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Third Treasury Report Calls on HUD to Reconsider Application of Disparate Impact Rule to the Insurance Industry
On October 26, the U.S. Treasury Department published a report outlining a number of recommendations for ways to manage systemic risk primarily within the asset management and insurance industry. A section of the report, however, also discusses HUD’s potential application of the disparate impact rule to the insurance industry—specifically related to homeowner’s insurance. The report, “A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities—Asset Management and Insurance,” is the third in a series of four the Treasury plans to issue in response to President Trump’s Executive Order 13772 (EO), which mandated a review of financial regulations for inconsistencies with promoted “Core Principles.” (See Buckley Sandler Special Alert on the EO here and InfoBytes coverage on the first two reports here.)
HUD is authorized to adjudicate housing discrimination claims and issue rules relating to the Fair Housing Act. According to the report, Treasury recommends that HUD reconsider the use of the disparate impact theory to the insurance industry. The report notes a number of problems and challenges that would arise from applying disparate impact to the insurance industry. In particular, the report identifies potential challenges because (i) “state insurance regulations ordinarily prohibit the consideration of protected characteristics in the evaluation and pooling of risk” and at least one state expressly prohibits the collection of this data; (ii) the rule could impose unnecessary burdens on insurers and lead to actions that are not actuarially sound in an effort to avoid underwriting practices that may result in disparate outcomes; and (iii) it may be inconsistent with the McCarran-Ferguson Act and other existing state laws.
The report also recommends, among other things, that Congress clarify the “business of insurance” exception that generally excludes these services from the CFPB’s jurisdiction. The report recommends clarification to this exception to eliminate uncertainty about the CFPB’s jurisdiction and the potential overlap between the Bureau and state insurance regulators. A fact sheet accompanying the report further highlights Treasury’s recommendations to evaluate systemic risk, streamline regulations, rationalize international engagement, and promote economic growth.
ABA, State Bankers Associations Respond to HUD’s Request for Comment; Discuss Need to Clarify Disparate Impact
On May 15, HUD issued a request for comment on its review of regulations as required by Executive Order 13777, which compels each agency to review and carry out regulatory reform. According to the request for comment, the self-assessment will address suggestions for “specific current regulations that may be outdated, ineffective, or excessively burdensome, and therefore, warranting repeal, replacement, or modification.” The request, which closed for public comment on June 14, received 100 comments from state bankers associations, financial institutions, and individuals.
American Bankers Association (ABA) and State Bankers Associations. On June 14, a joint comment letter was sent on behalf of the ABA and state bankers associations representing all 50 states. A key issue raised by the letter was that HUD adopted an incorrect and improper standard for disparate impact liability in its rule implementing the Fair Housing Act’s discriminatory effects standard—a rule the groups calls “outdated and legally wrong.” Under the terms of the rule, HUD provided that “[l]iability may be established under the Fair Housing Act based on a practice’s discriminatory effect . . . even if the practice was not motivated by a discriminatory intent” and then articulated a burden shifting framework for such claims in which a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case using statistics alone. However, the groups claim that the burden shifting framework conflicts with a Supreme Court decision in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, and assert that “a case premised on statistics alone is a prime example of an abuse of disparate impact.” The groups further wonder if HUD will “maintain the supervisory view that statistics alone can establish a prima facie case, as stated in the [r]ule[.]” It is the opinion of the groups that the Supreme Court enforced strict limitations of the use of disparate impact—“in stark contrast to the Rule’s approach”—in order to “avoid injecting the consideration of race into decision making and . . . address important constitutional concerns.” Thus, “[a] rule that creates, rather than eliminates, confusion undermines its own purpose and is entirely ineffective.” Furthermore, the letter (i) indicates that the groups are willing to engage in discussions with HUD on the topic of disparate impact, and (ii) raises the issue of whether a revised rule or a reopening of comments on the existing rule are in order.
District Court Dismisses Disparate Impact Claim under the Fair Housing Act
In The Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. The Tex. Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty., No. 3:08-cv-00546-D (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2016), on remand from the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit, the district court dismissed claims of disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant allocated two different types of tax credits in a manner that perpetuated racial segregation. The district court applied the Supreme Court’s previously explained three-part burden-shifting framework to analyze the plaintiff’s claim, and determined that, among other things, the plaintiff’s claim failed to show a “specific, facially neutral policy” causing a racially disparate impact. The court reasoned that “[b]y relying simply on [the defendant’s] exercise of discretion in awarding tax credits, [the plaintiff] has not isolated and identified the specific practice that caused the disparity in the location of low-income housing…. [The plaintiff] cannot rely on this generalized policy of discretion to prove disparate impact.” The district court further reasoned that because the plaintiff had not “sufficiently identified a specific, facially-neutral policy that has caused a statistically disparity,” the court could not “fashion a remedy that removes that policy.” The district court concluded that the plaintiff “failed to prove a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that a challenged practice caused a discriminatory effect” and entered judgment in favor of the defendants.
HUD Issues Guidance Regarding the Application of Fair Housing Act Standards to the Use of Criminal Records
On April 4, HUD issued guidance deploying a disparate impact analysis with respect to the Fair Housing Act’s application to the use of criminal history by those who come under the Fair Housing Act, and in particular by providers or operators of housing and real-estate related transactions. The guidance indicates that, because African Americans and Hispanics are arrested, convicted and incarcerated at rates disproportionate to their share of the general population, criminal records-based barriers to housing are likely to have a disproportionate impact on minority home seekers. HUD then walks through the three step burden-shifting disparate impact analysis to support its argument. To determine whether the use of criminal history has, on its face, a discriminatory effect, HUD looks at national statistics to demonstrate that incarceration rates are disproportionate for African Americans and Hispanics. HUD also notes that, while state or local statistics should be presented when available, national statistics may be used where state or local statistics are not readily available and there is no reason to believe they would differ markedly from the national statistics. HUD then moves to a discussion of whether the practice is necessary to achieve a substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest. HUD warns that, while ensuring resident safety and protecting property may be considered substantial and legitimate interests, bald assertions based on generalizations or stereotypes that any individual with an arrest or conviction record poses a greater risk than any individual without such a record would be insufficient to satisfy the burden set by the second prong. For the final prong, regarding the availability of a less discriminatory alternative, HUD notes that the inquiry is fact specific, but suggests that individualized assessment of relevant mitigating information beyond that contained in an individual’s criminal record is likely to have a less discriminatory effect than a categorical exclusion that does not take additional information into account. The guidance also discusses the potential for intentional discrimination, and notes that a disparate treatment violation may be proven based on evidence that exceptions to a general disqualification based on criminal record are provided to white applicants, but not African American applicants.
House Financial Services Committee: CFPB Removed Safeguards to Achieve Political Goals
On January 20, Republicans on the House Committee on Financial Services issued a report alleging that the CFPB removed a number of safeguards from the claims process after it secured its first settlement with an auto finance company and the company’s subsidiary bank in 2013. The Committee’s most recent report follows a November 2015 report in which the Republican staff (i) criticized the CFPB’s approach for determining discrimination in the auto lending industry; and (ii) questioned the CFPB’s authority to bring claims against banks involved in indirect auto lending under ECOA on a disparate impact theory. According to the more recently published report, the CFPB failed to confirm that funds from the 2013 settlement would be distributed to eligible recipients. Specifically, the report states that when CFPB Director Cordray announced that $80 million would be paid to consumers affected by the auto finance company’s practices, he “did not know the race of a single borrower in any vehicle finance contract purchased by [the company].” The report further comments that, “Bureau officials knew that in order to generate a sufficient number of check recipients, they would have to remove a number of safeguards from the claims process, including confirming the race of claimants alleged to have been discriminated against, thus making it more likely that non-minority consumers would receive remuneration.”
House Report Examines the CFPB's Methodology in Auto Finance Investigations
On November 24, Republicans on the House Committee on Financial Services issued a report regarding the CFPB’s approach for determining discrimination in the auto lending industry. The report questions the CFPB’s proxy methodology and its authority to bring claims against banks involved in indirect auto lending under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act’s (ECOA) disparate impact theory. According to the report, disparate impact “is a controversial legal theory of liability in discrimination cases.” The report further states that, even if it assumes that the ECOA permits disparate impact claims, the CFPB is nonetheless required to identify the following to establish a prima facie case: (i) a specific policy or practice adopted by the creditor; (ii) disparate impact on a prohibited basis; and (iii) a causal relationship between the challenged practice and the alleged disparate impact. The report states, “[d]ocuments obtained by the Committee show that the Bureau will likely have difficulty proving any one of these requirements, much less all three.” Notably, the report criticizes the CFPB’s adoption of the Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding proxy method, which “combines surname- and geography-based information into a single proxy probability for race and ethnicity,” labeling it as “faulty and unreliable.” The report further suggests that the CFPB observed the method to be “less accurate . . . than some proprietary proxy methods that use nonpublic data.” In closing, the report comments on the CFPB’s “ambition to eliminate dealer markup” by summarizing (i) a December 2013 settlement in which the CFPB used its leverage over a bank holding company to negotiate the settlement terms; (ii) the agency’s plans to increase the number of individual enforcement actions on dealer markup and compensation policies; and (iii) potential ECOA rulemaking to “promulgate a regulation prohibiting lenders from compensating dealers based on the terms of a loan.”
U.S. Attorney General Lynch: "More Determined Than Ever to Vigorously Enforce the Fair Housing Act"
On September 2, U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch delivered remarks at HUD’s Fair Housing Policy Conference. In her remarks, Lynch stressed the importance of fair housing as being a primary driver “to access to employment, to education, to credit, to transportation, to safety and to a whole range of institutions and opportunities.” Lynch stated that she is “more determined than ever to vigorously enforce the Fair Housing Act (FHA).” Among other things, Lynch provided an overview on how the DOJ is implementing new programs, technology, and research to conduct electronic testing, allowing the DOJ to expand the reach of its Fair Housing Testing Program. The Attorney General also expressed her support of HUD’s recently issued “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing” rule, and signaled that the DOJ intends to “vigorously enforce” the FHA using every available tool, including the disparate impact theory, which the Supreme Court ruled recently as a valid enforcement tool to challenge unfair mortgage lending practices.
District Court Applies Supreme Court's Inclusive Communities Decision in Rejecting Disparate Impact Claim
On July 17, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment for Wells Fargo in a Fair Housing Act (FHA) case brought by the City of Los Angeles. City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:13-cv-09007-ODW (RZx) (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015). The City alleged that the bank engaged in mortgage lending practices that had a disparate impact on minority borrowers. In rejecting the City’s claims, the court’s opinion heavily relied on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., which imposed limitations on the disparate impact theory of liability under the FHA, despite holding that the theory remains cognizable. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). Citing Inclusive Communities, the district court warned that disparate impact claims may only seek to “remove policies that are artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers and not valid governmental and private priorities.” The court further held that the City failed to point to a specific defendant policy that caused the disparate impact and failed to show “robust causality” between any of defendant’s policies and the alleged statistical disparity, as Inclusive Communities requires. The court also rejected the notion that disparate impact claims could be used to impose new policies on lenders, and said that the City’s argument that lenders should adopt policies to avoid disproportionate lending was a “roundabout way of arguing for a racial quota,” which Inclusive Communities also warns against. Finally, the court was sharply critical of the City’s argument that Federal Housing Administration loans are harmful to minority borrowers, and that, in any event, any disparate impact from these loans would be a result of the federal government’s policies, not the defendant’s policies.
Special Alert: Disparate Impact Under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act After Inclusive Communities
On June 25, the Supreme Court in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. held that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The Court, in a 5-4 decision, concluded that the FHA permits disparate-impact claims based on its interpretation of the FHA’s language, the amendment history of the FHA, and the purpose of the FHA.
Applicability to ECOA
When certiorari was granted in Inclusive Communities, senior officials from the CFPB and DOJ made clear that they would continue to enforce the disparate impact theory under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) even if the Supreme Court held that disparate-impact claims were not cognizable under the FHA. It is reasonable to expect that the Court’s decision will embolden the agencies, as well as private litigants, to assert even more aggressively the disparate impact theory under ECOA.
But just as the federal officials had stated that they would continue to assert disparate impact under ECOA if Inclusive Communities invalidated disparate impact under the FHA, lenders still have a number of arguments that the Inclusive Communities Court’s analysis does not apply to ECOA, given the material differences between the text and history of the FHA and ECOA. First, the Court principally based its textual arguments on the use of “otherwise make unavailable” in Section 804 of the FHA—a section that applies to the sale and rental of housing but not to lending. The Court stated that this effects-based language “is of central importance” to its analysis. Although the Court also stated that it had construed statutory language similar to FHA Section 805—which applies to lending—the discussion of Section 805 is so brief as to suggest it was merely an afterthought. The Court repeatedly states its textual analysis focused on the text “otherwise make unavailable.” But ECOA contains no similar effects-based language.
Second, the Court’s analysis of the FHA’s amendment history is inapplicable to ECOA. The Court focused principally on three provisions which it characterized as “exemptions” from disparate-impact liability, and concluded that such exemptions made sense only if Congress were acknowledging the validity of disparate impact claims. But ECOA contains no similar “exemptions” from disparate-impact liability that might otherwise lead to the conclusion disparate impact is cognizable under ECOA.
Finally, while the Court also notes that disparate-impact claims are “consistent with the FHA’s central purpose,” this justification appears merely to support the Court’s textual and historical arguments. The Court has repeatedly cautioned that a statute’s purpose does not trump its text. Whatever similarities may exist between the purpose of the FHA and ECOA, the material textual and historical differences weigh heavily against treating the two statutes the same for disparate-impact purposes.
Burden Shifting Framework
Even if the Inclusive Communities analysis could apply to ECOA, the Court’s emphasis on rigorous application of the three-step burden-shifting framework to analyze disparate impact claims—and protect against “abusive disparate-impact claims” —is likely to impose significant burdens on regulators and plaintiffs seeking to bring disparate impact claims under ECOA. The Court’s articulation of the steps in the burden-shifting framework are materially different—and more friendly to lenders—than those applied by federal agencies (e.g., in HUD’s disparate impact rule). While it is possible that the government and private plaintiffs will argue that the burden shifting framework outlined in Inclusive Communities applies only to the FHA, the Court’s reasoning supports applying the same framework to other civil rights laws—including ECOA.
First, the Court has reaffirmed the significant burden plaintiffs must bear in satisfying the first step of the burden-shifting framework: establishing a prima facie case. The Court noted that a “robust causality requirement” must be satisfied to show that a specific policy caused a statistical disparity to “protect[] defendants from being held liable for racial disparities they did not create.” “[A] disparate-impact claim that relies on a statistical disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies causing that disparity.” The Court emphasized that “prompt resolution of these cases [by courts] is important.” This, when taken together with the Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, may make maintaining a disparate impact claim under ECOA particularly difficult when addressing such practices as discretionary pricing (e.g., dealer markup in the auto finance context).
Second, with respect to the second step of the framework, the Court explained that “[g]overnmental or private policies are not contrary to the disparate-impact requirement unless they are ‘artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.’” The Court noted that this is critical to ensure that defendants “must not be prevented from achieving legitimate objectives.” Specifically, the Court endorsed the importance of considering “practical business choices and profit-related decisions that sustain a vibrant and dynamic free-enterprise system” in determining whether a company’s policy is supported by a legitimate business justification. The Court further explained that “entrepreneurs must be given latitude to consider market factors,” as well as other “objective” and “subjective” factors.
Third, the Court emphasized that before rejecting a “business justification,” a court “must determine that a plaintiff has shown that there is an available alternative practice that has less disparate impact and serves the entity’s legitimate needs.” (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Significantly, and in contrast to previous interpretations by federal agencies, the Court clarified that the plaintiff bears the burden of showing a less discriminatory alternative in the third step of the burden-shifting framework.
The Court cautioned that a rigorous application of the burden-shifting framework is necessary to prevent disparate-impact liability from supplanting nondiscriminatory private choice: “Were standards for proceeding with disparate-impact suits not to incorporate at least the safeguards discussed here, then disparate-impact liability might displace valid governmental and private priorities, rather than solely removing artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers. And that, in turn, would set our Nation back in its quest to reduce the salience of race in our social and economic system.” (internal citations and alterations omitted).
Special Alert: Supreme Court Upholds Disparate Impact Under Fair Housing Act, But Emphasizes Limits on Such Claims
Today, the Supreme Court in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. held that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). In a 5-4 decision, the Court concluded that the use of the phrase “otherwise make available” in Section 804 of the Fair Housing Act supports disparate-impact claims. The Court also held that Section 805 of the Fair Housing Act (which applies to lending) permits disparate impact, reasoning that the Court “has construed statutory language similar to § 805(a) to include disparate-impact liability.” The Court also wrote that the 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act support its conclusion because (1) all the federal Courts of Appeals to have considered the issue at that time had held that the FHA permits disparate-impact claims; and (2) the substance of the amendments, which the Court characterized as exceptions from disparate impact, “is convincing support for the conclusion that Congress accepted and ratified the unanimous holdings of the Courts of Appeals finding disparate-impact liability.”
The Court emphasized, however, that “disparate-impact liability has always been properly limited in key respects . . . .” Specifically, the Court explained disparate-impact liability must be limited so companies “are able to make the practical business choices and profit-related decisions that sustain a vibrant and dynamic free-enterprise system.” “Entrepreneurs must be given latitude to consider market factors,” the Court explained. The Court clarified further that a variety of factors, including both “objective” and “subjective” factors, are “legitimate concerns.”
To prevent what the Court characterized as “abusive disparate-impact claims,” the Court emphasized that the three-step burden-shifting framework used to analyze disparate-impact claims must be applied rigorously by courts and government agencies. At the first step in the framework, the Court noted that a “robust causality requirement” must be satisfied to show that a specific policy caused a statistical disparity to “protect[] defendants from being held liable for racial disparities they did not create.” “[A] disparate-impact claim that relies on a statistical disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies causing that disparity.” The Court emphasized that “prompt resolution of these cases [by courts] is important.”
With respect to the second step of the framework, the Court, citing the seminal Title VII case of Griggs v. Duke Power, further explained that “[g]overnmental or private policies are not contrary to the disparate-impact requirement unless they are ‘artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.’” The Court stated that this is critical to ensure that defendants “must not be prevented from achieving legitimate objectives.”
Finally, under the third step of the framework, the Court emphasized that before rejecting a “business justification,” a court “must determine that a plaintiff has shown that there is an available alternative practice that has less disparate impact and serves the entity’s legitimate needs.” (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Significantly, the Court clarified that the plaintiff bears the burden of showing a less discriminatory alternative in the third step of the burden-shifting framework.
Without a rigorous application of this burden shifting framework, the Court cautioned that disparate-impact liability could be used to replace nondiscriminatory private choice: “Were standards for proceeding with disparate-impact suits not to incorporate at least the safeguards discussed here, then disparate-impact liability might displace valid governmental and private priorities, rather than solely removing artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers. And that, in turn, would set our Nation back in its quest to reduce the salience of race in our social and economic system.” (internal citations and alterations omitted).
Although the Court did not expressly address whether its decision invalidates HUD’s disparate impact rule with its expansive burden shifting framework, the decision also does not rely on or defer to the discussion of the burden shifting framework contained in HUD’s disparate impact rule, notwithstanding the HUD rule’s extensive treatment of the burden shifting framework for disparate-impact claims under the FHA. The dissenting justices, however, concluded that given what they called “this unusual pattern” regarding the promulgation of the HUD rule, “there is an argument that deference may be unwarranted.”