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2nd Circuit affirms dismissal in FCRA suit
On January 4, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment for a credit reporting agency (defendant) in a suit alleging FCRA violations. According to the opinion, four years after the plaintiff took out a student loan, he filed for bankruptcy protection. The bankruptcy court issued a final decree of discharge, which released the plaintiff from all “dischargeable debts,” but did not specifically indicate that the loan was discharged. The student loan servicer indicated that the student loan was not discharged, and the plaintiff executed a loan modification agreement with the loan holder and made payments for several years. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant consumer reporting agency, alleging that it violated the FCRA and New York law for including the loan on his credit report. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant after determining that the consumer’s loan had not been discharged. The plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, the 2nd Circuit noted that the plaintiff’s claim “hinges on the resolution of an unsettled legal question”: whether the loan was in fact discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding. Making such a determination would have required the defendant to resolve a legal question related to the debt, which the appellate court concluded was not required under the FCRA. As a result, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint because the alleged inaccuracy is not considered to not be an actionable “inaccuracy” under the FCRA.
National bank to pay $2 million in mortgage fee violation class action
On December 19, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California granted final approval of a settlement in a $2 million class action resolving allegations that a national bank violated California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (RFDCPA) and Unfair Competition Law (UCL). According to the order for preliminary approval, the plaintiff class alleged that the bank improperly charged and collected transaction fees when processing mortgage payments. The district court certified the class, which included “all persons who have or had a California address, and at any time between June 1, 2016 and the date of the Court’s order preliminarily approving the settlement, paid at least one transaction fee to [the defendant] for making a payment on a residential mortgage loan serviced by [the defendant] by telephone, IVR, or the internet.” The district court determined that the settlement agreement was “reasonable and adequate.” The two class representatives who filed the suit were awarded $1,500 each, and their attorneys were awarded $499,000 in fees.
District Court grants summary judgment to bank in discriminatory lending suit
On December 19, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of a national bank with respect to discriminatory lending allegations brought by the County of Cook in Illinois (County). As previously covered by InfoBytes, the County alleged that the bank’s lending practices were discriminatory and led to an increase in foreclosures among Black and Latino borrowers, causing the County to incur financial injury, including foreclosure-related and judicial proceeding costs and municipal expenses due to an increase in vacant properties. In 2021, the court denied the bank’s motion to dismiss the alleged Fair Housing Act violations after determining that all the County had to do was show a reasonable argument that the bank’s lending practices resulted in foreclosures, and that the bank failed to dispute that the County properly alleged a financial injury sufficient to support standing.
The court explained in its December 19 order, however, that two of the County’s expert witnesses did not make valid comparisons when measuring the denial rate for minority borrowers compared to white borrowers. According to the court, the expert witnesses failed to properly account for the financial conditions of the borrowers seeking mortgage modifications, leaving the County with “no other evidentiary basis to establish that [the bank] engaged in intentionally discriminatory servicing practices that caused minority borrowers to disproportionately suffer default and foreclosure.” The court found that, accordingly, the County cannot demonstrate “intentional discrimination against minority borrowers that proximately caused the County’s injuries, and its disparate treatment claim accordingly cannot survive summary judgment.” Additionally, the court found that the County failed to cite authority for its arguments that the bank can be liable for loans it purchased “and for which it did not commit any discriminatory acts in servicing” or for loans it originated but sold and never serviced.
District Court approves $2.8 million settlement in FDCPA convenience fee class action
On December 22, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted preliminary approval of a $2.8 million settlement in an FDCPA class-action suit resolving allegations that convenience fees were charged when consumers made payments on their mortgages over the phone or online. According to the suit, the plaintiffs claimed the defendant did not charge processing fees if borrowers made payments by check or signed up for automatic monthly debits from their bank accounts. The plaintiffs further argued that the processing fees were “illegal and improper because neither the mortgages themselves nor applicable statutes authorize such fees.” The parties agreed to mediation in April 2022, and a motion for preliminary approval of a settlement was filed in August. A coalition of state attorneys general from 32 states and the District of Columbia, led by the New York AG filed an amicus brief in the district court opposing the original proposed $13 million settlement in the suit (covered previously by InfoBytes here). The AGs outlined concerns with the proposed settlement, including that (i) the relief provided to class members violates various state laws, and that the defendant seeks to ratify fees in an “unwritten, mass amendment” that violates state laws and regulations; (ii) class members only receive an “inadequate” one-time payment, while the defendant may continue to charge excessive fees for the life of the loan; and (iii) low- and moderate-income borrowers are not treated equitably under the proposed settlement. Under the terms of the new settlement, members of the class who do not opt out of the settlement will receive a share of the $2.8 million. The settlement also reduces the fees class members will have to pay when making payments online or via the telephone for the next two years. The defendant also agreed to add additional disclosures to its website to increase borrower awareness of alternative payment methods that could have lower fees or no fees. Defendant’s representatives will also receive additional training to ensure they provide additional information and disclosures about convenience fees when speaking with customers.
On June 16, the court granted final approval of the settlement.
CFPB, FTC say furnishers’ investigative duties extend to legal disputes
On December 16, the CFPB and FTC filed an amicus brief in a case on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concerning two related FCRA cases in support of plaintiffs-appellants and reversal of their suits involving a defendant hotel chain’s summary judgments. Both cases involve the same defendant company. In one case, the plaintiff entered into a timeshare agreement with the defendant for a property and made monthly payments for approximately three years. When the plaintiff stopped making payments, the plaintiff mailed the defendant letters that disputed the validity of, and purported to rescind, the agreement, while permitting the defendant to retain all prior payments as liquidated damages. The plaintiff obtained a copy of his credit report from a credit reporting agency (CRA), which stated that he had an open account with the defendant with a past-due balance. In three letters to the CRA, the plaintiff disputed the credit reporting. The letters stated that the plaintiff had terminated his agreement with the defendant and that he did not owe a balance. After the CRA communicated each dispute to the defendant, the defendant certified that the information for the defendant’s account was accurate. The plaintiff sued alleging the defendant violated the FCRA when it verified the accuracy of his credit report without conducting reasonable investigations following receipt of his indirect disputes. The defendant moved for summary judgment, alleging, among other things, that the plaintiff’s claim that he was not contractually obligated to make the payments to the defendant that are reported on his credit report as being due “is inherently a legal dispute and is not actionable under the FCRA.” The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, which the plaintiff appealed.
In the other case, the plaintiff entered into a timeshare agreement with the defendant. She made a down payment and the first three installment payments, but did not make any additional payments. The plaintiff sent letters to the defendant disputing the validity of, and attempted to cancel, the agreement. The defendant reported the plaintiff’s delinquency to the CRA. In three letters to the CRA, the plaintiff disputed the credit reporting. After the CRA communicated the disputes to the defendant, the defendant determined there was no inaccuracy in the reporting. The plaintiff sued alleging the defendant violated the FCRA when it verified the accuracy of her credit report without conducting reasonable investigations following receipt of her indirect disputes about credit reporting inaccuracies. The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, which the plaintiff appealed.
The CFPB and FTC argued in favor of the plaintiffs-appellants. According to the agencies, furnishers’ duty under the FCRA to reasonably investigate applies not only to factual disputes, but also to disputes that can be labeled as legal in nature. The agencies made three arguments to support their contention. First, a reasonable investigation is required under the FCRA to comport with its goal to “protect consumers from the transmission of inaccurate information about them.” The agencies argued that reasonableness is case specific, but it can “be evaluated by how thoroughly the furnisher investigated the dispute (e.g., how well its conclusion is supported by the information it considered or reasonably could have considered).”
Second, the agencies argued that Congress did not intend to exclude disputes that involve legal questions. The FCRA describes the types of indirect disputes that furnishers need to investigate, which are “those that dispute ‘the completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in a consumer’s file.’” The agencies said nothing suggests that Congress intended to exclude information that is inaccurate on account of legal issues. Furthermore, the agencies noted that a lot of “inaccuracies in consumer reports could be characterized as legal, which would create an exception that would swallow the rule.” Consumer reports generally include information regarding an individual’s debt obligations, which are generally creatures of contract. Therefore, “many inaccurate representations pertaining to an individual’s debt obligations arguably could be characterized as legal inaccuracies, given that determining the truth or falsity of the representation could require the reading of a contract.”
Lastly, the agencies argued that an “atextual exception for legal inaccuracies would create a loophole that could swallow the reasonable investigation rule.” The agencies urged that “[g]iven the difficulty in distinguishing ‘legal’ from ‘factual’ disputes,” the court “should hold that there is no exemption in the FCRA’s reasonable investigation requirement for legal questions” because it would “curtail the reach of the FCRA’s investigation requirement in a way that runs counter to the purpose of the provision to require meaningful investigation to ensure accuracy on credit reports.”
Bank to pay $2 million in collection call suit
On December 14, a Superior Court of California granted a stipulated final judgment resolving claims that a national bank (defendant) violated the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (RDCPA) and the FDCPA by making “harassing and annoying” debt collection calls to its customers. According to the stipulated final judgment, since at least March 2015, the defendant allegedly violated California and federal law by making phone calls with “unreasonably excessive frequency,” while also persisting in calling wrong numbers in attempts to collect on unpaid debts. The defendant, which did not admit any liability or wrongdoing, agreed to, among other things: (i) adopt or maintain policies and procedures to avoid such harassing calls; (ii) limit the number of calls it will make as part of its future debt collection efforts; and (iii) cease calling those who ask orally or in writing that they not be contacted. Under the terms of the stipulated final judgment, the defendant must pay $1.45 million in civil penalties, $300,000 in investigative costs, and $250,000 in restitution.
District Court vacates DOE order on student loan servicer’s $22 million repayment
On December 16, the U.S. District Court for Eastern District of Virginia vacated and remanded the Department of Education’s (DOE) decision that a student loan servicer (plaintiff) had improperly collected $22 million in student loan-related subsidies from 2002 to 2005. According to the opinion, the plaintiff alleged that the DOE acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act when it determined that the plaintiff erroneously claimed over $22 million in student loan-related subsidies. The plaintiff contended that in claiming those subsidies, it reasonably relied on two 1993 “Dear Colleague Letters” (DCL) from the DOE authorizing it to collect subsidies for student loans funded in whole or in part by tax-exempt obligations. According to the plaintiff, the DOE issued a new DCL in 2007 which disavowed the guidance in the DOE’s two 1993 DCLs, but nonetheless stated that the DOE would not collect past erroneous subsidies if the plaintiff prospectively followed the DOE’s revised interpretation set forth in the 2007 DCL. Nevertheless, the DOE initiated administrative proceedings seeking over $22 million in past subsidies collected by the plaintiff pursuant to the 1993 DCLs. The DOE’s acting secretary ruled in January 2021 that the plaintiff erred when it claimed those subsidies and must pay it back.
The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the DOE’s decision in 2021 failed to consider its reliance on the previous policy statements in the 1993 and 2007 letters. However, the DOE argued it was “unreasonable” for the plaintiff to rely on the DCLs, saying that the loan company should have known that the 1993 letters contradicted the Higher Education Act. Siding with the plaintiff, the court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, which found that when an agency alters existing policy, it must assess “whether there were reliance interests, determine whether they were significant, and weigh any such interests against competing policy concerns.” The court further held that it is DOE's job to “weigh the strength of those reliance interests,” and it failed to do so.
District Court preliminarily approves lending discrimination settlement
On December 15, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California preliminarily approved a $480,000 class action settlement concerning whether an online lender allegedly denied consumers’ applications based on their immigration status. Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against the defendants, alleging the lender denied their loan applications based on one of the plaintiff’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status and the other plaintiff’s status as a conditional permanent resident (CPR). Plaintiffs claimed that these practices constituted unlawful discrimination and “alienage discrimination” in violation of federal law and California state law. Plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants violated the FCRA by accessing their credit reports without a permissible purpose. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) Under the terms of the preliminarily approved settlement, the defendants would be required to pay $155,000 into a settlement fund, as well as up to $300,000 in attorneys’ fees and $25,000 in administrative costs. The defendants have also agreed to change their lending policies to ensure DACA and CPR applicants are evaluated for loan eligibility based on the same terms as U.S. citizens.
The district court noted, however, that the proposed settlement includes a “clear sailing arrangement,” which provides that the defendants will not oppose plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs provided the requested amount does not exceed $300,000. Referring to an opinion issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in which the appellate court warned that clear sailing arrangements are “important warning signs of collusion” because they show an increased “likelihood that class counsel will have bargained away something of value to the class,” the district court explained that it intends to “carefully scrutinize the circumstances and determine what attorneys’ fee awards is appropriate in this case.”
District Court says debtor bears the burden of asserting a garnishment exemption
On December 15, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted a defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in a debt collection garnishment suit. One of the plaintiffs was referred to collections after he defaulted on his credit card debt, and a judgment was entered against him by the original creditor. The defendant filed for a writ of execution, seeking to garnish funds that were in a joint bank account maintained by both plaintiffs. The writ outlined major exemptions under Pennsylvania and federal law, noting that the plaintiff may also be able to rely on other exemptions, and instructed him to complete a claim for exemption. Plaintiffs sued for violations of the FDCPA, claiming, among other things, that the defendant should have known that the account was a joint account, and therefore exempt, before seeking the writ of execution. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant should have known or reasonably known “that the funds in the joint account were immune from execution because it ‘performed its own private asset search to discover’ the account.” The court disagreed, holding, that under Pennsylvania’s garnishment procedures, the debtor bears the burden of asserting an exemption. This assertion, the court said, must be more than a “self-serving statement that an exemption applies.”
The court cited a ruling issued by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, in which the court determined that “[t]he bottom line here is that, right or wrong, a judgment creditor has no duty under either California or federal law to investigate, much less confirm, that a judgment debtor’s bank accounts contain only non-exempt funds prior to authorizing a levy on those accounts. It is unreasonable to conclude that a judgment creditor’s failure to conduct a pre-levy debtor’s exam, when there is no legal obligation or requirement to do so, constitutes unfair or unconscionable action.”
States have their say on CFPB funding
Recently, a coalition of state attorneys general from 22 states, including the District of Columbia, filed an amicus brief supporting the CFPB’s petition for a writ of certiorari, which asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that the Bureau’s funding structure violates the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution. A separate coalition of 16 state attorneys general filed an amicus brief opposing the Bureau’s position and supporting the 5th Circuit’s decision, however these states also urged the Supreme Court to grant the Bureau’s petition to address whether the 5th Circuit’s conclusion was correct.
As previously covered by a Buckley Special Alert, the 5th Circuit’s October 19 holding found that although the Bureau spends money pursuant to a validly enacted statute, the structure violates the Appropriations Clause because (i) the Bureau obtains its funds from the Federal Reserve (not the Treasury); (ii) the agency maintains funds in a separate account; (iii) the Appropriations Committees do not have authority to review the agency’s expenditures; and (iv) the Bureau exercises broad authority over the economy. The case involves a challenge to the Bureau’s Payday Lending Rule, which prohibits lenders from attempting to withdraw payments for covered loans from consumers’ accounts after two consecutive withdrawal attempts have failed due to insufficient funds. As a result of the 5th Circuit’s decision, lenders’ obligation to comply with the rule (originally set for August 19, 2019, but repeatedly delayed) will be further delayed while the constitutional issue winds its way through the courts. The Bureau’s petition also asked the court to consider the 5th Circuit’s decision to vacate the Payday Lending Rule on the premise that it was promulgated at a time when the Bureau was receiving unconstitutional funding. (Covered by InfoBytes here.)
- Amicus brief supporting CFPB’s position. The 22 states urged the Supreme Court to review the 5th Circuit’s decision, arguing that the Bureau’s funding is lawful and that even if the Supreme Court were to find a constitutional defect in the funding scheme, vacating otherwise lawfully-promulgated regulations is neither justified nor compelled by law. “Left undisturbed, the court of appeals’ reasoning could jeopardize many of the CFPB’s actions from across its decade-long existence, to the detriment of both consumers protected by those actions and financial-services providers that rely on them to guide their conduct,” the states said. In their brief, the states argued, among other things, that the Supreme Court should grant the petition “to review at least the question of whether the court of appeals erred in vacating a regulation promulgated during a time when the CFPB received allegedly unconstitutional funding.” The states asserted that the decision “threatens substantial harm” to the states because the states and their residents “could stand to lose the benefits of the CFPB’s critical enforcement, regulatory, and informational functions if the decision [] stands and is interpreted to impair the CFPB’s ongoing operations.” With respect to questions related to the Bureau’s funding structure, the states claimed that it is altogether speculative as to whether the Bureau would have behaved differently if its funding had come from the Treasury rather than the Federal Reserve. Former Director Kraninger’s ratification and reissuance of the Payday Lending Rule “is strong evidence that the CFPB would have issued the same regulation once again, after any constitutional defect was corrected,” the states said.
- Amicus brief opposing CFPB’s position. The 16 opposing states argued, however, that the Supreme Court should grant the Bureau’s petition to provide states with “certainty over their role” in regulating the financial system, and should affirm the 5th Circuit’s decision to “restore the CFPB’s accountability to the states.” In their brief, the states asked the Supreme Court “to resolve this issue quickly” and to “reinvigorate the protections of the Appropriations Clause, not weaken them.” The states maintained that if the Supreme Court does not quickly resolve the dispute, states “will have to litigate the same issue in other districts and circuits over and over,” and “[a]ny continuing confusion could seriously impede the growth of the consumer-financial services market at a time when the economy is already strained.” According to the brief, congressional oversight “ensures a level of state participation that ordinary administrative processes don’t allow.” In summary, the states’ position is that the 5th Circuit’s decision on the funding question is correct and that the court “was right to vacate a rule enacted without constitutional funding.”