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Washington releases FAQs for My Health My Data Act
On June 20, the Washington attorney general published a series of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) related to the My Health My Data Act—a comprehensive health privacy law that provides broad restrictions on the use of consumer health data (covered by InfoBytes here). The FAQs include information on the law’s effective dates and applicability. According to the AG, “all persons, as defined in the Act, must comply with section 10 beginning July 23, 2023. Regulated entities that are not small businesses must comply with sections 4 through 9 beginning March 31, 2024. Small businesses, as defined in the Act, must comply with sections 4 through 9 beginning June 30, 2024. For sections 4 through 9, the effective dates apply to the entirety of the section and are not limited to the subsections in which the effective dates appear.” Additionally, the FAQs clarify that a business that is covered by the Act must provide a link to its consumer health data privacy policy on its homepage.
The FAQs also address a potential conflict between Sections 6 and 9 of the Act regarding the right to delete and consumers’ authorizations to sell data, respectively. Section 9 mandates that any person, not just regulated entities, must obtain consumer authorization before selling or offering to sell their data. Both the seller and purchaser are required to retain a copy of the authorization, which may contain consumer health data for six years. However, Section 6 stipulates that consumer health data should be deleted from a regulated entity’s network upon the consumer’s request. The FAQs advise that in cases where a consumer requests deletion under Section 6, any authorizations stored under Section 9 must be redacted to eliminate any information related to the data that was sold.
California probes employers’ CCPA compliance
On July 14, the California attorney general announced it recently sent inquiries to several large employers as part of an investigation into companies’ compliance with their legal obligations under the California Consumer Protection Act (CCPA). The investigation centers on how companies handle the personal information of employees and job applicants. As previously covered by InfoBytes, temporary exemptions related to human resource and business-to-business data provided by the CCPA and the California Privacy Rights Act expired on January 1 of this year. Amendments were introduced last legislative session that would have extended the exemption for “personal information that is collected and used by a business solely within the context of having an emergency contact on file, administering specified benefits, or a person’s role . . . [in] that business.” The amendments also proposed extending certain exemptions related to “personal information reflecting a communication or a transaction between a business and a company, partnership, sole proprietorship, nonprofit, or government agency that occurs solely within the context of the business conducting due diligence or providing or receiving a product or service.” However, the amendments were not adopted, and the exemptions expired.
The AG said they are sending the inquiry letters “to learn how employers are complying with their legal obligations.” Covered businesses subject to the CCPA are required to comply with the statute’s privacy protections as they relate to employee data, including providing notice of privacy practices and honoring consumer requests to exercise their rights to access, delete, and opt out of the sale and sharing of their personal information.
11th Circuit orders reexamination of breach class boundaries
On July 11, a split U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit partially vacated the greenlighting of two data breach class actions, holding that a district court must re-analyze the boundaries of the classes. Both the nationwide and California classes are individuals who sued a restaurant chain after their card data and personally identifiable information were compromised in a cyberattack. Plaintiffs claimed that information for roughly 4.5 million cards could be accessed on an online marketplace for stolen payment information. Two of the three named plaintiffs also said they experienced unauthorized charges on their accounts. Plaintiffs moved to certify two classes seeking both injunctive and monetary relief—a nationwide (or alternatively a statewide) class for negligence and a California class for claims based on the state’s unfair business practices laws. The district court certified a nationwide class and a separate California-only class. The restaurant chain’s parent company appealed, arguing that the certification violates court precedent on Article III standing for class actions, that the classes do not meet the commonality requirements for certification, and that the district court erred by finding that a common damages methodology existed for the class.
On appeal, the majority found that at the class certification stage, plaintiffs only had to show that a reliable damages methodology existed. The majority also determined that the district court correctly found that plaintiffs’ expert presented a sufficient methodology for calculating damages and that “it would be a ‘matter for the jury’ to decide actual damages at trial.” However, the majority remanded the case with instructions for the district court to clarify what it meant when it certified classes of individuals who had their “data accessed by cybercriminals.” According to the opinion, the district court meant for this term to encompass individuals who experienced fraudulent charges or whose credit card information was posted on the dark web. The majority expressed concerns that the phrase “accessed by cybercriminals” is broader than the two delineated categories provided by the district court and could include individuals who had their data taken but were otherwise uninjured. The majority also vacated the California class certification after determining that two of the three named plaintiffs lacked standing because they dined at the restaurant outside of the “at-risk” timeframe. The district court’s damages calculation methodology, however, was left undisturbed by the appellate court.
Partially dissenting, one of the judges wrote that while she agreed that one of the named plaintiffs had standing to sue, she disagreed with the majority’s concrete injury analysis. The judge also argued that the district court erred in its damage calculations by “impermissibly permit[ting] plaintiffs to receive an award based on damages that they did not suffer.”
Missouri will regulate lender-placed insurance
On July 7, the Missouri governor signed SB 101 (the “Act”) into law, amending several provisions relating to property and casualty insurance, including requirements for lender-placed insurance. The Act defines “lender-placed insurance” as insurance secured by the lender/servicer when the mortgagor does not have valid or sufficient insurance on a mortgaged real property, and will include “insurance purchased unilaterally by the lender or servicer, who is the named insured, subsequent to the date of the credit transaction, providing coverage against loss, expense, or damage to collateralized property as a result of fire, theft, collision, or other risks of loss” that impairs such lender/servicer’s interest or adversely impacts the collateral, where such purchase is a result of a mortgagor’s failure to obtain required insurance under a mortgage agreement. Among other things, the Act stipulates that lender-placed insurance is not effective until the date a mortgaged real property is not insured, and that individual lender-placed insurance terminates on the earliest date out of listed periods. Also specified is that mortgagors cannot be charged for the policies outside of the scheduled term of the lender-placed insurance. The Act further states that the calculation of the lender-placed insurance premium “should be based upon the replacement cost value of the property,” and outlines how the premium should be determined. All insurers shall have separate rates for lender-placed insurance and voluntary insurance obtained by a mortgage servicer on real estate owned property, as defined in the Act.
Further regarding lender-placed insurance, the Act prohibits: (i) “insurers and insurance producers from issuing lender-placed insurance if they or one of their affiliates owns, performs servicing for, or owns the servicing right to, the mortgaged property;” (ii) “insurers and insurance producers from compensating lenders, insurers, investors, or servicers for lender-placed insurance policies issued by the insurer, and from sharing premiums or risk with the lender, investor, or servicer;” (iii) “payments dependent on profitability or loss ratios from being made in connection with lender-placed insurance;” (iv) [insurers from] provid[ing] free or below-cost services or outsourc[ing] its own functions at an above-cost basis”; and (v) [insurers from] mak[ing] any payments for the purpose of securing lender-placed insurance business or related services.
The Act requires lender-placed insurance policy forms and certificates to be mailed and filed with the Missouri Department of Commerce and Insurance and stipulates the requirements for insurers who must report information to the department as well. Lastly, the Act specifies potential penalties for violations of the Act, including monetary penalties and suspension or revocation of an insurer’s license. The Act becomes effective on August 28.
CFPB, Maine say loan purpose determines whether TILA applies
On July 12, the CFPB and the State of Maine filed an amicus brief in the Maine Supreme Judicial Court arguing that determining whether a loan is covered by TILA requires an assessment of the borrower’s primary purpose in entering into the transaction. The action involves a couple who obtained a loan from the bank to purchase land for the construction of a home. Due to the 2008 financial crisis, the value of the property depreciated, resulting in insufficient proceeds from the sale of the home to fully pay off the loan. To cover the shortfall, the couple acquired a new loan from the bank and used a cabin they owned as collateral. When the loan’s term ended, the couple defaulted after being unable to make the required balloon payment. The bank sued, seeking to take possession of the cabin. At trial, the couple attempted to present evidence that the bank had not provided them with certain necessary disclosures mandated by TILA and did not assess their ability to repay the loan. The couple maintained “that the bank’s liability under TILA fully offset the amount they owed to the bank under the loan.” The court determined, however, that since the loan documents indicated a commercial purpose, TILA did not apply.
The couple attempted to introduce extrinsic evidence to show that even though the loan was labeled “commercial,” it was actually used for personal, family, or household purposes and therefore was a covered consumer loan. The court relied on a case (Bordetsky v. JAK Realty Trust) holding that, for purposes of determining the applicability of Maine’s notice of default statute for residential real estate foreclosures, “courts should not look to extrinsic evidence to determine whether the loan had a commercial or consumer purpose if the loan document states on its face that the loan has a commercial purpose.”
The brief explained that TILA generally applies to consumer loans (i.e., loans that are primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose) but not to loans made for a commercial purpose, and that the Maine Consumer Credit Code fully incorporates TILA. The brief argued that the borrower’s primary purpose for obtaining the loan should determine whether TILA and the Maine Consumer Credit Code apply, and presented three arguments as to why the trial court erred in concluding that TILA is not applicable on the sole basis that the loan is labeled as a “commercial loan.” First, statutory text provides that a loan is generally covered by TILA if a borrower obtained the loan primarily for a family, personal or household purpose. TILA “requires a substantive and fact-intensive inquiry into the reasons why the borrower entered into the transaction,” the brief explained. Second, judicial precedent has established that “determining whether a loan has a covered purpose requires looking beyond the four corners of the contract.” The trial court erred in relying on Bordetsky because it pertains to a different Maine statute and does not address the judicial precedent or administrative guidance that govern TILA coverage, the brief said. Finally, permitting creditors to evade TILA by labeling a loan as “commercial” is at odds with TILA’s remedial purpose, the brief maintained.
“Why the consumer borrowed the money—not the label that the company sticks on the loan—determines whether the loan is covered by the law,” Seth Frotman, general counsel and senior advisor to the CFPB director, said in a blog post.
CFPB, states sue company over deceptive student lending and collection
On July 13, the CFPB joined state attorneys general from Washington, Oregon, Delaware, Minnesota, Illinois, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia in taking action against an education firm accused of engaging in deceptive marketing and unfair debt collection practices. California’s Department of Financial Protection and Innovation is participating in the action as well. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, the Delaware-based defendant operated a private, for-profit vocational training program for software sales representatives. The joint complaint, filed as an adversary proceeding in the firm’s bankruptcy case, alleges that the defendant charged consumers up to $30,000 for its programs. The complaint further alleges that the defendant encouraged consumers who could not pay upfront to enter into income share agreements, which required minimum payments equal to between 12.5 and 16 percent of their gross income for 4 to 8 years or until they had paid a total of $30,000, whichever came first.
The complaint asserts that the defendant engaged in deceptive practices by misrepresenting its income share agreement as not a loan and not debt, and mislead borrowers into believing that no payments would need to be made until they received a job offer from a technology company with a minimum annual income of $60,000. The defendant is also accused of failing to disclose important financing terms, such as the amount financed, finance charges, and annual percentage rates, as required by TILA and Regulation Z. The complaint also claims that the defendant hired two debt collection companies to pursue collection activities on defaulted income share loans. One of the defendant debt collectors is accused of engaging in unfair practices by filing debt collection lawsuits in remote jurisdictions where consumers neither resided nor were physically present when the financing agreements were executed. The complaint further alleges the two defendant debt collectors violated the FDCPA and the CFPA by deceptively inducing consumers into settlement agreements and falsely claiming they owed more than they did.
According to the Bureau and the states, after the Delaware Department of Justice and Delaware courts began scrutinizing the debt collection lawsuits, the defendant unilaterally changed the terms of its contracts with consumers to force them into arbitration even though none of them had agreed to arbitrate their claims. Additionally, the complaint contends that settlement agreements marketed as being “beneficial” to consumers actually released consumers’ claims against the defendant and converted income share loans into revised “settlement agreements” that obligated them to make recurring monthly payments for several years and contained burdensome dispute resolution and collection terms.
The complaint seeks permanent injunctive relief, monetary relief, consumer redress, and civil money penalties. The CFPB and states are also seeking to void the income share loans.
States urge Supreme Court to find CFPB funding unconstitutional
On July 10, the West Virginia attorney general, along with 26 other states, filed an amicus brief in support of respondents in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Association of America, arguing that the CFPB’s funding structure violates the Constitution and that by operating outside the ordinary appropriations process states are often left “out in the cold.” In their brief, the states urged the U.S. Supreme Court to uphold the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in which it found that the Bureau’s “perpetual self-directed, double-insulated funding structure” violated the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause (covered by InfoBytes here and a firm article here). The 5th Circuit’s decision also vacated the agency’s Payday Lending Rule on the premise that it was promulgated at a time when the Bureau was receiving unconstitutional funding.
Arguing that the Bureau is operating beyond the boundaries established by the Constitution, the states maintained that the current funding mechanism limits Congress’s ability to oversee the agency. “Even if the CFPB has done some good—and some would even dispute that premise—it wouldn't matter,” the states said, warning that “sidelining Congress can greenlight an agency to wreak havoc,” especially if the “agency wields broad regulatory and enforcement powers over the entire U.S. financial system, acts under the control of a single powerful figure, and lacks other protections from meaningful oversight.”
The appropriations process plays a crucial role in enabling states to influence agency actions indirectly, the states maintained, explaining that when an agency initiates a new enforcement initiative or significant rulemaking endeavor, it is required to publicly outline its projected work in order to secure the necessary funding to carry it out. “Disclosure on the front end of the appropriations process can empower affected parties—including the [s]tates—to take quick, responsive actions beyond lobbying their representatives (up to suing to stop illegal action, if need be).” In contrast, the Bureau’s insulation from this process has allowed it to hide its actions from public view, the states wrote. As an example, the Bureau has repeatedly declined to interpret or provide further clarity on how the provisions governing unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices work.
The brief also highlighted examples of when Congress used funding cuts through the appropriations process to curtail agencies’ powers. Additionally, unlike the challenges of amending authorizing statutes, appropriations bills must be passed by Congress each year to avoid a government shutdown, which can be “a painful pill to swallow for the sake of standing up for an agency’s policy choice,” the states noted, adding that “[b]ecause appropriations involves both oversight committees and appropriations committees, agencies may have ‘less flexibility to ally themselves with executive branch officials or interest groups.’”
The states also urged the Court to “ignore doomsaying” about the consequences of finding the funding structure unconstitutional. Should the Court agree to invalidate the funding structure, Congress can pass a proper appropriations bill for the Bureau, the states explained, adding that “a rebuke from this Court would no doubt grease the sticky wheels of the legislative process and move them a bit faster.” Moreover, states could also fill any gaps should Congress somehow pare back the CFPB’s funding, the brief stressed.
Several amicus briefs were also filed this week in support of CFSA, including an amici curiae brief filed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and several banking associations and an amici curiae brief filed by 132 members of Congress, including 99 representatives and 33 senators, which urged the Court to uphold the 5th Circuit’s decision.
Hawaii amends money transmitter provisions
On July 3, the Hawaii governor signed HB 1027 (the “Act”) into law, amending several provisions relating to the Money Transmitters Modernization Act. The Act adds and amends several definitions. Changes include defining “money,” “receiving money or monetary value for transmission,” and “tangible net worth.” The definition of “money transmission” has also been amended to clarify its connection to business done in Hawaii, and “stored value” has been amended to mean monetary value “that represents a claim against the issuer evidenced by an electronic or digital record and that is intended and accepted for use as a means of redemption for money or monetary value, or payment for goods or services.” Stored value does not include “a payment instrument or closed loop stored value, or stored value not sold to the public but issued and distributed as part of a loyalty, rewards, or promotional program.”
Among the various exemptions, the Act also provides for an exemption for an agent of the payee to collect and process a payment from a payor to the payee for goods or services, other than money transmission services, provided certain criteria is met. Additional exemptions include certain persons acting as intermediaries, persons expressly appointed as third-party service providers to an exempt entity, and registered futures commission merchants and securities broker-dealers, among others. Anyone claiming to be exempt from licensing may be required to provide information and documentation demonstrating their qualification for the claimed exemption.
The amendments outline numerous licensing application and renewal procedures, including largely adopting the net worth, surety bond, and permissible investment requirements set forth in the Money Transmission Modernization Act. Several other states have also recently enacted provisions relating to the licensing and regulation of money transmitters (see InfoBytes coverage here and here).
The Act took effect July 1.
States endorse CFPB’s policy statement on abusive conduct
On July 6, the California attorney announced that he had joined a coalition of state attorneys general in submitting a comment letter endorsing the CFPB’s recently issued policy statement on abusive conduct in consumer financial markets. The multi-state coalition comprises Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. In April, the Bureau issued a policy statement containing an “analytical framework” for identifying abusive conduct prohibited under the Consumer Financial Protection Act, in which it broadly defined abusive conduct as anything that obscures, withholds, de-emphasizes, renders confusing, or hides information about the key features of a product or service. (Covered by InfoBytes here.)
In their letter, the state attorneys general emphasized the importance of preventing abusive conduct in consumer financial markets and highlighted the partnership between states and the Bureau in achieving this goal. The states also commended the Bureau for providing a clear, analytical framework for what constitutes abusive acts or practices and expressed appreciation for the agency’s use of real enforcement actions as examples of illegal abusive conduct. The multi-state coalition applauded the flexibility and guidance provided by the policy statement and complimented the Bureau for acknowledging the realities of modern consumer markets by clarifying that both acts and omissions can hinder consumers’ understanding of terms and conditions, including the use of fine print or complex language that limits comprehension.
District Court orders individual to pay $148 million in student debt-relief scam
On July 7, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered a final judgment and order against an individual defendant accused of operating and controlling a deceptive student loan debt relief operation. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in 2019, the CFPB, along with the Minnesota and North Carolina attorneys general and the Los Angeles City Attorney (together, the “states”), announced an action against the student loan debt relief operation for allegedly deceiving thousands of student loan borrowers. The Bureau and the states alleged that since at least 2015, the debt relief operation violated the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA), Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR), FDCPA, and various state laws by charging and collecting over $95 million in illegal advance fees from student loan borrowers. In addition, the Bureau and the states claimed that the debt relief operation engaged in deceptive practices by misrepresenting the purpose and application of the fees they charged and the nature and benefits of their services. Specifically, the debt relief operation allegedly failed to inform borrowers that, among other things, (i) they would request that the loans be placed in forbearance and interest would continue to accrue during the forbearance period, thereby increasing the borrowers’ overall loan balances; and (ii) it was their practice to submit false information about the borrowers to student loan servicers to try to qualify borrowers for lower monthly payments. The individual defendant was accused of owning, controlling, and managing the student loan debt relief operation, materially participating in the operation’s affairs, and providing substantial assistance or support while knowing or consciously avoiding knowledge that the operation was engaging in illegal conduct.
The individual defendant was held liable, jointly and severally, in the amount of approximately $95,057,757, for the purpose of providing redress to affected borrowers. Because the individual defendant was found to have recklessly violated the TSR and the CFPA, the court also imposed second-tier civil monetary penalties of $147,985,000 to the Bureau, of which $5,000 will be paid to each state. The final judgment also imposes various forms of injunctive relief, including permanent bans on engaging in consumer financial products or services and violating the TSR, CFPA, and similar laws in Minnesota, North Carolina, and California. The individual defendant is also prohibited from disclosing, using, or benefiting from customer information obtained in connection with the offering or providing of the debt relief services, and may not “attempt to collect, sell, assign, or otherwise transfer any right to collect payment from any consumer who purchased or agreed to purchase” a debt relief service from any of the defendants.