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  • CFPB files reply brief supporting its constitutional structure

    Courts

    On August 3, the CFPB filed a Reply Brief in support of its request to overturn the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, in which the 5th Circuit found that the CFPB’s funding structure violated the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause (covered by InfoBytes here, here, and here, and in a firm article here).

    In its Reply Brief, the CFPB argues that Congress did not violate the Appropriations Clause by failing to specify a specific dollar amount to fund the CFPB because “the Appropriations Clause contains no dollar-amount requirement.” In support of that argument, the CFPB points to the Founders’ appropriation of funds for the Post Office and the National Mint where they did not decide the specific amounts of annual funding, the funding structure for the OCC and the Federal Reserve Board, and to current federal appropriations for Social Security payments and unemployment assistance.

    The Bureau then argues that even if there was a specific dollar amount requirement, that requirement is nonetheless satisfied because “Congress fixed the CFPB’s maximum annual funding.” According to the Bureau, the fact that it has the discretion to ask for less than the maximum authorized is commonplace and “[t]o this day, Congress routinely appropriates sums ‘not to exceed’ a particular amount;’ that phrase appears more than 400 times in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022.”

    The Bureau then aims to refute plaintiff’s arguments that the Appropriations Clause requires time-limited funding laws and imposes special rules for law enforcement agencies. The Bureau argues that the fact that the Constitution includes a specific restriction limiting Congress from funding the army for more than two years dictates that by negative implication there is no such prohibition of a standing appropriation for a different appropriation.

    Finally, the Bureau argues that its combination of features is not as unique as CFSA contends, and that even if the Supreme Court ultimately finds the funding structure unconstitutional vacating the Payday Lending Rule is an inappropriate remedy because the 5th Circuit failed “to consider whether the defect it perceived could be cured by severing portions of Section 5497.”

    Courts CFPB Constitution Supreme Court Funding Structure Fifth Circuit Appellate Payday Rule

  • 11th Circuit changes course, says one text message sufficient for TCPA standing

    Courts

    On July 24, the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit unanimously held that a plaintiff who receives a single, unwanted text message has standing to sue the sender of the message under the TCPA. The decision departs from precedent set by the same court in 2019, in which it determined in a different case that receiving one unsolicited text message is not enough of a concrete injury to establish standing under the statute. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) Plaintiff filed a putative class action against a web-hosting company alleging the defendant violated the TCPA by using a prohibited autodialer to send promotional calls and text messages selling services and products. The settlement agreement reached between the parties also resolved claims brought against the defendant by parties in two other actions.

    During settlement discussions, the district court cited the aforementioned 2019 11th Circuit decision and asked the parties to brief how their case, which includes individuals who received only one text message, was distinguishable from the 2019 action. The district court ultimately ruled that class members who only received one text message “lacked a viable claim” in the 11th Circuit under the 2019 precedent, but noted that because the case involves a nationwide settlement, “those class members ‘do have a viable claim in their respective Circuit.’” An objector to the settlement appealed the ruling on various grounds to the 11th Circuit, which dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and held that the class definition did not meet Article III standing requirements, as it included individuals who received a single text message. Plaintiff moved for rehearing en banc, asking the 11th Circuit to reevaluate the 2019 precedent and to clarify the elements necessary to pursue a TCPA claim.

    Reviewing de novo the threshold jurisdiction question of whether plaintiffs have standing to sue, the 11th Circuit said that “the harm that underlies a lawsuit for the common-law claim of intrusion upon seclusion” shares a “close relationship” with a “traditional harm.” The appellate court explained that because “[b]oth harms reflect an intrusion into the peace and quiet in a realm that is private and personal[,] [a] plaintiff who receives an unwanted, illegal text message suffers a concrete injury. Because [plaintiff] has endured a concrete injury, we remand this matter to the panel to consider the rest of the appeal.” Recognizing that a single unsolicited text message may not be considered “highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man” it “is nonetheless offensive to some degree to a reasonable person.” The 11th Circuit also referred to seven other circuit courts that “have declined to consider the degree of offensiveness required to state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion at common law,” and have instead chosen to conclude that “receiving either one or two unwanted texts or phone calls resembles the kind of harm associated with intrusion upon seclusion.” Moreover, the 11th Circuit noted that Congress is given authority under the Constitution “to decide what degree of harm is enough so long as that harm is similar in kind to a traditional harm,” which is “exactly what Congress did in the TCPA when it provided a cause of action to redress the harm that unwanted telemarketing texts and phone calls cause.”

    Courts Appellate Eleventh Circuit TCPA Class Action Autodialer

  • 9th Circuit partially reverses FDCPA dismissal

    Courts

    On July 14, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit partially affirmed and partially reversed a district court’s dismissal of an FDCPA suit. The district court reviewed plaintiff’s claims under the FDCPA, which alleged that defendants violated the bankruptcy court’s order discharging his debt and knowingly filed a baseless debt collection lawsuit. The district court determined that the claims should be dismissed because (i) debtors do not have a private right of action for violations of the Bankruptcy Code; and (ii) the claim was time-barred due to the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations. On appeal, the 9th Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims based on a violation of his bankruptcy discharge order but reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s baseless lawsuit claim, holding that it was not barred by the FDCPA’s statute of limitations.

    The 9th Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff “correctly asserts that some litigation acts can constitute independent FDCPA violations and that each such violation triggers its own one-year statute of limitations under the FDCPA.” In making its decision “to determine whether a litigation act constitutes an independent violation of the FDCPA and thus has its own statute of limitations,” the appellate court derived a test, stating: “Under this test, if a debt collector decides to take a certain action during litigation, courts must assess whether that act was the debt collector’s ‘last opportunity to comply’ with the FDCPA.” Because the appellate court determined that service and filing are separate FDCPA violations and plaintiff brought suit within one year of defendants’ state law claim, the 9th Circuit held that plaintiff’s action was timely.

    Courts Appellate Third Circuit Bankruptcy Consumer Finance FDCPA Debt Collection

  • 9th Circuit denies en banc hearing on COPPA preemption question

    Courts

    On July 13, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered an order amending an opinion filed on December 28, 2022 and denied a petition for rehearing en banc in a putative class action accusing a multinational technology company and search engine and its affiliated video-sharing platform of collecting children’s data and tracking their online behavior surreptitiously without parental consent in violation of state law and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). The panel unanimously voted against defendant’s en banc rehearing request, commenting that no other 9th Circuit judge has requested a vote on whether to consider the matter en banc.

    Claiming the defendant used “persistent identifiers” — which the FTC’s regulations define as information “that can be used to recognize a user over time and across different Web sites or online services” — class members alleged state law claims arising under the constitutional, statutory, and common laws of California, Colorado, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Tennessee. Last December, the three-judge panel reversed and remanded the district court’s dismissal of the suit, disagreeing that the allegations were squarely covered, and preempted, by COPPA (covered by InfoBytes here.) On appeal, the 9th Circuit considered whether COPPA preempts state law claims based on underlying conduct that also violates COPPA’s regulations. The panel determined that “COPPA’s preemption clause does not bar state-law causes of action that are parallel to, or proscribe the same conduct forbidden by, COPPA. Express preemption therefore does not apply to the children’s claims.” The panel further noted that the U.S. Supreme Court and others have long held “that a state law damages remedy for conduct already proscribed by federal regulations is not preempted.”

    The panel, however, amended its prior opinion to note that the FTC supports its conclusion that COPPA does not preempt the asserted state law privacy claims on the basis of either express preemption or conflict preemption. At the end of May, at the 9th Circuit’s request, the FTC filed an amicus brief (covered by InfoBytes here) arguing that COPPA does not preempt state laws that are consistent with the federal statute’s treatment of regulated activities. The panel concluded that neither express preemption nor conflict preemption bar the plaintiffs’ claims.

    Courts Privacy, Cyber Risk & Data Security Appellate Ninth Circuit COPPA State Issues Class Action FTC Preemption

  • 11th Circuit orders reexamination of breach class boundaries

    Privacy, Cyber Risk & Data Security

    On July 11, a split U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit partially vacated the greenlighting of two data breach class actions, holding that a district court must re-analyze the boundaries of the classes. Both the nationwide and California classes are individuals who sued a restaurant chain after their card data and personally identifiable information were compromised in a cyberattack. Plaintiffs claimed that information for roughly 4.5 million cards could be accessed on an online marketplace for stolen payment information. Two of the three named plaintiffs also said they experienced unauthorized charges on their accounts. Plaintiffs moved to certify two classes seeking both injunctive and monetary relief—a nationwide (or alternatively a statewide) class for negligence and a California class for claims based on the state’s unfair business practices laws. The district court certified a nationwide class and a separate California-only class. The restaurant chain’s parent company appealed, arguing that the certification violates court precedent on Article III standing for class actions, that the classes do not meet the commonality requirements for certification, and that the district court erred by finding that a common damages methodology existed for the class.

    On appeal, the majority found that at the class certification stage, plaintiffs only had to show that a reliable damages methodology existed. The majority also determined that the district court correctly found that plaintiffs’ expert presented a sufficient methodology for calculating damages and that “it would be a ‘matter for the jury’ to decide actual damages at trial.” However, the majority remanded the case with instructions for the district court to clarify what it meant when it certified classes of individuals who had their “data accessed by cybercriminals.” According to the opinion, the district court meant for this term to encompass individuals who experienced fraudulent charges or whose credit card information was posted on the dark web. The majority expressed concerns that the phrase “accessed by cybercriminals” is broader than the two delineated categories provided by the district court and could include individuals who had their data taken but were otherwise uninjured. The majority also vacated the California class certification after determining that two of the three named plaintiffs lacked standing because they dined at the restaurant outside of the “at-risk” timeframe. The district court’s damages calculation methodology, however, was left undisturbed by the appellate court.  

    Partially dissenting, one of the judges wrote that while she agreed that one of the named plaintiffs had standing to sue, she disagreed with the majority’s concrete injury analysis. The judge also argued that the district court erred in its damage calculations by “impermissibly permit[ting] plaintiffs to receive an award based on damages that they did not suffer.”

    Privacy, Cyber Risk & Data Security Courts State Issues California Appellate Eleventh Circuit Consumer Protection Class Action Data Breach

  • States urge Supreme Court to find CFPB funding unconstitutional

    Courts

    On July 10, the West Virginia attorney general, along with 26 other states, filed an amicus brief in support of respondents in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Association of America, arguing that the CFPB’s funding structure violates the Constitution and that by operating outside the ordinary appropriations process states are often left “out in the cold.” In their brief, the states urged the U.S. Supreme Court to uphold the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in which it found that the Bureau’s “perpetual self-directed, double-insulated funding structure” violated the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause (covered by InfoBytes here and a firm article here). The 5th Circuit’s decision also vacated the agency’s Payday Lending Rule on the premise that it was promulgated at a time when the Bureau was receiving unconstitutional funding.

    Arguing that the Bureau is operating beyond the boundaries established by the Constitution, the states maintained that the current funding mechanism limits Congress’s ability to oversee the agency. “Even if the CFPB has done some good—and some would even dispute that premise—it wouldn't matter,” the states said, warning that “sidelining Congress can greenlight an agency to wreak havoc,” especially if the “agency wields broad regulatory and enforcement powers over the entire U.S. financial system, acts under the control of a single powerful figure, and lacks other protections from meaningful oversight.”

    The appropriations process plays a crucial role in enabling states to influence agency actions indirectly, the states maintained, explaining that when an agency initiates a new enforcement initiative or significant rulemaking endeavor, it is required to publicly outline its projected work in order to secure the necessary funding to carry it out. “Disclosure on the front end of the appropriations process can empower affected parties—including the [s]tates—to take quick, responsive actions beyond lobbying their representatives (up to suing to stop illegal action, if need be).” In contrast, the Bureau’s insulation from this process has allowed it to hide its actions from public view, the states wrote. As an example, the Bureau has repeatedly declined to interpret or provide further clarity on how the provisions governing unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices work.

    The brief also highlighted examples of when Congress used funding cuts through the appropriations process to curtail agencies’ powers. Additionally, unlike the challenges of amending authorizing statutes, appropriations bills must be passed by Congress each year to avoid a government shutdown, which can be “a painful pill to swallow for the sake of standing up for an agency’s policy choice,” the states noted, adding that “[b]ecause appropriations involves both oversight committees and appropriations committees, agencies may have ‘less flexibility to ally themselves with executive branch officials or interest groups.’”

    The states also urged the Court to “ignore doomsaying” about the consequences of finding the funding structure unconstitutional. Should the Court agree to invalidate the funding structure, Congress can pass a proper appropriations bill for the Bureau, the states explained, adding that “a rebuke from this Court would no doubt grease the sticky wheels of the legislative process and move them a bit faster.” Moreover, states could also fill any gaps should Congress somehow pare back the CFPB’s funding, the brief stressed.

    Several amicus briefs were also filed this week in support of CFSA, including an amici curiae brief filed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and several banking associations and an amici curiae brief filed by 132 members of Congress, including 99 representatives and 33 senators, which urged the Court to uphold the 5th Circuit’s decision.

    Courts State Issues CFPB U.S. Supreme Court Funding Structure Constitution State Attorney General Appellate Fifth Circuit

  • 7th Circuit affirms dismissal of FCRA claims against subservicer

    Courts

    On July 5, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of a defendant data furnisher in an FCRA case, holding that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant provided “patently incorrect or materially misleading information” to a credit reporting agency (CRA). Defendant was the subservicer for plaintiff’s mortgage and was responsible for accepting and tracking payments and providing payment data to the CRAs. After plaintiff failed to make her monthly payments, she resolved the delinquency through a short sale of her home. Several years later, plaintiff noticed that the closed mortgage account appeared on her credit reports as delinquent. She disputed the information to several CRAs. To confirm the accuracy of its records on plaintiff’s mortgage, one of the CRAs sent the defendant data furnisher four automated consumer dispute verification (ACDV) forms. In the ACDV responses, the defendant amended or verified several contested data points, including the pay rate and account history. The CRA reported this amended data to indicate on plaintiff’s credit report that she was currently delinquent on the mortgage with missed payments in the months following the short sale. After plaintiff applied for and was denied a new mortgage based on the credit report, plaintiff sued the defendant data furnisher for alleged violations of the FCRA, alleging that the defendant failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of the disputed data and provided false and misleading information to CRAs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that plaintiff failed to make a threshold showing that the defendant’s data was incomplete or inaccurate.

    On appeal, the 7th Circuit disagreed with plaintiff that “completeness or accuracy” under the FCRA “must be judged based, not on the ACDV response the data furnisher provided, but on the credit report generated from it.” The court reasoned that the text of the statute “says nothing about a credit report, let alone a duty of a data furnisher with respect to credit reports produced using its amended data. To the contrary, the statute sets out the data furnisher’s duties to investigate disputes, correct incomplete or inaccurate information, and report results from an investigation” to the CRA. Holding that “context can play a large role in determining completeness or accuracy” in this situation, the appellate court agreed with the district court that the data provided by the defendant to the CRA was “not materially misleading” and that “no reasonable jury could find” that the data meant that plaintiff was currently delinquent on her debt, particularly because of strong “contextual evidence”—specifically, that the disputed data appeared directly beside a status code showing that the account was closed. The appeals court affirmed summary judgment for the data furnisher.

    Courts Appellate Seventh Circuit FCRA Consumer Finance Credit Furnishing Mortgages Credit Reporting Agency Credit Report

  • 1st Circuit confirms standing for data breach victims

    Courts

    On June 30, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit overruled a district court’s dismissal of a putative class action against a home delivery pharmacy service for allegedly failing to prevent a 2021 data breach that exposed the personally identifiable information (PII) of over 75,000 patients. The class action complaint alleged state law claims for negligence, breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, invasion of privacy, and breach of fiduciary duty, and sought damages and injunctive relief. The putative class was comprised of U.S. residents whose PII was compromised in the data breach. The two named plaintiffs were former or current patients whose PII were compromised in the data breach, and one of the two named plaintiffs had her stolen PII used to file a fraudulent tax return. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of Article III standing.

    Affirming in part and reversing in part, the 1st Circuit held that the complaint “plausibly demonstrates” the plaintiffs’ standing to seek damages, applying the principles articulated by the Supreme Court in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, which clarified the type of concrete injury necessary to establish Article III standing (covered by InfoBytes here).

    First, the court concluded that, with respect to the named plaintiff whose PII was used to file a fraudulent tax return, the complaint’s “plausible allegations of actual misuse” of the stolen PII constituted a “concrete injury in fact” for purposes of Article III standing. According to the 1st Circuit, there existed “an “obvious temporal connection” between the timing of the data breach and the filed return, among other facts. The appellate court also found that the fraudulent tax return could make it probable that more of the named plaintiff’s information could be further misused—changing the risk of future misuse from speculative to “imminent and substantial.”

    Second, with respect to the named plaintiff for whom there was no allegation of actual misuse of PII, the court reasoned that “the complaint plausibly alleges a concrete injury in fact based on the material risk of future misuse of [plaintiff’s] PII and a concrete harm caused by exposure to this risk.” The appellate court also found that, because the data here was compromised in a “targeted attack,” then “it stands to reason that [such data] is more likely to be misused…and the risk of future misuse is heightened when the compromised data is particularly sensitive.”

    Third, the court concluded that the complaint plausibly alleged a “separate concrete, present harm” caused by exposure to the risk of future harm, “based on the allegations of the plaintiffs’ lost time spent taking protective measures [against further identity theft] that would otherwise have been put to some productive use.” “The loss of this time is equivalent to a monetary injury, which is indisputably a concrete injury,” the appellate court wrote, adding that it joins other circuits in holding that time spent responding to a data breach is sufficient to establish standing.

    Finally, the court held that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief “because their desired injunctions would not likely redress their alleged injuries” as any such relief would only safeguard against future breaches and would not protect “plaintiffs from future misuse of their PII by the individuals they allege now possess it.”

    Courts Privacy, Cyber Risk & Data Security Appellate First Circuit Data Breach Class Action Consumer Protection

  • CFSA says CFPB funding violates Constitution

    Courts

    On July 3, the Community Financial Services Association of America (CFSA) and the Consumer Service Alliance of Texas filed their brief with the U.S. Supreme Court, urging the high court that the CFPB’s independent funding structure is “unprecedented and must be stopped before it spreads without limit.” Respondents asked the Court to affirm the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, where the appellate court found that the Bureau’s “perpetual self-directed, double-insulated funding structure” violated the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause (covered by InfoBytes here and a firm article here). The 5th Circuit’s decision also vacated the agency’s Payday Lending Rule on the premise that it was promulgated at a time when the Bureau was receiving unconstitutional funding.

    The Bureau expanded on why it believes the 5th Circuit erred in its holding in its opening brief filed with the Court in May (covered by InfoBytes here), and explained that even if there were some constitutional flaw in the statute creating the agency’s funding mechanism, the 5th Circuit should have looked for some cure to allow the remainder of the funding mechanism to stand independently instead of presuming the funding mechanism created under Section 5497(a)-(c) was entirely invalid. Vacatur of the agency’s past actions was not an appropriate remedy and is inconsistent with historical practice, the Bureau stressed.

    In their brief, the respondents challenged the Bureau’s arguments, writing that the “unconstitutionality of the CFPB’s funding scheme is confirmed by both its unprecedented nature and lack of any limiting principle. Whether viewed with an eye toward the past or the future, the threat to separated powers and individual liberty is easy to see.” Disagreeing with the Bureau’s position that the Constitution gives Congress wide discretion to exempt agencies from annual appropriations and that independent funding is not uncommon for a financial regulator, the respondents stated that Congress gave up its appropriations power to the Bureau “without any temporal limit.” The respondents further took the position that the Bureau “can continue to set its own funding ‘forever’” unless both chambers agree and can persuade or override the president. Moreover, because the Federal Reserve Board is required to transfer “the amount determined by the Director to be reasonably necessary to carry out the [CFPB’s] authorities, . . . it ‘foreclose[s] the application of any meaningful judicial standard of review.’”

    The respondents also argued that the Bureau’s funding structure is clearly distinguishable from other assessment-funded agencies in that these financial regulators are held to “some level of political accountability” since “they must consider the risk of losing funding if entities exit their regulatory sphere due to imprudent regulation.” Additionally, the respondents claimed that the fundamental flaws in the funding statute cannot be severed, reasoning, among other things, that courts “cannot ‘re-write Congress’s work’” and are not able to replace the Bureau’s self-funding discretion with either a specific sum or assessments from regulated parties.

    With respect to the vacatur of the Payday Lending Rule and the potential for unintended consequences, the respondents urged the Court to affirm the 5th Circuit’s rejection of the rule, claiming it was unlawfully promulgated since a valid appropriation was a necessary condition to its rulemaking. “Lacking any viable legal argument, the Bureau resorts to fear-mongering about ‘significant disruption’ if all ‘the CFPB’s past actions’ are vacated,” the respondents wrote, claiming the Bureau “grossly exaggerates the effects and implications of setting aside this Rule.” According to the respondents, the Bureau does not claim that any harm would result from setting aside the rule, especially since no one has “reasonably relied” on the rule as it has been stayed and never went into effect. As to other rules issued by the agency, the respondents countered that Congress could “legislatively ratify” some or all of the agency’s existing rules and that only “‘timely’ claims can lead to relief” in past adjudications. Additionally, the respondents noted that many of the Bureau’s rules were issued outside the six-year limitations period prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). This includes a substantial portion of its rules related to mortgage-related disclosure. Even for challenges filed within the time limit, courts can apply equitable defenses such as “laches” to deny retrospective relief and prevent disruption or inequity, the respondents said.

    Courts CFPB U.S. Supreme Court Appellate Fifth Circuit Funding Structure Constitution Payday Lending Payday Rule

  • Supreme Court blocks student debt relief program

    Courts

    On June 30, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 6-3 decision in Biden v. Nebraska, striking down the Department of Education’s (DOE) student loan debt relief program (announced in August and covered by InfoBytes here) that would have provided between $10,000 and $20,000 in debt cancellation to certain qualifying federal student loan borrowers making under $125,000 a year.

    The Biden administration appealed an injunction entered by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that temporarily prohibited the Secretary of Education from discharging any federal loans under the agency’s program. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) Arguing that the universal injunction was overbroad, the administration contended that the six states lack standing because the debt relief plan “does not require respondents to do anything, forbid them from doing anything, or harm them in any other way.” Moreover, the secretary was acting within the bounds of the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (HEROES Act) when he put together the debt relief plan, the administration claimed.

    In considering whether the secretary has authority under the HEROES Act “to depart from the existing provisions of the Education Act and establish a student loan forgiveness program that will cancel about $430 billion in debt principal and affect nearly all borrowers,” the Court majority (opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined) held that at least one state, Missouri, had Article III standing to challenge the program because it would cost the Missouri Higher Education Loan Authority (MOHELA), a nonprofit government corporation created by the state to participate in the student loan market, roughly $44 million a year in fees. “The harm to MOHELA in the performance of its public function is necessarily a direct injury to Missouri itself,” the Court wrote.

    The Court also ruled in favor of the respondents on the merits, noting that the text of the HEROES Act does not authorize the secretary’s loan forgiveness plan. While the statute allows the Secretary to “waive or modify” existing statutory or regulatory provisions applicable to student financial assistance programs under the Education Act in connection with a war or other military operation or national emergency, it does not permit the Secretary to rewrite that statute, the Court explained, adding that the “modifications” challenged in this case create a “novel and fundamentally different loan forgiveness program.” As such, the Court concluded that “the HEROES Act provides no authorization for the [s]ecretary’s plan when examined using the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation—let alone ‘clear congressional authorization’ for such a program.”

    In dissent, three of the justices argued that the majority’s overreach applies to standing as well as to the merits. The states have no personal stake in the loan forgiveness program, the justices argued, calling them “classic ideological plaintiffs.” While the HEROES Act bounds the secretary’s authority, “within that bounded area, Congress gave discretion to the [s]ecretary” by providing that he “could ‘waive or modify any statutory or regulatory provision’ applying to federal student-loan programs, including provisions relating to loan repayment and forgiveness. And in so doing, he could replace the old provisions with new ‘terms and conditions,”’ the justices wrote, adding that the secretary could provide whatever relief needed that he deemed most appropriate.

    The Court also handed down a decision in Department of Education v. Brown, ruling that the Court lacks jurisdiction to address the merits of the case as the respondents lacked Article III standing because they failed to establish that any injury they may have suffered from not having their loans forgiven is fairly traceable to the program. Respondents in this case are individuals whose loans are ineligible for debt forgiveness under the plan. The respondents challenged whether the student debt relief program violated the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures as they were not given the opportunity to provide feedback. (Covered by InfoBytes here.)

    President Biden expressed his disappointment following the rulings, but announced new actions are forthcoming to provide debt relief to student borrowers. (See DOE fact sheet here.) The first is a rulemaking initiative “aimed at opening an alternative path to debt relief for as many working and middle-class borrowers as possible, using the Secretary’s authority under the Higher Education Act.” The administration also announced an income-driven repayment plan—the Saving on a Valuable Education (SAVE) plan—which will, among other things, cut borrowers’ monthly payments in half (from 10 to 5 percent of discretionary income) and forgive loan balances after 10 years of payments rather than 20 years for borrowers with original loan balances of $12,000 or less.

    Courts Federal Issues State Issues U.S. Supreme Court Biden Consumer Finance Student Lending Debt Relief Department of Education HEROES Act Administrative Procedure Act Appellate Eighth Circuit

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