the TCPA, please visit our Class Actions practice page, or contact a Buckley attorney with whom you have worked in the past.