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  • CFPB, New York AG ask court to lift stay after 2nd Circuit decision

    Courts

    On March 31, plaintiffs CFPB and the New York Attorney General moved the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to lift its stay order in their litigation against a remittance provider in response to a recent U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decision upholding the CFPB’s funding structure under the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) The plaintiffs argued that the 2nd Circuit’s binding opinion has now “answer[ed] the question at the heart of this Court’s stay order: whether the Bureau’s statutory funding mechanism violates the Constitution.”

    As previously covered by InfoBytes, the district court had originally paused the proceedings at the defendant’s request when the Supreme Court was considering whether to hear an appeal in a different matter relating to the Bureau’s funding structure. The district court continued the stay after the Supreme Court agreed to review the 5th Circuit’s decision in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, where it found that the CFPB’s “perpetual self-directed, double-insulated funding structure” violated the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause. The Supreme Court is scheduled to review the 5th Circuit’s decision next term (covered by InfoBytes here).

    The agencies argued primarily that (i) the 2nd Circuit “expressly considered and rejected the Fifth Circuit’s contrary view in CFSA;” (ii) it “did so notwithstanding that the Supreme Court will consider the same issue next Term”; and (iii) “[g]rants of certiorari do not change the law, and a district court remains bound by circuit precedent until the Supreme Court or the court of appeals changes that precedent.”

    On April 7, the court issued an order denying the Bureau's request and electing to keep the stay in place while the Supreme Court resolves the circuit split on this issue.

     

    Courts State Issues CFPB State Attorney General New York Enforcement Remittance Appellate Second Circuit Funding Structure Constitution U.S. Supreme Court Fifth Circuit

  • 2nd Circuit: CFPB funding is constitutional

    Courts

    On March 23, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the CFPB’s funding structure is constitutional—splitting from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which concluded that Congress violated the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause when it created what that Court described as a “perpetual self-directed, double-insulated funding structure.” The U.S. Supreme Court is scheduled to review the 5th Circuit’s decision next term (covered by InfoBytes here).

    Meanwhile, the 2nd Circuit concluded that it “cannot find any support” for the 5th Circuit’s determination in Supreme Court precedent, the text of the Constitution text, or in the history of the Appropriations Clause. “Because the CFPB’s funding structure was authorized by Congress and bound by specific statutory provisions, we find that the CFPB’s funding structure does not offend the Appropriations Clause,” the 2nd Circuit wrote. As such, the appellate court affirmed a 2020 district court order requiring the defendant debt collection law office to comply with a civil investigative demand issued by the Bureau in June 2017. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the CID requested information from the defendant as part of a Bureau investigation into whether debt collectors, furnishers, or other persons associated with the collection of debt and furnishing of information have engaged or are engaging in unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in violation of the CFPA, FDCPA, and FCRA. The defendant objected on several grounds, including that the CID was void ab initio under Seila Law LLC v. CFPB (the defendant contended that “the CFPB Director was shielded from presidential oversight by an unconstitutional removal provision at the time the CID was issued”), and that the Bureau is unconstitutionally funded. As noted in the opinion, the Bureau ratified the CID and the enforcement action against the defendant following the Supreme Court’s decision in Seila Law, and the district court ultimately granted the Bureau’s petition to enforce the CID.

    On review, the 2nd Circuit affirmed the district court’s order, concluding that the CID was not void ab initio because “there is no dispute that the CFPB Director who issued the CID was properly appointed.” The appellate court pointed to the majority opinion in the Supreme Court’s decision in Collins v. Yellen (covered by InfoBytes here), which held that “‘an unconstitutional removal restriction does not invalidate agency action so long as the agency head was properly appointed[,]’” and therefore the Bureau’s actions are not void and do not need to be ratified, unless a plaintiff can show that “the agency action would not have been taken but for the President’s inability to remove the agency head.” The panel further noted that “[s]ince the CID was issued, there have been three different CFPB Directors appointed by two different presidents, each of whom has been subject to at-will removal at some point in their tenure. There is nothing to suggest that the Director’s removal protection affected the issuance of the CID or the investigation into [the defendant].” The 2nd Circuit further concluded that “the CFPB’s funding structure is not constitutionally infirm under either the Appropriations Clause or the nondelegation doctrine, and that the CID served on [the defendant] is not an unduly burdensome administrative subpoena.”

    Courts CFPB Appellate Second Circuit Fifth Circuit CID Constitution Crowdfunding U.S. Supreme Court

  • 9th Circuit: Law firm did not violate FCRA by accessing credit report

    Courts

    On March 17, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a defendant law firm that allegedly accessed a plaintiff’s credit report to obtain her current address after it was hired to collect unpaid homeowner association (HOA) assessments. The plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit claiming, among other things, that the defendant violated the FCRA by accessing her credit report without her consent and that neither the HOA nor the defendant are creditors within the meaning of the FCRA. The district court disagreed, concluding that the HOA was in fact a creditor for purposes of the FCRA. “Under the [a]greement, the HOA determines the assessment amount for a full year and then makes it payable in installments over the course of the year. Thus, it regularly extends credit,” the district court wrote, explaining that because the HOA is a creditor, its attorneys, in collecting on the account, have the right to review a consumer’s credit report without consent. Moreover, the district court determined that the defendant had established the requisite “direct link” between the credit transaction and its request for the plaintiff’s credit report.

    The 9th Circuit concluded that the “[d]efendant’s reading of the statute was not objectively unreasonable” because the plaintiff “had a grace period during which she could receive half a month’s services that she had not yet paid for,” which “could be considered an extension of credit.” While concurring with the panel, one of the judges commented, however, that “[i]t is hard to imagine that Congress intended FCRA, a statute that protects consumer privacy, to empower HOAs composed of neighboring homeowners to run their neighbors’ credit reports if homeowners fall two weeks behind in their payments.” The judge recommended that the appellate court “revisit the issue,” noting that it is unclear under current case law whether an HOA assessment qualifies as a “credit transaction” under the FCRA.

    Courts Appellate Ninth Circuit FCRA Consumer Finance Credit Report Class Action

  • Online lender asks Supreme Court to review ALJ ruling

    Courts

    A Delaware-based online payday lender and its founder and CEO (collectively, “petitioners”) recently submitted a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s affirmation of a CFPB administrative ruling related to alleged violations of the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA), TILA, and EFTA. The petitioners asked the Court to first review whether the high court’s ruling in Lucia v. SEC, which “instructed that an agency must hold a ‘new hearing’ before a new and properly appointed official in order to cure an Appointments Clause violation” (covered by InfoBytes here), meant that a CFPB administrative law judge (ALJ) could “conduct a cold review of the paper record of the first, tainted hearing, without any additional discovery or new testimony.” Or, the petitioners asked, did the Court intend for the agency to actually conduct a new hearing. The petitioners also asked the Court to consider whether an agency funding structure that circumvents the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause violates the separation of powers so as to invalidate prior agency actions promulgated at a time when the Bureau was receiving such funding.

    The case involves a challenge to a 2015 administrative action that alleged the petitioners engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices when making short-term loans (covered by InfoBytes here). The Bureau’s order required the petitioners to pay $38.4 million as both legal and equitable restitution, along with $8.1 million in penalties for the company and $5.4 million in penalties for the CEO. As previously covered by InfoBytes, between 2018 and 2021, the Court issued four decisions, including Lucia, which “bore on the Bureau’s enforcement activity in this case” by “deciding fundamental issues related to the Bureau’s constitutional authority to act” and appoint ALJs. During this time, two different ALJs decided the present case years apart, with their recommendations separately appealed to the Bureau’s director. The director upheld the decision by the second ALJ and ordered the lender and its owner to pay the restitution. A district court issued a final order upholding the award, which the petitioners appealed, arguing, among other things, that the enforcement action violated their due-process rights by denying the CEO additional discovery concerning the statute of limitations. The petitioners claimed that they were entitled to a “new hearing” under Lucia, and that the second administrative hearing did not rise to the level of due process prescribed in that case. 

    However, the 10th Circuit affirmed the district court’s $38.4 million restitution award, rejecting the petitioners’ various challenges and affirming the director’s order. The 10th Circuit determined that there was “no support for a bright-line rule against de novo review of a previous administrative hearing,” nor did it see a reason for a more extensive hearing. Moreover, the petitioners “had a full opportunity to present their case in the first proceeding,” the 10th Circuit wrote.

    The petitioners maintained that “[d]espite the Court’s clear instruction to hold a ‘new hearing,’ ALJs and courts have reached divergent conclusions as to what Lucia requires, expressing confusion and frustration regarding the lack of guidance.” What it means to hold a “new hearing” runs “the gamut,” the petitioners wrote, pointing out that while some ALJs perform a full redo of the proceedings, others merely accept a prior decision based on a cold review of the paper record. The petitioners argued that they should have been provided a true de novo hearing with an opportunity for new testimony, evidence, discovery, and legal arguments. The rehearing from the new ALJ was little more than a perfunctory “paper review,” the petitioners wrote.

    Petitioners asked the Court to grant the petition for three reasons: (i) “the scope of Lucia’s ‘new hearing’ remedy is an important and apparently unsettled question of federal law”; (ii) “the notion Lucia does not require a genuinely ‘new’ de novo proceeding is necessarily wrong because a sham ‘remedy’ provides parties no incentive to litigate Appointments Clause challenges”; and (iii) the case “is an ideal vehicle to provide guidance on Lucia’s ‘new hearing’ remedy.” The petitioners further argued that “Lucia’s remedy should provide parties an incentive to raise separation of powers arguments by providing them actual and meaningful relief.”

    The petitioners’ second question involves whether Appropriations Clause violations that render an agency’s funding structure unconstitutional, if upheld, invalidate agency actions taken under such a structure. The petitioners called this “an important, unsettled question of federal law meriting the Court’s review,” citing splits between the Circuits over the constitutionality of the Bureau’s funding structure which has resulted in uncertainty for both regulators and regulated parties. Recently, the Court granted the Bureau’s request to review the 5th Circuit’s decision in CFSAA v. CFPB, which held that Congress violated the Appropriations Clause when it created what the 5th Circuit described as a “perpetual self-directed, double-insulated funding structure” for the agency (covered by InfoBytes here).

    Courts CFPB U.S. Supreme Court Online Lending Payday Lending Appellate Tenth Circuit Fifth Circuit TILA EFTA CFPA UDAAP Enforcement Constitution Funding Structure ALJ

  • 6th Circuit: Each alleged FDCPA violation carries its own statute of limitations

    Courts

    On March 1, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a debt collection action, holding that every alleged violation of the FDCPA has its own statute of limitations. According to the opinion, the plaintiff financed a furniture purchase through a retail installment contract. While making payments on the contract, the company purportedly sold the debt to a third party. After the plaintiff defaulted on the debt, the third party—through the defendant attorney—sued the plaintiff in state court to recover the unpaid debt and attorney’s fees. After the third party eventually voluntarily dismissed the suit due to questions of whether the debt transfer was valid, the plaintiff sued the attorney for violating the FDCPA, alleging the defendant doctored the retail installment contract (RIC) to make it appear as if the debt assignment was legal. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint as time-barred by the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations. The district court dismissed the case citing the complaint was filed more than a year after the third party filed the state court complaint and later denied both the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees. Both parties appealed.

    On appeal, the 6th Circuit agreed that the plaintiff made a timely claim. Plaintiff argued that at least one of her claims fell within the one-year statute of limitations—the attorney’s filing of the updated RIC that allegedly showed the “contrived transfer” of debt—and maintained that she filed within one year of that alleged violation. The defendant countered, among other things, that the plaintiff’s claim was time-barred because it was a continuing effect of the third party’s initial filing of the state court complaint. The 6th Circuit reviewed caselaw on the “continuing-violation doctrine” and determined that the doctrine was not relevant to the case, stating that the plaintiff never invoked it because she was not “trying to sweep in acts that would otherwise be outside of the filing period,” but rather sought “redress for a single claim that is not time-barred.” The 6th Circuit emphasized that the plaintiff’s “single claim is independent of [the third party’s] initial filing of the lawsuit—not a continuing effect of it—because it is a standalone FDCPA violation.” The opinion further stated that the only date considered for the statute of limitations is the date a lawsuit is filed when subsequent FDCPA violations within that lawsuit occurred, and wrote that “[i]f we were to only consider the date [the third party] filed suit . . . we would create a rule that disregards the fact that §1629k(d) creates an independent statute of limitations for each violation of the FDCPA . . . . And if we adopted [the defendant’s] approach, we’d be saying that ‘so long as a debtor does not initiate suit within one year of the first violation, a debt collector [is] permitted to violate the FDCPA with regard to that debt indefinitely and with impunity.’”

    Courts Appellate Sixth Circuit FDCPA Debt Collection State Issues Consumer Finance

  • 4th Circuit remands privacy suit to state court

    Privacy, Cyber Risk & Data Security

    On February 21, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a proposed class action over website login procedures belongs in state court. Plaintiff alleged that after a nonparty credit reporting agency experienced a data breach, it used the defendant subsidiary’s website to inform customers whether their personal data had been compromised. Because the defendant’s website required the plaintiff to enter six digits of his Social Security number to access the information, the plaintiff alleged violations of South Carolina’s Financial Identity Fraud and Identity Theft Protection Act and the state’s common-law right to privacy. Under the state statute, companies are prohibited from requiring consumers to use six digits or more of their Social Security number to access a website unless a password, a unique personal identification number, or another form of authentication is also required. According to the plaintiff, the defendant’s website did not include this requirement.

    The defendant moved the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act and requested that the case be dismissed. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in federal court, as well as a motion asking the district court to first determine whether it had subject matter jurisdiction, given the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, which clarified the type of concrete injury necessary to establish Article III standing (covered by InfoBytes here). Although the district court held that the plaintiff had alleged “an intangible concrete harm in the manner of an invasion of privacy,” which it said was enough to give it subject-matter jurisdiction “at this early stage of the case,” it dismissed the case after determining the plaintiff had not plausibly stated a claim. 

    In reversing and remanding the action, the 4th Circuit found that the plaintiff alleged only a bare statutory violation and had not pled a concrete injury sufficient to confer Article III standing in federal court. The appellate court vacated the district court’s decision to dismiss the case and ordered the district court to remand the case to state court. The 4th Circuit took the position that an intangible harm, such as a plaintiff “enduring a statutory violation” is insufficient to confer standing unless there is a separate harm “or a materially increased risk of another harm” associated with the violation. “[Plaintiff] hasn’t alleged—even in a speculative or conclusory fashion—that entering six digits of his SSN on [defendant’s] website has somehow raised his risk of identity theft,” the 4th Circuit said. In conclusion, the 4th Circuit wrote: “We offer no opinion about whether the alleged facts state a claim under the Act. Absent Article III jurisdiction, that’s a question for [plaintiff] to take up in state court.”

    Privacy, Cyber Risk & Data Security Courts State Issues Class Action Data Breach Credit Reporting Agency Consumer Protection Appellate Fourth Circuit

  • 9th Circuit concludes district attorneys can sue national banks in state court

    Courts

    On February 27, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision to abstain from enjoining a state action brought by a California county district attorney (DA) against a national bank, concluding that the enforcement action was not an exercise of “visitorial powers.” According to the opinion, the DA launched an investigation into the bank’s vendor and issued the bank an investigative subpoena seeking records of its banking activities. The bank objected, claiming the request “improperly infringes on the exclusive visitorial powers of the [OCC]” because it sought to inspect the bank’s books and records. The bank subsequently filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California asking the court to enjoin the state action and requesting injunctive relief to prevent the DA from taking any action to enforce federal and state lending, debt collection, and consumer laws against the bank, or from exercising visitorial powers in violation of the National Bank Act (NBA). The DA withdrew his investigative subpoena and moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the case was now moot. The motion to dismiss was denied on the premise that the DA had not demonstrated that a “renewed investigative subpoena against [the bank] ‘could not be reasonably be expected.’”

    The DA then filed a complaint in state court claiming the bank violated California law by hiring a third-party vendor to place “extensive harassing” debt collection phone calls to residents in the state. The complaint alleged violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law, the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, and the right to privacy under the California Constitution. In federal court, the bank moved for summary judgment, arguing that the state action was an improper exercise of visitorial powers. The district court, however, ruled that the Younger v. Harris abstention (in which a federal court refrains from staying or enjoining pending state criminal prosecutions absent extraordinary circumstances or state civil enforcement actions when certain conditions are met) applied. The bank appealed.

    The 9th Circuit considered two questions: (i) whether the Younger abstention was correctly applied, and (ii) whether the DA’s state court action “was an impermissible exercise of visitorial powers vested exclusively with the OCC.” The 9th Circuit held that the district court was correct in applying the Younger abstention doctrine because (i) “the state action qualified as an ‘ongoing’ judicial proceeding because no proceedings of substance on the merits had taken place in the federal action”; (ii) the state court action implicated an important state interest in consumer protection and nothing in federal law bars a DA from suing a national bank; (iii) the bank had the option to raise a federal defense under the NBA in the state court action; and (iv) the injunction the bank requested in the federal action would interfere with the state court proceeding.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      The 9th Circuit also rejected the bank’s arguments that the state action constituted an illegal exercise of visitorial powers that only belongs to the OCC or state attorneys general. The 9th Circuit cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C., in which the high court “held that bringing a civil lawsuit to enforce a non-preempted state law is not an exercise of visitorial powers,” and that “a sovereign’s ‘visitorial powers’ and its power to enforce the law are two different things.” Relying on the Cuomo holding, the 9th Circuit found that accepting the bank’s position “would mean that actions brought against national banks by federal or state agencies or, for that matter, individuals would be forbidden as unlawful exercises of visitorial powers.” “Such a result is wrong. It contradicts established law and is unsupported by any legal authority cited by [the bank]” and would additionally “raise serious anti-commandeering concerns under the Tenth Amendment.”

    Courts Appellate Ninth Circuit Debt Collection State Issues California National Bank Act Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

  • 8th Circuit reverses debt collection action for lack of standing

    Courts

    On February 24, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded the dismissal of a class action lawsuit concerning a medical collection letter that listed amounts due but did not distinguish between the principal and the interest that the debt collectors were attempting to charge. Plaintiff, who never paid any part of the interest or principal, filed a class action against the defendant debt collectors alleging violations of the FDCPA and the Nebraska Consumer Practices Act (NCPA). The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff lacked Article III standing. The district court denied the motion and the jury found for the defendants on all counts except for the NCPA claim, which was not tried before a jury. After trial, the district court determined it had provided improper jury instructions, and sua sponte, entered judgment for the plaintiff as a matter of law on both the NCPA and FDCPA claims. The district court specifically ruled that the NCPA does not allow collection of prejudgment interest by a debt collector without an actual judgment. The defendants appealed.

    On appeal, the 8th Circuit focused on whether the plaintiff had standing. The appellate court held that the collection letter did not cause the plaintiff concrete harm, and concluded (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins) that without a concrete injury in fact, she “is ‘not seeking to remedy any harm to herself but instead is merely seeking to ensure a defendant’s compliance with regulatory law (and, of course, to obtain some money via the statutory damages).’” Without suffering a tangible harm, the appellate court said it could only recognize injuries with “a ‘close relationship’ to harm ‘traditionally’ recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.” The plaintiff pointed to fraudulent misrepresentation and conversion as analogous to her alleged injury, but the appellate court disagreed and determined that the consumer could not establish injury sufficient to satisfy Article III standing. In vacating and remanding the district court’s ruling, the 8th Circuit pointed out that, absent standing, it lacked jurisdiction to decide any other issues raised on appeal.

    Courts Appellate Debt Collection Consumer Finance Eighth Circuit FDCPA Class Action State Issues Nebraska

  • Supreme Court agrees to review constitutionality of CFPB’s funding, but not on an expedited basis

    Courts

    The Supreme Court granted the CFPB's request to review the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau but so far has not expedited consideration of the case. Without quick action to expediate consideration by the Court, all CFPB actions will be open to challenge until the Supreme Court issues a decision. At the current pace, the CFPB could remain in this limbo until June of 2024.

    In this case, the 5th Circuit held that Congress violated the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause when it created what that Court described as a “perpetual self-directed, double-insulated funding structure” for the agency. As a result, the CFPB’s 2017 Payday Lending Rule is invalid because the CFPB would not have been able to issue it “without its unconstitutional funding.” The implication, as the CFPB itself pointed out in its petition for certiorari, is that all past and future actions that relied on the same funding mechanism—basically everything the agency has ever done or will ever do—are invalid as well.

    Although the CFPB had ninety days to seek review of the 5th Circuit’s decision, it took the unusual step of filing the petition in less than 30 days, and specifically urged the Supreme Court to “set this case for argument this Term,” to guarantee a decision by June or early July of this year. The Court’s order issued Monday simply states that the CFPB’s petition is granted, without setting an expediated briefing schedule. As a result, without the Court taking some immediate steps to speed up consideration, the case will be decided under the Court’s standard briefing schedule. This means the matter will be briefed over the next several months with oral argument likely next fall, as part of the Supreme Court’s October 2023 Term. Although a decision could come out any time after oral argument, cases as significant as this case often come out towards the end of the term, i.e., by June 2024.

    The Supreme Court’s unwillingness to expedite consideration of the case to date has serious practical implications for the CFPB’s ability to push forward its ambitious agenda. As the CFPB has itself acknowledged, the 5th Circuit’s decision binds lower courts in that circuit unless and until it is overturned. It will likely encourage challenges to CFPB rulemakings and potentially other actions in that circuit. Even outside of the 5th Circuit, lower courts adjudicating CFPB enforcement actions may be unwilling to move those cases forward until the Supreme Court provides direction on this fundamental funding issue. Thus, for the time being, we can expect more challenges and more delays in CFPB enforcement actions.

    For financial institutions, our advice remains the same as when the 5th Circuit’s decision was issued. Generally, companies should maintain their day-to-day focus on compliance, as the CFPB may weather this latest constitutional challenge with its full authority, including its enforcement power, intact. In addition, other Federal agencies—for example, the Federal banking agencies, the National Credit Union Administration, the Federal Trade Commission—and state attorneys general and/or state regulators often have overlapping authority to enforce Federal consumer financial law. Finally, companies should continue to assume that rules issued by the Bureau are valid and that they will not be penalized for good-faith reliance on such rules.

    Courts CFPB U.S. Supreme Court Appellate Fifth Circuit Payday Lending Payday Rule Constitution Enforcement Funding Structure

  • Illinois Supreme Court says BIPA claims accrue with every transmission

    Privacy, Cyber Risk & Data Security

    On February 17, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a split decision holding that under the state’s Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), claims accrue “with every scan or transmission of biometric identifiers or biometric information without prior informed consent.” The plaintiff filed a proposed class action alleging a defendant fast food chain violated BIPA sections 15(b) and (d) by unlawfully collecting her biometric data and disclosing the data to a third-party vendor without first obtaining her consent. According to the plaintiff, the defendant introduced a biometric-collection system that required employees to scan their fingerprints in order to access pay stubs and computers shortly after she began her employment in 2004. Under BIPA (which became effective in 2008), section 15(b) prohibits private entities from collecting, capturing, purchasing, receiving through trade, or otherwise obtaining “a person’s biometric data without first providing notice to and receiving consent from the person,” whereas Section 15(d) provides that private entities “may not ‘disclose, redisclose, or otherwise disseminate’ biometric data without consent.” While the plaintiff asserted that the defendant did not seek her consent until 2018, the defendant argued, among other things, that the action was untimely because the plaintiff’s claim accrued the first time defendant obtained her biometric data. In this case, defendant argued that plaintiff’s claim accrued in 2008 after BIPA’s effective date. Plaintiff challenged that “a new claim accrued each time she scanned her fingerprints” and her data was sent to a third-party authenticator, thus “rendering her action timely with respect to the unlawful scans and transmissions that occurred within the applicable limitations period.” The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois agreed with the plaintiff but certified its order for immediate interlocutory appeal after “finding that its decision involved a controlling question of law on which there is substantial ground for disagreement.”

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ultimately found that the parties’ competing interpretations of claim accrual were reasonable under Illinois law, and agreed that “the novelty and uncertainty of the claim-accrual question” warranted certification to the Illinois Supreme Court. The question certified to the high court asked whether “section 15(b) and (d) claims accrue each time a private entity scans a person’s biometric identifier and each time a private entity transmits such a scan to a third party, respectively, or only upon the first scan and first transmission[.]”

    The majority held that the plain language of the statute supports the plaintiff’s interpretation. “With the subsequent scans, the fingerprint is compared to the stored copy of the fingerprint. Defendant fails to explain how such a system could work without collecting or capturing the fingerprint every time the employee needs to access his or her computer or pay stub,” the high court said. The majority rejected the defendant’s argument that a BIPA claim is limited to the initial scan or transmission of biometric information since that is when the individual loses the right to control their biometric information “[b]ecause a person cannot keep information secret from another entity that already has it.” This interpretation, the majority wrote, wrongfully assumes that BIPA limits claims under section 15 to the first time a party’s biometric identifier or biometric information is scanned or transmitted. The Illinois Supreme Court further held that “[a]s the district court observed, this court has repeatedly held that, where statutory language is clear, it must be given effect, ‘even though the consequences may be harsh, unjust, absurd or unwise.’” However, the majority emphasized that BIPA does not contain language “suggesting legislative intent to authorize a damages award that would result in the financial destruction of a business,” adding that because “we continue to believe that policy-based concerns about potentially excessive damage awards under [BIPA] are best addressed by the legislature, . . . [w]e respectfully suggest that the legislature review these policy concerns and make clear its intent regarding the assessment of damages under [BIPA].”

    The dissenting judges countered that “[i]mposing punitive, crippling liability on businesses could not have been a goal of [BIPA], nor did the legislature intend to impose damages wildly exceeding any remotely reasonable estimate of harm.” “Indeed, the statute’s provision of liquidated damages of between $1000 and $5000 is itself evidence that the legislature did not intend to impose ruinous liability on businesses,” the dissenting judges wrote, cautioning that plaintiffs may be incentivized to delay bringing claims for as long as possible in an effort to increase actionable violations. Under BIPA, individuals have five years to assert violations of section 15—the statute of limitations recently established by a ruling issued by the Illinois Supreme Court earlier this month (covered by InfoBytes here).

    Privacy, Cyber Risk & Data Security Courts State Issues Illinois BIPA Enforcement Consumer Protection Class Action Appellate

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