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California appellate court overturns ruling for collector that stapled note to summons
On August 23, the California Sixth Appellate District overturned summary judgment in favor of a collector (defendant) that was sued for FDCPA and the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act violations. According to the court, the plaintiff incurred an unpaid medical debt, which was referred to the defendant for collection. The defendant sent the plaintiff eight letters; however, the plaintiff was allegedly not aware that the hospital assigned the debt to a debt collector and did not pay the debt. The defendant filed a collection suit against the plaintiff, seeking to recover the unpaid medical debt. The defendant stapled a typewritten note to the summons, which read, “If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact: []” in English and Spanish. The plaintiff filed a complaint, accusing the defendant of violating the FDCPA and the Rosenthal Act, alleging that “it was unlawful for [the defendant] to send the attachment with the summons and the complaint because the attachment appeared to be a message from the court and did not contain language disclosing that it was sent by a debt collector.” The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the communication was lawful, and denied the plaintiff’s cross-request for summary judgment.
On the appeal, the defendant argued that "the attachment is not a ‘communication’ within the meaning of either statute, on the theory that the attachment itself says nothing about the debt." However, the appellate court wrote that the note was not sent “in a vacuum: The attachment, summons, and complaint comprised a collection of documents delivered by a process server—personally to [the plaintiff’s] girlfriend and then by mail to [the plaintiff].” The appellate court further noted that the reference to “this matter” in the note “unmistakably signified the litigation initiated by the accompanying complaint pleading [the plaintiff’s] indebtedness and the amount and source of indebtedness in a common count cause of action.” With regard to whether the note was a communication in connection with the collection of a debt, the appellate court noted that it “fail[ed] to conceive of any subject other than debt collection [the defendant] might think the communication was in connection with. The message in the attachment refers to the existence of a debt, conveys information regarding the debt, and serves the purpose of debt collection by enticing the recipient to contact the debt collector.” The appellate court concluded that “[b]y omitting the mandatory disclosure that this attachment was from [the defendant], a debt collector, [the defendant] made it reasonably likely that the least sophisticated consumer would believe the suggestion to call [the defendant] was from the court that issued the summons to which the suggestion was affixed. [The defendant’s] communication was therefore deceptive.”
District Court rules email can be a signed, written instrument for purposes of amending a partnership agreement
On August 15, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, ruling in part that an email could constitute a “written instrument” for purposes of amending a partnership agreement. The plaintiff is one of 33 limited partners in a funding entity formed to pool investments into a fund for litigation-related financing ventures. The plaintiff sued the defendants (the partnership’s general partner and asset manager) asserting four causes of action tied to their alleged failure to dissolve the partnership by a deadline established in the partnership agreement. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed by the parties, in which the court reviewed plaintiff’s claims as to whether there was a valid amendment extending the term of the partnership, whether the limited partners received notice of this proposed amendment, and whether the limited partners approved the amendment or failed to raise objections within 25 days.
While the defendants argued that an August 2019 email constitutes a valid amendment of the partnership term, the plaintiff countered that the email “is not a written instrument, is not signed, and does not specify the duration of the extension.” The court first reviewed the text of the partnership agreement, which stated that it “may be amended ‘only by a written instrument signed by the General Partner.’” While the agreement does not define what constitutes a “written instrument,” the court wrote, it “provides that ‘[a]ll notices, requests and other communications to any party hereunder shall be in writing (including electronic means or similar writing).’” As such, the court concluded that an email could constitute a “written instrument” for the purposes of amending the agreement.
With respect to whether the email was “signed,” the court discussed the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN Act), which provides that “a signature . . . may not be denied legal effect . . . solely because it is in electronic form,” and pointed to several court decisions that similarly determined that the “law demands only demonstration of a person’s intent to authenticate a document as her own in order for the document to be signed [and that] [m]any symbols may demonstrate this intent.” In the present action, the court determined that “the e-mail speaks in the plural using ‘we’ and refers to the senders in third person as ‘your General Partners.’” Moreover, the court held that the plaintiff’s “unsubstantiated assertion” that the email is unsigned “is insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact with respect to [managing members’] intent to sign the e-mail.” The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that that the email is not a valid amendment because it did not specify the duration of the extension, pointing to language in the email stating that the fund will be extended until 2021. The court further disagreed with the plaintiff’s assertion that the amendment was not approved, noting that unrebutted statements provided by one of the managing members demonstrated that none of the limited partners aside from the plaintiff objected to the proposed extension.
D.C. reaches $2.54 million settlement with online delivery company
On August 17, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia issued a consent order and judgment against an online delivery company resolving claims that it charged consumers millions of dollars in deceptive service fees. According to a press release issued by the D.C. AG, from 2016 until 2018, the company allegedly misled consumers into believing that service fees charged on their orders were tips that went to delivery workers. Instead, these fees went to the company to subsidize operating expenses. Without admitting any wrongdoing, the company agreed to pay $1.8 million to the district to go towards restitution and cover litigation costs. The company also agreed it will not seek refunds of $739,057 in previously disputed sales tax payments and will collect and remit sales tax on the total amount of the sales price it charges consumers going forward. Additionally, the company will cease making any misrepresentations about the nature of fees on consumer orders.
District Court rules use of “obligation” in collection letter carries “litigious connotations”
On August 11, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey denied a defendant debt collector’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling that using the word “obligation” in a letter suggested that a time-barred debt was legally enforceable. The plaintiff received a letter in 2022 seeking to recover unpaid debt that had been in default since August 2017 (the statute of limitations for collecting the debt had expired in August 2021). The letter included language stating: “We recognize that a possible hardship or pitfall may have prevented you from satisfying your obligation. We are presenting three options to resolve your balance. We are not obligated to renew this offer.” The letter also stated that it was an attempt to collect a debt and that “any information obtained will be used for that purpose.” The plaintiff sued for violations of Sections 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(5), and 1692e(10) of the FDCPA, claiming the defendant’s letter offered payment options for time-barred debt. The defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that that the claims fail because the letter did not include language that could lead the plaintiff to believe that the time-barred debt could be legally enforced.
The court reviewed whether the phrase “satisfying your obligation” would confuse the least sophisticated debtor, and eventually determined that the word “obligation” carried “litigious connotations” and therefore was “closer to ‘settlement’ and other impermissible language than it is to permissible language such as ‘satisfy.’” According to the court, “[i]t is more than plausible, and even likely, that the least sophisticated debtor would understand that their ‘obligation’ is a duty to pay that a creditor could enforce in court through the commencement of litigation.” The court also explained that Congress intended “obligation” as used in the FDCPA to mean “a legal duty arising from mutual promises to pay on the one hand and to perform services or provide goods on the other,” including “one susceptible to being ‘reduced to judgement.’” As such, the court concluded that when viewing the letter in its entirety, it appeared to be “carefully crafted to push the envelope of acceptable language under the FDCPA while maximizing the chance of collecting from debtors.”
Maryland Court of Appeals says law firm collecting HOA debt is not engaged in the business of making loans
On August 11, a split Maryland Court of Appeals held that “a law firm that engages in debt collection activities on behalf of a client, including the preparation of a promissory note containing a confessed judgment clause and the filing of a confessed judgment complaint to collect a consumer debt, is not subject to the Maryland Consumer Loan Law [(MCLL)].” A putative class action challenging the law firm’s debt collection practices was filed in Maryland state court in 2018. According to the opinion, several homeowners associations and condominium regimes (collectively, “HOAs”) retained the law firm to help them draft and negotiate promissory notes memorializing repayment terms of delinquent assessments. These promissory notes, the opinion said, included confessed judgment clauses that were later used against homeowners who defaulted on their obligations. The suit was removed to federal court and was later stayed while the Maryland Court of Appeals weighed in on whether the law firm was subject to the MCLL. Loans made under the MCLL by an unlicensed entity render the loans void and unenforceable, the opinion said.
Class members claimed that the law firm is in the business of making loans and that the promissory notes are subject to the MCLL and “constitute ‘loans’ because they are an extension of credit enabling the homeowners to pay delinquent debt to the HOAs.” Because neither the law firm nor the HOAs are licensed to make loans the promissory notes are void and unenforceable, class members argued. The law firm countered that it (and the HOAs) are not obligated to be licensed because they are not lenders that “engage in the business of making loans” as provided in the MCLL.
On appeal, the majority concluded that there is no evidence that the state legislature intended to require HOAs to be licensed “in order to exercise their statutory right to collect delinquent assessments or charges, including entering into payment plans for the repayment of past-due assessments.” Moreover, in order to qualify for a license, an applicant “must demonstrate, among other things, that its ‘business will promote the convenience and advantage of the community in which the place of business will be located[]’”—criteria that does not apply to an HOA or a law firm, the opinion stated. Additionally, applying class members’ interpretation would lead to “illogical and unreasonable results that are inconsistent with common sense,” the opinion read, adding that “[t]o hold that the MCLL covers all transactions involving any small loan or extension of credit—without regard to whether the lender is ‘in the business of making loans’—would cast a broad net over businesses that are not currently licensed under the MCLL.”
The dissenting judge countered that the law firm should be subject to the MCC because to determine otherwise would allow law firms to engage in the business of making loans in the form of new extensions of credit with confessed judgment clauses and would “create a gap in the Maryland Consumer Loan Law that the General Assembly did not intend.”
District Court approves $84 million payment processing settlement
On August 17, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska granted final approval of an $84 million class action settlement resolving allegations that a payment processing company’s billing practices overcharged merchants. Class members retained the company to process credit card payments and claimed that the company allegedly charged fees that did not align with the terms of their contracts. Class members accused the company of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act violations, breach of contract, and fraudulent concealment related to allegations that the company assessed noncompliance fees, increased contractual credit card discount rates, and shifted credit card transactions from lower-cost rate tiers to higher-cost rate tiers. Under the terms of the settlement, the company will pay up to $84 million into a settlement fund, which will provide cash benefits to class members and cover administrative costs, attorney fees, and other expenses.
3rd Circuit overturns decision in WESCA suit
On August 16, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit overturned a district court’s decision in a Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (WESCA) suit against a retailer and third-party marketing company (collectively, “defendants”). According to the opinion, the plaintiff searched the retailer’s website while the “browser simultaneously communicated” with both the retailer and a third-party marketing service. The messages to the third party marketing service alerted it to how the plaintiff was interacting with the website, including which pages she visited, when she filled in an email address, and when she added an item to her cart. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendants for using a software that used a code that placed “cookies on the user’s browser so that her activity on the webpage had an associated visitor ID,” and “told the user’s browser to begin sending information to [the third party marketing service] as she navigated through the website, such as communicating that the user had clicked the ‘add to cart’ button or tabbed out of a form field,” in violation of WESCA. The district court dismissed the common law claim and subsequently granted summary judgment to the defendants on the WESCA claim, finding that the defendants were exempt from liability as direct parties to the electronic communications.
The 3rd Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that the district court “never addressed whether [the retailer] posted a privacy policy and, if so, whether that policy sufficiently alerted [the plaintiff] that her communications were being sent to a third-party company.” The appellate court further disagreed “with the District Court’s holding that [the third party marketing company] is exempt from liability because it was a direct party to [the plaintiff’s] communications and that interception only occurred at the site of [the third party marketing company] servers in Virginia.”
8th Circuit affirms rulings for defendant in FCRA suits
On August 16, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a complaint in an FCRA case. According to the opinion, the plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. The bankruptcy court entered a discharge, and when the plaintiff obtained the credit reports, among other things, one debt was still being reported as “Current; Paid or Paying as Agreed” with an outstanding balance. The plaintiff filed suit, alleging the defendants violated the FCRA because they “do not maintain reasonable procedures to ensure debts that are derogatory prior to a consumer’s bankruptcy filing do not continue to report balances owing or past due amounts when those debts are almost certainly discharged in bankruptcy.” The plaintiff claimed to suffer emotional distress and obtained credit at less favorable rates. The defendants jointly moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege the reporting. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice.
According to the 8th Circuit, the plaintiff’s complaint was “too thin to raise a plausible entitlement to relief.” The appellate court noted that, “[i]t is not the credit reporting agencies’ job to “wade into individual bankruptcy dockets to discern whether a debt survived discharge.” The appellate court ultimately agreed with the district court that “’there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”
The same day, in a separate suit, the 8th Circuit affirmed another district court’s dismissal of a complaint in an FCRA case. According to the opinion, the plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection, and after the debts were discharged, the plaintiff’s credit report still listed a debt with an outstanding balance that was noted as “open” and “past due.” The plaintiff filed suit, alleging the defendants violated the FCRA “by neglecting to ‘maintain reasonable procedures to ensure debts that are derogatory prior to a consumer’s bankruptcy filing do not continue to report balances owing or past due amounts when those debts are almost certainly discharged in bankruptcy.’” The plaintiff sought damages resulting from emotional distress and financial harm, but the district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, agreeing that plaintiff failed to show proof of actual damages.
On the appeal, the 8th Circuit noted that it was the bankruptcy, not the information in plaintiff’s credit report, that led to her applications for credit cards being denied. Regarding her allegation about emotional distress, the appeals court reasoned that plaintiff “‘suffered no physical injury, she was not medically treated for any psychological or emotional injury, and no other witness corroborated any outward manifestation of emotional distress.’” Accordingly, the court concluded that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
District Court grants summary judgment concerning TILA, ECOA, FHA claims
On August 12, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana issued an order denying plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and granting defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment in an action concerning alleged violations of TILA, ECOA, and FHA disparate impact claims. According to the court’s determination, the defendant corporate entity was not a “creditor” during the leasing portion of the underlying rent-to-buy (RTB) agreements, and the plaintiffs lacked standing on certain claims because the wrong parties were targeted.
The defendant realty group purchases, sells, and manages real estate. The plaintiffs all entered into RTB agreements with the realty group that allowed the renter to make 24 payments and then execute a sales contract for the property. The agreements carried interest rate terms between 9.87 and 18 percent. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants, among other things, did not provide TILA-required disclosures for high-cost mortgages, did not require written certifications that tenants had obtained counseling prior to entering into the transaction, and did not provide property appraisals to tenants.
The plaintiffs sued alleging several claims under TILA for failure to provide required information. However, the court concluded that during the 24-month rental period, the realty group was not a “creditor” but was instead a “landlord.” Moreover, the court determined that “the only entities that could arguably be considered creditors are the Individual Land Trusts as the sellers and parties to the Conditional Sales Contract.” These trusts were not named as defendants, the court observed, adding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the burden of showing that the land trusts were sufficiently related to the named defendants to allow the court to “pierce the corporate veil” and hold the named defendants liable for actions conducted by the non-party individual land trusts.
With respect to the plaintiffs’ ECOA claims, which claimed that the realty group’s policies and practices were intentionally discriminatory and had a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, and/or national origin, the court applied the same rationale as it did to the TILA claims and again ruled that the realty group was not a “creditor.” In terms of plaintiffs’ FHA claims, the court said that “the racial disparity must have been created by the defendant.” In this action, the court determined that the realty group did not create the condition, reasoning that “the fact that lower-priced homes are more likely to exist in minority neighborhoods is not of Defendants’ making and existed before, and without, the RTB Program.”
However, the court’s order does allow certain individual and class claims related to disparate treatment under the FHA to proceed, as well as certain claims regarding Indiana law related to standard contract terms and the condition of homes in the RTB program.
District Court dismisses EFTA claims over prepaid debit card fraud
On August 11, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed a putative class action alleging violations of the EFTA and state privacy and consumer protection laws brought against a national bank on behalf of consumers who were issued prepaid debit cards providing pandemic unemployment benefits. The named plaintiff—a self-employed individual who did not qualify for state unemployment insurance but who was eligible to receive temporary Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) benefits—alleged that he lost nearly $15,000 when an unauthorized user fraudulently used a prepaid debit card containing PUA funds that were intended for him. The court dismissed the class claims with respect to the EFTA and Regulation E, finding that the Covid-19 pandemic was a “qualified disaster” under applicable law and regulations (i.e. PUA payments were “qualified disaster relief payments”), and that as such, the payments satisfied the CFPB’s official interpretation of Regulation E and were excluded from the definition of a “prepaid account.” The court further explained that while relevant CFPB regulations define an “account” to include a prepaid account, Regulation E excludes “any ‘account that is directly or indirectly established through a third party and loaded only with qualified disaster relief payments.’” Because the prepaid debit card in question was established through a third party and was loaded only with PUA funds, it did not meet the definition of a “prepaid account” and therefore fell outside the EFTA’s definition of a covered account. The court also disagreed with the plaintiff’s contention that PUA payments were authorized by Congress in the CARES Act due to the public health emergency rather than a disaster.