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Utah Court of Appeals affirms ruling for debt buyer engaged in unlicensed collection efforts
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court’s ruling against a debt buyer that acquired a portfolio of bad debts from borrowers all over the country, including residents of Utah. The debt buyer collected on the portfolio of debts by retaining third-party debt collectors or, in some instances, attorneys to recover such debts by filing lawsuits. The debt buyer was not licensed under the Utah Collection Agency Act (UCAA). As such, the plaintiffs argued that the debt buyer’s collection efforts were “deceptive” and “unconscionable” under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act.
The lower court ruled for the debt buyer on the grounds that failure to obtain a license, without more, did not rise to the level of “deceptive” or “unconscionable” conduct. Further, the UCAA does not have a private right of action.
Utah recently repealed the collection agency’s license, effective May 3, 2023 (covered by InfoBytes here).
Fifth Circuit affirms dismissal of Fannie, Freddie shareholders’ claims related to FHFA removal restriction and funding
On October 12, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac shareholders’ claims that the FHFA’s unconstitutional removal restriction caused them harm and that the FHFA’s funding mechanism is inconsistent with the Appropriations Clause. After the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship, it entered into several preferred stock purchase agreements with the U.S. Treasury. As a result of these agreements, any value the companies generated would go to the Treasury and not to junior preferred and common stockholders such as plaintiffs.
The plaintiff shareholders sued in 2016, arguing that the “for cause” removal protection for the director of the FHFA was unconstitutional. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of FHFA, but a panel of the 5th Circuit reversed. Sitting en banc, the 5th Circuit then determined that the removal provision violated the separation of powers, and held that the proper remedy was to sever the removal restriction from the rest of the authorizing statute. On further appeal, the Supreme Court held that for-cause restriction on the President’s removal authority violates the separation of powers, but it refused to hold that the relevant preferred stock purchase agreement must be undone.
The Supreme Court remanded the case for lower courts to resolve whether the unconstitutional removal provision caused harm to plaintiffs as shareholders, and the 5th Circuit, again sitting en banc, remanded that question to the district court. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on remand, bringing claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and directly under the Constitution. The amended complaint also alleged, for the first time, that the FHFA’s financing structure violates the Appropriations Clause. Defendants moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion in its entirety and dismissed all claims with prejudice.
The 5th Circuit determined that the removal claims were within the scope of the remand order, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, but that the plaintiff’s APA claim was barred by an anti-injunction clause in the authorizing statute. Turning to the Constitutional claim, the 5th Circuit concluded that judicial review was not precluded and proceeded to the merits of the claim.
To show compensable harm from the unconstitutional removal provision, plaintiffs had to allege, among other things, a “nexus between the desire to remove and the challenged actions taken by the insulated actor.” More specifically, they had to allege a connection between the Trump Administration’s desire to remove the director of the FHFA and the Administration’s failure to have FHFA exit the conservatorships and return Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to private control. The amended complaint, however, failed to plead facts demonstrating that the Trump Administration’s purported plan for re-privatization would have been completed if President Trump had been able to remove the existing FHFA director. Those allegations, the Fifth Circuit held, were insufficient.
The 5th Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs’ Appropriations Clause argument was outside the mandate of the earlier remand order. The appeals court reasoned that the remand order “[left] no opening for plaintiffs to bring a challenge under a completely different constitutional theory for the first time on remand,” nor was there an intervening change in the law such that the mandate rule would not apply.
3rd Circuit Limits furnishers’ labeling authority
On October 2, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that a collection agency who was acting as a furnisher of credit reporting information could not shirk its duty to investigate a dispute by labeling the dispute “frivolous” when the complaint was referred for investigation by a credit reporting agency (CRA). The decision overturned the lower court’s ruling which had sided with the furnisher.
According the ruling, the plaintiff in this action claimed that a fraudulent account had been opened in his name with a television service provider. Plaintiff was described as having first disputed the account directly with the television service provider, but failed to provide supporting documents which the television service provider had requested. Following the plaintiff’s failure to provide the requested documentation, the television service provider referred the disputed account to the collection agency, who in turn reported the delinquent account to the CRA.
The ruling states that when the disputed account appeared on the plaintiff’s consumer report, the plaintiff made an indirect dispute of the information with the CRA, who in turn forwarded the dispute to the collection agency for investigation. The ruling notes that the collection agency undertook no further investigation in response to the dispute, and instead merely confirmed the account information and updated the plaintiff’s address, which the court noted took only 13 seconds.
The court noted that although the FCRA does allow for the recipient of disputes “to preliminarily vet the dispute for frivolousness or irrelevance before investigating,” once a CRA has referred a dispute to a furnisher, “the furnisher does not have such discretion.” Because in this case the collection agency had been referred to it by a CRA, it “had a duty to investigate [plaintiff’s] indirect dispute when it received notice thereof from [the CRA].”
Supreme Court hears oral argument in challenge to CFPB
On October 3, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in CFPB v. Community Financial Services Association of America —a case presenting the most significant challenge yet to the constitutionality of the CFPB. As previously covered by InfoBytes, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the plaintiff industry groups that the CFPB’s funding structure violates the appropriations clause. At oral argument, the U.S. Solicitor General observed that the lower court decision was the “first time any court in our nation’s history has held that Congress violated the Appropriations Clause by enacting a statute providing funding.” She noted that Congress has approved similar “standing appropriations” for agencies including the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Post Office, and the U.S. Mint.
Several conservative justices pushed back against the CFPB’s and Solicitor General’s stance. For example, Chief Justice Roberts called it “very aggressive view” of Congress’ authority, and Justice Alito emphasized that the CFPB’s funding mechanism was unique in that its funding comes from the Federal Reserve, which is itself not funded through normal appropriations. However, Justice Thomas challenged counsel for the industry groups, noting that “we need a finer point” on “what the constitutional problem is,” beyond the uniqueness of the funding mechanism. Justice Barrett, too, stated she was “struggling to figure out” what standard courts might use in determining whether a cap on an agency’s appropriation is too high.
Find continuing InfoBytes coverage on CFPB v. Community Financial Services Association of America here.
District Court grants summary judgement for bank in “spoofing” case
On September 29, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgement on all claims in favor of the defendant bank, while denying summary judgement for the New Jersey-based plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged violations of the UCC, breach of contract, and gross negligence arising from a “spoofing” fraud incident that resulted in more than $8.5 million being wired from the plaintiff’s account with the defendant. The district court reasoned that the plaintiff was not entitled to a refund because the plaintiff’s employees authorized the wires – and claims under Section 4-A of the UCC require that a payment order be both not authorized and not effective in order to refund a payment. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the wires were improper because the bank’s policy prohibited bank employees from authorizing wires over $500,000 – noting that the policy was for “internal use only,” and solely for the bank’s protection. Further, the court rejected the plaintiff’s common law claims as pre-empted by Article 4-A.
Court infers receipt of validation notice to allow pro se plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim to survive
On September 19, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted in part and denied in part a complaint filed by two pro se plaintiffs who alleged that the defendant’s debt collection efforts related a balance due from a timeshare membership program violated the FCRA, TILA, and FDCPA. In reaching its decision, the court explained that complaints filed by pro se pleadings must be construed more liberally than those drafted by lawyers. Notwithstanding this more liberal approach, however, the court still determined that plaintiffs’ TILA and FCRA claims were insufficiently pled. With respect to the TILA claim, the court stated that plaintiffs failed to specify which provisions were allegedly violated and only alleged that “Defendant has computed and imposed an internal alleged account balance on plaintiff including principal balance, interest rates, fees and terms without property consumer transparency of mode of accounting verification methods,” which was insufficient to allege a TILA violation. The court noted that to the extent it could interpret plaintiffs’ complaint to implicate specific provisions of the FCRA, plaintiffs still failed to state claim under any of the potentially relevant provisions, either because there was no private right of action or there were no facts supporting any alleged claims.
By contrast, plaintiffs did allege specific provisions of the FDCPA that defendant’s conduct purportedly breached. While the court still concluded that plaintiffs failed to state a claim with regard to most of the cited FDCPA provisions, it determined that plaintiffs had plausibly stated a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g, which, among other things, requires a debt collector to cease debt collection efforts if, within 30 days of receiving a validation notice from the debt collector, a consumer disputes the debt or any portion thereof.
Although the record did not reflect whether the defendant had sent plaintiffs a validation notice, the court, in liberally construing plaintiffs’ complaint, found it reasonable to “infer” that such notice had been provided to the plaintiffs. Specifically, the court reasoned that plaintiffs’ notarized letter to defendant, titled “Validation of Debt / Claim” was likely sent in response to a validation notice from defendant, and therefore, under Section 1692g, all collection activity should have ceased following receipt of plaintiffs’ letter.
Challenge to HUD fair housing rule denied
On September 19, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied a motion for summary judgment from the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies arguing that the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s disparate-impact rule conflicts with the limits of the Fair Housing Act as interpreted at the Supreme Court. The rule, promulgated in 2013 and reinstated under the Biden administration, a policy is unlawful if it has a “discriminatory effect” on a protected class and was not necessary to achieve a “substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory” interest or if there is a less discriminatory alternative. Judge Richard J. Leon held that the rule does not exceed limitations on disparate-impact liability under the FHA placed by the Supreme Court in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519 (2015) where those limitations avoid potential constitutional issues and prevent the Act from forcing housing authorities to reorder their legitimate priorities.
CFPB denies petition to set aside investigative demand in student loan discharge probe
On September 19, the CFPB published a recent decision and order denying the petition of one of the nation’s largest private student loan servicers to set aside the CFPB’s civil investigative demand (CID) in connection with its investigation into potential violations of the CFPA’s prohibition of unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices for attempting to collect on loans that had been previously discharged in bankruptcy. The order instructs the servicer to “comply in full” with the requests for documents and information set forth in the Bureau’s June 2023 CID.
The servicer objected to the CFPB’s investigation, arguing, among other things, that the Bureau lacks authority to enforce the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The servicer also argued that the Bankruptcy Code displaces the CFPA if the reason a debt is not owed is due to a bankruptcy discharge.
The Bureau rejected the servicer’s arguments, stating “[t]he Bureau seeks to determine whether a student loan servicer violated the prohibition on unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices not just by making individual attempts to collect discharged debts from individual debtors, but also, more globally, by having no policies and procedures in place to determine whether loans in the servicer’s portfolio are dischargeable in bankruptcy via standard bankruptcy orders, a practice that could put entire populations of borrowers at risk of harmful and unlawful collection efforts.” It went on to say “[t]he bureau does not seek to investigate potential violations of the Bankruptcy Code, but rather potential violations of the CFPA.” The CFPB also noted that courts have “repeatedly held that the Bureau can bring CFPA claims based on companies’ attempts to collect debts that consumers do not owe due to the impact of some other statute.”
Kentucky banks win injunction on Small Business Lending Rule enforcement
On September 14, U.S. District Judge Karen K. Caldwell issued an order granting an injunction sought by the Kentucky Bankers Association and eight Kentucky-based banks to enjoin the CFPB from implementing and enforcing requirements for small business lenders until the U.S. Supreme Court rules on the CFPB’s funding structure (previously covered by InfoBytes here and here).
As previously covered by InfoBytes, the plaintiff banks filed their motion for a preliminary injunction seeking an order to enjoin the CFPB from enforcing the Small Business Lending Rule against them for the same reasons that a Texas district court enjoined enforcement of the rule (Texas decision covered by InfoBytes here). The CFPB argued, among other things, that the plaintiff banks failed to satisfy the factors necessary for preliminary relief, that the plaintiff banks are factually wrong in asserting that the Rule would require lenders to compile “‘scores of additional data points’ about their small business loans,” and the “outlier ruling of the 5th Circuit” in the Texas case does not demonstrate that the plaintiff banks are entitled to the relief they seek.
In the order granting the preliminary injunction, Judge Caldwell discussed the factors for determining whether injunctive relief is appropriate. Notably, Judge Caldwell determined that the irreparable harm factor weighs in favor of the plaintiffs, stating “[p]laintiffs are already incurring expenses in preparation for enforcement of the Rule and will not be able to recover upon a Supreme Court ruling that the CFPB’s funding structure is unconstitutional.” Additionally, Judge Caldwell indicated that the likelihood of success factor “does not tip the scale in either direction,” and the substantial harm to others if the preliminary injunction is granted, and the public interest factors “carry little weight” because “[b]efore the Rule becomes enforceable, a decision on the merits will be issued by the highest court in the land.”
Judge Caldwell found that the imposition of the preliminary injunction “will create no harm to the CFPB nor the public since the rule would not otherwise be enforceable in the interim” and granted the preliminary injunction “in the interest of preserving the status quo until the Supreme Court has made its decision.”
Tech giant to pay $62M in smartphone location tracking suit
On September 14, 2023, in the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California, San Jose Division, plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary approval of a proposed Class Action Settlement Agreement and Release pursuant to which a tech giant will pay $62 million to resolve claims that it illegally tracked and stored such users’ private location information even after users opted out. According to the filing, the proposed settlement “would be used to pay for the costs of Notice and Settlement administration, any Court-awarded attorneys’ fees and expenses and Class Representative Service Awards” with the balance being “distributed to one or more Court-approved cy pres recipients” each of which must be “independent 501(c)(3) organizations with a track record of addressing privacy concerns on the Internet.”
The company also agreed to injunctive relief for a period of at least three years, requiring it to, among other things: (i) “maintain a policy whereby (a) Location Information stored through Location History (“LH”) and Web & App Activity (“WAA”) is automatically deleted by default after a period of at least 18 months when users opt into these settings for the first time, and (b) users can set their own auto-delete periods;” (ii) provide users with instructions on how to disable each data collection setting, delete the data collected, and set retention limits; and (iii) confirm that the company “does not now share users’ precise Location Information collected in LH or WAA with third parties (except for valid legal reasons).” The settlement class includes as many as 247 million smartphone users whose location information the company stored “while “Location History” was disabled” from January 1, 2014, through the notice date.
In a statement on September 15, a spokesperson for the company said “[c]onsistent with improvements we've made in recent years, we have settled this matter, which was based on outdated product policies that we changed years ago."