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Default judgment entered against provider of immigration bonds
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia recently entered default judgment against defendants accused of misrepresenting the cost of immigration bond services and deceiving migrants to keep them paying monthly fees by making false threats of deportation for failure to pay. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the defendants—a group of companies providing immigration bond products or services for non-English speaking U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement detainees—were sued by the CFPB and state attorneys general from Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia in 2021 for allegedly engaging in deceptive and abusive acts and practices in violation of the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA). The defendants argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Bureau did not have authority to enforce the CFPA since the defendants are regulated by state insurance regulators and are merchants, retailors, or sellers of nonfinancial goods or services. However, the court disagreed, explaining that “limitations on the CFPB’s regulatory authority do not equate to limitations on this court’s jurisdiction.” (Covered by InfoBytes here.)
As explained in the court’s opinion, last year the plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions and for an order to show cause why the court should not hold the defendants in contempt for actions relating to several ongoing discovery disputes. The court determined that the defendants failed to demonstrate that “factors other than obduracy and willfulness” led to their failure to comply with multiple discovery orders and that the defendants engaged in a “pattern of knowing noncompliance with numerous orders of the court.” These delays, the court said, have significantly harmed the plaintiffs in their ability to prepare their case. Finding each defendant in civil contempt of court, the court also entered a default judgment against the defendants, citing them for discovery violations in other cases. The court set June deadlines for briefs on remedies and damages.
CFPB: Reopening a closed account could be a UDAAP
On May 10, the CFPB released Circular 2023-02 to opine that unilaterally reopening a closed account without a customer’s permission in order to process a transaction is a likely violation of federal law, particularly if a bank collects fees on the account. “When a bank unilaterally chooses to open an account in someone’s name after they have already closed it, this is a fake account,” CFPB Director Rohit Chopra said in the announcement. “The CFPB is acting on all fronts to halt the harvesting of illegal junk fees.”
The Bureau described receiving complaints from consumers about banks reopening closed accounts and then assessing overdraft/nonsufficient funds fees and monthly maintenance fees. Such practices, the Bureau warned, may violate the Consumer Financial Protection Act’s prohibition on unfair acts or practices. Consumers may experience substantial injury including monetary harm by paying fees due to the unfair practice, the Bureau said, explaining that because consumers likely cannot reasonably avoid the injury, “[a]ctual injury is not required; significant risk of concrete harm is sufficient.” Aside from subjecting consumers to fees, when a bank processes a credit through a reopened account, the consumers’ funds may become available to third parties, including those that do not have permission to access such funds, the Bureau warned, adding that there is also a risk that banks may furnish negative information to consumer reporting agencies if reopening the account overdraws the account and the consumer does not quickly repay the amount owed. The Bureau further noted that deposit account agreements typically indicate that a financial institution “may return any debits or deposits to the account that the financial institution receives after closure and faces no liability for failing to honor any debits or deposits received after closure.”
The Circular explained that rather than reopening an account when a third party attempts to deposit or withdraw money from it, banks should decline the transactions. This allows customers the opportunity to update their information with the entity attempting to access a closed account while avoiding potential fees. “Reopening a closed account does not appear to provide any meaningful benefits to consumers or competition,” the Bureau said in the Circular. “While consumers might potentially benefit in some instances where their accounts are reopened to receive deposits, which then become available to them, that benefit does not outweigh the injuries that can be caused by unilateral account reopening.”
District Court won’t stay CFPB litigation with credit reporter
On April 13, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied a credit reporting agency’s (CRA) bid to stay litigation filed by the CFPB alleging deceptive practices related to the marketing and sale of credit scores, credit reports, and credit-monitoring products to consumers. The Bureau sued the CRA and one of its former senior executives last April (covered by InfoBytes here), claiming the defendants allegedly violated a 2017 consent order by continuing to engage in “digital dark patterns” that caused consumers seeking free credit scores to unknowingly sign up for a credit monitoring service with recurring monthly charges.
The CRA requested a stay while the U.S. Supreme Court considers whether the Bureau’s funding mechanism is unconstitutional. Earlier this year, the Court agreed to review next term the 5th Circuit’s decision in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, where it found that the CFPB’s “perpetual self-directed, double-insulated funding structure” violated the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause. (Covered by InfoBytes here and a firm article here.) While acknowledging that a ruling against the Bureau may result in the dismissal of the action against the CRA, the court concurred with the Bureau that consumers may be exposed to harm during a stay. “Were I to grant the requested stay, it could last more than one year, depending on when the Supreme Court issues its opinion,” the court wrote. “In that time, if the Bureau’s allegations bear out, consumers will continue to suffer harm because of defendants’ unlawful conduct. That potential cost is too great to outweigh the resource preserving benefits a stay would confer.”
CFPB defines abusive conduct under the CFPA
On April 3, the CFPB issued a policy statement containing an “analytical framework” for identifying abusive conduct prohibited under the Consumer Financial Protection Act. The Bureau broadly defines abusive conduct as anything that obscures, withholds, de-emphasizes, renders confusing, or hides information about the important features of a product or service. The policy statement, which is intended to clarify Congress’s statutory definition of abusive practices, serves as the Bureau’s “first formal issuance” summarizing more than a decade’s worth of precedent on abusiveness.
Specifically, the policy statement highlights two categories of abusive prohibitions: (i) obscuring critical features that could materially interfere with or impede a consumer’s ability to understand terms or conditions that may prompt a consumer to reconsider signing up for certain products or services (e.g., burying or overshadowing important disclosures, filling disclosures with complex jargon, omitting material terms and conditions, physically preventing consumers from viewing notices, or engaging in digital interference through the use of “dark patterns” aimed at “making the terms and conditions materially less accessible or salient”); and (ii) leveraging a company’s knowledge or market power to take unreasonable advantage of a consumer relating to: gaps in understanding; unequal bargaining power; and consumer reliance (e.g., causing a consumer to face a range of potential harms, including monetary and non-monetary costs, taking advantage of a consumer’s lack of understanding as it relates to whether a debt is legally enforceable or when fees will be assessed, or preventing a consumer from switching service providers).
Additionally, the Bureau notes that in order to establish liability, the agency would not be required to show that “substantial injury” occurred—it only needs to show that a practice is considered “harmful or distortionary to the proper functioning of the market.”
Abusive acts or practices will focus on actions, CFPB Director Rohit Chopra explained in prepared remarks at the University of California Irvine Law School, whereas deception claims are more concerned with whether a company’s communications create a misleading net impression. “Congress prohibited companies from leveraging unequal bargaining power, and that includes consumer reporting companies, servicers, and debt collectors who use the fact that their customers are captive to force people into less advantageous deals, extract excess profits, or reduce costs by providing worse service than they would provide if they were competing in an open market,” Chopra added.
The Bureau will receive comments on the policy statement through July 3.
Online lender asks Supreme Court to review ALJ ruling
A Delaware-based online payday lender and its founder and CEO (collectively, “petitioners”) recently submitted a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s affirmation of a CFPB administrative ruling related to alleged violations of the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA), TILA, and EFTA. The petitioners asked the Court to first review whether the high court’s ruling in Lucia v. SEC, which “instructed that an agency must hold a ‘new hearing’ before a new and properly appointed official in order to cure an Appointments Clause violation” (covered by InfoBytes here), meant that a CFPB administrative law judge (ALJ) could “conduct a cold review of the paper record of the first, tainted hearing, without any additional discovery or new testimony.” Or, the petitioners asked, did the Court intend for the agency to actually conduct a new hearing. The petitioners also asked the Court to consider whether an agency funding structure that circumvents the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause violates the separation of powers so as to invalidate prior agency actions promulgated at a time when the Bureau was receiving such funding.
The case involves a challenge to a 2015 administrative action that alleged the petitioners engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices when making short-term loans (covered by InfoBytes here). The Bureau’s order required the petitioners to pay $38.4 million as both legal and equitable restitution, along with $8.1 million in penalties for the company and $5.4 million in penalties for the CEO. As previously covered by InfoBytes, between 2018 and 2021, the Court issued four decisions, including Lucia, which “bore on the Bureau’s enforcement activity in this case” by “deciding fundamental issues related to the Bureau’s constitutional authority to act” and appoint ALJs. During this time, two different ALJs decided the present case years apart, with their recommendations separately appealed to the Bureau’s director. The director upheld the decision by the second ALJ and ordered the lender and its owner to pay the restitution. A district court issued a final order upholding the award, which the petitioners appealed, arguing, among other things, that the enforcement action violated their due-process rights by denying the CEO additional discovery concerning the statute of limitations. The petitioners claimed that they were entitled to a “new hearing” under Lucia, and that the second administrative hearing did not rise to the level of due process prescribed in that case.
However, the 10th Circuit affirmed the district court’s $38.4 million restitution award, rejecting the petitioners’ various challenges and affirming the director’s order. The 10th Circuit determined that there was “no support for a bright-line rule against de novo review of a previous administrative hearing,” nor did it see a reason for a more extensive hearing. Moreover, the petitioners “had a full opportunity to present their case in the first proceeding,” the 10th Circuit wrote.
The petitioners maintained that “[d]espite the Court’s clear instruction to hold a ‘new hearing,’ ALJs and courts have reached divergent conclusions as to what Lucia requires, expressing confusion and frustration regarding the lack of guidance.” What it means to hold a “new hearing” runs “the gamut,” the petitioners wrote, pointing out that while some ALJs perform a full redo of the proceedings, others merely accept a prior decision based on a cold review of the paper record. The petitioners argued that they should have been provided a true de novo hearing with an opportunity for new testimony, evidence, discovery, and legal arguments. The rehearing from the new ALJ was little more than a perfunctory “paper review,” the petitioners wrote.
Petitioners asked the Court to grant the petition for three reasons: (i) “the scope of Lucia’s ‘new hearing’ remedy is an important and apparently unsettled question of federal law”; (ii) “the notion Lucia does not require a genuinely ‘new’ de novo proceeding is necessarily wrong because a sham ‘remedy’ provides parties no incentive to litigate Appointments Clause challenges”; and (iii) the case “is an ideal vehicle to provide guidance on Lucia’s ‘new hearing’ remedy.” The petitioners further argued that “Lucia’s remedy should provide parties an incentive to raise separation of powers arguments by providing them actual and meaningful relief.”
The petitioners’ second question involves whether Appropriations Clause violations that render an agency’s funding structure unconstitutional, if upheld, invalidate agency actions taken under such a structure. The petitioners called this “an important, unsettled question of federal law meriting the Court’s review,” citing splits between the Circuits over the constitutionality of the Bureau’s funding structure which has resulted in uncertainty for both regulators and regulated parties. Recently, the Court granted the Bureau’s request to review the 5th Circuit’s decision in CFSAA v. CFPB, which held that Congress violated the Appropriations Clause when it created what the 5th Circuit described as a “perpetual self-directed, double-insulated funding structure” for the agency (covered by InfoBytes here).
CFPB shutters mortgage lender, alleging deceptive advertising
On February 27, the CFPB entered a consent order against a California-based mortgage lender (respondent) for alleged repeat violations of the Consumer Financial Protection Act, TILA (Regulation Z), and the Mortgage Acts and Practices Advertising Rule (Regulation N), in relation to a 2015 consent order. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in 2015, the Bureau claimed the respondent (which is licensed in at least 30 states and Puerto Rico and originates consumer mortgages guaranteed by the Department of Veterans Affairs and mortgages insured by the FHA) allegedly led consumers to believe it was affiliated with the U.S. government. Specifically, respondent allegedly used the names and logos of the VA and FHA in its advertisements, described loan products as part of a “distinctive program offered by the U.S. government,” and instructed consumers to call the “VA Interest Rate Reduction Department” at a phone number belonging to the mortgage lender, thus implying that the mailings were sent by government agencies. The 2015 consent order required the respondent to abide by several prohibitions and imposed a $250,000 civil money penalty.
The Bureau contends, however, that after the 2015 consent order went into effect, the respondent continued to send millions of mortgage advertisements that allegedly made deceptive representations or contained inadequate or impermissible disclosures, including that the respondent was affiliated with the VA or the FHA. Additionally, the Bureau alleges that the respondent misrepresented interest rates, key terms, and the amount of monthly payments, and falsely represented that benefits available to qualifying borrowers were time limited. Many of these alleged misrepresentations, the Bureau claims, were expressly prohibited by the 2015 consent order.
The 2023 consent order permanently bans the respondent from engaging in any mortgage lending activities, or from “otherwise participating in or receiving remuneration from mortgage lending, or assisting others in doing so.” The respondent, which neither admits nor denies the allegations, is also required pay a $1 million civil money penalty.
CFPB finalizes updates to Rules of Practice for Adjudication Procedures
On February 24, the CFPB finalized updates to the agency’s Rules of Practice for Adjudication Procedures (Rules of Practice). Under Section 1053(e) of the Consumer Financial Protection Act, the Bureau is required to establish procedures for administrative adjudications. Last February, the Bureau issued a request for comments on proposed amendments to the Rules of Practice, which are intended to provide greater procedural flexibility, provide parties earlier access to relevant information, expand deposition opportunities, and make various other changes (covered by InfoBytes here). After considering comments received, the Bureau said it will retain the proposed updates in the final procedural rule. According to the Bureau, the updated Rules of Practice expand opportunities for parties in adjudication proceedings to conduct depositions of potential witnesses to allow hearings to “proceed more efficiently and focus more on issues central to the proceeding.” The final rule also makes several amendments related to “timing and deadlines, the content of answers, the scheduling conference, bifurcation of proceedings, the process for deciding dispositive motions, and requirements for issue exhaustion, as well as other technical changes.” The final rule is effective upon publication in the Federal Register. The Bureau noted in its announcement that while it “still plans to bring the vast majority of its matters in district court,” it will continue to conduct administrative adjudications in certain circumstances.
CFPB orders nonbank title lender to pay $15 million for numerous violations
On February 23, the CFPB entered a consent order against a Georgia-based nonbank auto title lender (respondent) for alleged violations of the Military Lending Act (MLA), the Truth in Lending Act, and the Consumer Financial Protection Act. According to the Bureau, the respondent allegedly charged nearly three times the MLA’s 36 percent annual interest rate cap on auto title loans made to military families. The respondent also allegedly changed military borrowers’ personal information in an attempt to hide their protected status, included mandatory arbitration clauses and unreasonable notice provisions in its loans, and charged fees for an insurance product that provided no benefit to the borrower. The Bureau noted that the respondent has been under a consent order since 2016 for allegedly engaging in unfair and abusive acts related to its lending and debt collection practices (covered by InfoBytes here). While neither admitting nor denying any of the allegations, the respondent has agreed to pay $5.05 million in consumer redress and a $10 million penalty. The respondent must also implement robust measures to prevent future violations.
District Court dismisses CFPB redlining action against nonbank lender
On February 3, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed with prejudice claims that a Chicago-based nonbank mortgage company and its owner violated ECOA by engaging in discriminatory marketing and applicant outreach practices. The CFPB sued the defendants in 2020 alleging fair lending violations, including violations of ECOA and the CFPA, predicated, in part, on statements made by the company’s owner and other employees during radio shows and podcasts from 2014 through 2017. (Covered by a Special Alert.) The complaint (which was later amended) marked the first time a federal regulator has taken a public enforcement action against a nondepository institution based on allegations of redlining.
The Bureau claimed that the defendants discouraged African Americans from applying for mortgage loans from the company and redlined African American neighborhoods in the Chicago area by (i) discouraging their residents from applying for mortgage loans from the company; and (ii) discouraging nonresidents from applying for loans from the company for homes in these neighborhoods. The defendants moved to dismiss with prejudice, arguing that the Bureau improperly attempted to expand ECOA’s reach “beyond the express and unambiguous language of the statute.” The defendants explained that while the statute “regulates behavior towards applicants for credit, it does not regulate any behavior relating to prospective applicants who have not yet applied for credit.” The Bureau countered that courts have consistently recognized Regulation B’s discouragement prohibition even when applied to prospective applicants.
In dismissing the action with prejudice, the court applied step one of Chevron framework (which is to determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue”) when reviewing whether the Bureau’s interpretation of ECOA in Regulation B is permissible. Explaining that ECOA’s plain text “clearly and unambiguously prohibits discrimination against applicants”—defined as a person who applies for credit—the court concluded (citing to case law in support of its decision) that Congress’s directive only prohibits discrimination against applicants and does not apply to prospective applicants. The court stressed that the agency’s authority to enact regulations is not limitless and that the statute’s use of the term “applicant” clearly marks the boundary of ECOA.
The court also rejected the Bureau’s argument that ECOA’s delegation of authority to the Bureau to adopt rules to prevent evasion means the anti-discouragement provision must be sustained provided it reasonably relates to ECOA’s objectives. The Bureau pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Mourning v. Fam. Publ’ns Serv., Inc. (upholding the “Four Installment Rule” under similar delegation language in TILA), but the court held that Mourning does not permit it to avoid Chevron’s two-step framework. Because the anti-discouragement provision does not survive the first step, the court did not reach whether the provision is reasonably related to ECOA’s objectives and dismissed the action with prejudice. The remaining claims, which depend on the ECOA claim, were also dismissed with prejudice.
The firm will be sending out a Special Alert in the next few business days providing additional thinking on this decision.
9th Circuit orders district court to reassess $7.9 million civil penalty against payments company
On January 27, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered a district court to reassess its decision “under the changed legal landscape since its initial order and opinion” in an action concerning alleged misrepresentations made by a bi-weekly payments company. The Bureau filed a lawsuit against the company in 2015, alleging, among other things, that the company made misrepresentations to consumers about its bi-weekly payment program when it overstated the savings provided by the program and created the impression the company was affiliated with the consumers’ lender. In 2017, the district court granted a $7.9 million civil penalty proposed by the Bureau, as well as permanent injunctive relief, but denied restitution of almost $74 million sought by the agency. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) The company appealed the district court’s conclusion that it had engaged in deceptive practices in violation of the Consumer Financial Protection Act, while the Bureau cross-appealed the district court’s decision to deny restitution. The 9th Circuit consolidated the appeals for consideration.
During the pendency of the cross-appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in 2020 in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, in which it determined that the director’s for-cause removal provision was unconstitutional but was severable from the statute establishing the Bureau (covered by a Buckley Special Alert). Following Seila, former Director Kathy Kraninger ratified several prior regulatory actions (covered by InfoBytes here), including the enforcement action brought against the company. At issue in the company’s appeal is whether the Bureau has authority to pursue its claims, including whether the agency’s funding mechanism is unconstitutional and whether its case is distinguishable from other actions and is entitled to dismissal for the Bureau director’s unconstitutional for-cause removal provision.
The appellate court declined to offer a position on these issues, and instead left them for the district court to consider. The 9th Circuit noted that since the district court’s 2017 order, “sister circuit courts have split” on the funding issue. “We vacate the district court’s order and remand, allowing it to reassess the case under the changed legal landscape since its initial order and opinion,” the appellate court wrote, directing the district court to “provide further consideration to [the company’s] argument on the constitutionality of the Bureau’s funding mechanism.” With respect to the Bureau’s appeal of the restitution denial, the 9th Circuit remanded the case to allow the district court to consider the effect CFPB v. CashCall and Liu v. SEC may have on the action (covered by InfoBytes here and here), as well as whether the agency “waived its claim to legal restitution by characterizing it only as a form of equitable relief before the district court.”