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CSBS: OCC’s proposed “non-branch” provisions undermine dual banking system
On August 3, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) issued its comment letter to the OCC’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPR) on national bank and savings association activities concerning “non-branch” offices. Specifically, CSBS wrote that the “non-branch” provisions in the NPR make “far-reaching” revisions without legal authority, undermine the dual banking system, conflict with National Bank Act (NBA) preemption limits, and would allow national banks to operate branches without complying with related Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) obligations. Additionally, CSBS contended that the OCC’s rulemaking process is “truncated and flawed,” and afforded a particularly brief period for public comments during the Covid-19 pandemic.
According to CSBS, the NPR, announced in June (covered by InfoBytes here), would “expand the scope of activities that may occur at non-branch offices purportedly without regard” to state restrictions. These activities include: (i) performing loan approval and origination functions at a single, publicly accessible office; (ii) disbursing loan proceeds through an operating subsidiary; and (iii) establishing drop boxes and other unstaffed facilities. CSBS also contended that the NPR’s non-branch provisions would undermine Congressional intent and give national banks competitive advantages over state-charted banks. CSBS further argued that the non-branch provisions conflict with Congress’ clear intention that “NBA preemption does not apply to agents, affiliates or subsidiaries of national banks.” Finally, CSBS highlighted a distinction between the proposed non-branches (but de facto branches) and actual branch offices, arguing that the NPR creates a legal loophole allowing non-branch national banks to avoid CRA obligations associated with licensed branches.
District court denies interlocutory appeal request in escrow interest action
On July 9, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland denied a national bank’s request for interlocutory appeal of the court’s February decision denying the bank’s motion to dismiss an action, which alleged that the bank violated Maryland law by not paying interest on escrow sums for residential mortgages. As previously covered by InfoBytes, after the bank allegedly failed to pay interest on a consumer’s mortgage escrow account, the consumer filed suit against the bank alleging, among other things, a violation of Section 12-109 of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), which “requires lenders to pay interest on funds maintained in escrow on behalf of borrowers.” The court rejected the bank’s assertion that the state law is preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA) and by the OCC’s 2004 preemption regulations. The court concluded that under the Dodd-Frank Act, national banks are required to pay interest on escrow accounts when mandated by applicable state or federal law.
The bank subsequently moved for an interlocutory appeal. In denying the bank’s request, the court explained that there was not a difference of opinion among courts as to whether the NBA preempts Maryland’s interest on escrow law. Specifically, the court noted that its “conclusion aligns with the only other two courts that have examined [the] particular question,” citing to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lusnak v Bank of America and the Eastern District of New York’s decision in Hymes v. Bank of America (covered by InfoBytes here and here, respectively). After finding there is no “difference of opinion as to any ‘controlling legal issue,’” the court concluded the motion failed to satisfy the requisite elements for an interlocutory appeal.
CSBS challenges OCC’s Covid-19 preemption bulletin
On June 24, the Director of Regulatory Policy & Policy Counsel at CSBS, Mike Townsley, wrote a blog post in response to the OCC’s Bulletin on Covid-19 preemption, arguing that the bulletin does not have the force and effect of law. As previously covered by InfoBytes, on June 17, the OCC issued a Bulletin stating that banks are governed primarily by federal standards and generally are not subject to state law limitations. The OCC acknowledged states’ efforts to respond to the economic disruptions as “well-intended,” but noted that the competing requirements could risk banks’ safety and soundness. The Bulletin also provided specific examples of the types of state laws that do not apply to banks’ lending and deposit activities.
In response, Townsley asserts that the Bulletin has no preemptive effect, because the OCC did not follow the “process required by the National Bank Act (NBA) to determine that these state COVID-19 relief measures are preempted.” Specifically, Townsley argues that through the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress “amended the NBA to overturn the OCC’s preemption regulations and establish substantive procedural requirements for the determination of whether the NBA preempts a state law.” The requirements include a court or the OCC having to conclude that the law “‘prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its powers,’” which determination, according to Townsley, if made by the OCC, must be on a case-by-case basis, and include a notice and comment period and the backing of “‘substantial evidence’ on the record.” Townsley also seeks to cast further doubt as to whether the preemption regulations cited by the Bulletin can serve as a guide on procedural grounds, observing that Dodd-Frank requires the OCC to review and decide, through notice and comment, whether to “continue or rescind” each preemption determination every five years, and it has been “well over five years” since the rules were adopted and no such review has ever been conducted. Townsley concludes by citing to the 19th century Supreme Court decision Nat'l Bank v. Commonwealth, stating that national banks “’are subject to the laws of the State.’”
California State Assembly Banking and Finance Committee issues memorandum on Covid-19 banking and finance issues
On March 20, the California State Assembly Banking and Finance Committee issued a memorandum noting that state authority over large national banks “is significantly constrained by federal law.” The memorandum provides that, under the National Bank Act and related case law, courts have widely upheld federal preemption over state laws that “interfere with the business of banking.” As such, courts “would likely stop any attempts by the state to force banks to limit rates or fees, demand forbearance or loan modifications, or require banks to make certain loans.” While state officials may urge national banks to give their borrowers relief, “these requests do not carry the force of law.” The memorandum also discusses mortgage rates and home sales, noting that in the event that mortgage rates increase and negatively affect the real estate market, “state legislators have limited tools to address such problems.”
District court: Maryland’s interest on escrow law not preempted by National Bank Act
On February 24, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland denied a national bank’s motion to dismiss a putative class action alleging the bank violated Maryland law by not paying interest on escrow sums for residential mortgages. After the bank allegedly failed to pay the mortgage escrow interest, the consumer filed a lawsuit asserting various claims including for violation of Section 12-109 of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), which “requires lenders to pay interest on funds maintained in escrow on behalf of borrowers.” In response, the bank filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the state law is preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA) and by 2004 OCC preemption regulations.
The court disagreed, determining that under the Dodd-Frank Act, national banks are required to pay interest on escrow accounts when mandated by applicable state or federal law. Citing previous decisions in similar escrow interest cases brought against the same bank in other states (covered by InfoBytes here and here), the court stated that Section 12-109 “does not prevent or significantly interfere with [the bank’s] exercise of its federal banking authority, because [Section] 12-109’s ‘interference’ is minimal, when compared with statutes that the Supreme Court has previously found were preempted.” The court noted that state law—which “still allows [the bank] to require escrow accounts for its borrowers”—provides that the bank must pay a small amount of interest to borrowers if it chooses to maintain escrow accounts. Moreover, the court concluded that the bank’s “suggestions about interference are belied by the fact that its direct competitors dutifully comply with [Section] 12-109.” As for the OCC’s 2004 preemption regulation, Section 34.4, the court determined that the regulation is entitled to minimal deference, and noted that it is not clear that the OCC, in promulgating the regulations, “ever considered whether the NBA preempts state laws that mandate payment of interest for escrow accounts.” According to the court, the regulations do not mention state escrow interest laws at all. As such, the court stated that it “will not defer to the OCC’s regulation, or to the agency’s current position that [Section] 12-109 is preempted.”
State AGs urge OCC to withdraw Madden proposal
On January 21, a bipartisan collation of attorneys general from 21 states and the District of Columbia, along with the Hawaii Office of Consumer Protection, submitted a comment letter in response to the OCC’s proposed rule to clarify that when a national bank or savings association sells, assigns, or otherwise transfers a loan, the interest permissible prior to the transfer continues to be permissible following the transfer. (See Buckley Special Alert on the proposed rule.) The coalition, led by California, Illinois, and New York, urges the OCC to withdraw the proposed rule. Among their concerns, the AGs argue that the OCC’s proposal conflicts with the National Bank Act and Dodd-Frank, exceeds the OCC’s statutory authority, and is in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Specifically, the AGs claim that the proposed rule conflicts with National Bank Act (NBA) provisions that grant benefits of federal preemption only to national banks and no one else. Moreover, the AGs assert that Congress explicitly stated in Dodd-Frank that “that the benefits of federal preemption provided by the NBA accrue only to [n]ational [b]anks,” (emphasis in original) and argue that the proposed rule would contravene “this important limitation” and “cloak non-banks in [the NBA’s] preemptive power.” Moreover, the NBA sections say “nothing about interest chargeable by assignees, transferees, or purchasers of bank loans,” the AGs write.
The AGs also argue that the proposed rule would facilitate predatory “rent-a-bank schemes” by allowing non-bank entities to ignore state interest rate caps and usury laws. “The OCC has not addressed, even summarily, how the [p]roposed [r]ule, if adopted, will serve to incentivize and sanction predatory rent-a-bank schemes,” the AGs state. “This failure to consider the substantial negative consequences this rule would have on consumer financial protection across the country renders the OCC’s [p]roposed [r]ule arbitrary and capricious.” Furthermore, the AGs contend that the OCC’s proposed rule contains no factual findings or reasoned analysis to support its proposal to extend NBA preemption to all non-bank entities that purchase loans from national banks. “[T]his is beyond the agency’s power,” the AGs argue, asserting that “[t]he OCC simply ‘may not rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own sense of how the statute should operate.’”
District Court enters final judgment: Only depository institutions can receive OCC fintech charter
On October 21, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York entered a final judgment in NYDFS’s lawsuit against the OCC challenging the agency’s Special Purpose National Bank Charter (SPNB), concluding that the regulation should be “set aside with respect to all fintech applicants seeking a national bank charter that do not accept deposits.” As previously covered by InfoBytes, in May the district court denied the OCC’s motion to dismiss the complaint by NYDFS, which argued that the agency’s decision to allow fintech companies to apply for a SPNB is a move that will destabilize financial markets more effectively regulated by the state. The court stated that because the OCC failed to rebut NYDFS’s claims that the proposed national fintech charter posed a threat to the state’s ability to establish its own laws and regulations, the challenge “is ripe for adjudication.” After the May decision, the OCC informed the court that it would be seeking final judgment in the case, and on October 7, each party submitted proposed final orders (available here and here). The proposals were “nearly identical,” according to the court, as both (i) “direct the Clerk of Court to enter final judgment in favor of plaintiff [NYDFS] and close the case,” and (ii) “provide that each party shall bear its own fees and costs.” However, NYDFS proposed “that the regulation be ‘set aside with respect to all fintech applicants seeking a national bank charter that do not accept deposits,’” while the OCC suggested the regulation only be set aside “‘with respect to all fintech applicants seeking a national bank charter that do not accept deposits, and that have a nexus to New York State…in a manner that would subject them to regulation by [NYDFS].’” The court agreed with NYDFS, concluding that the OCC “failed to identify a persuasive reason to deviate from ordinary administrative law procedure,” which requires “vacatur” of the regulation.
District Court: New York’s interest on escrow law not preempted by National Bank Act
On September 30, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that the National Bank Act (NBA) does not preempt a New York law requiring interest on mortgage escrow accounts. According to the opinion, plaintiffs brought a pair of putative class actions against a national bank seeking interest on funds deposited into their mortgage escrow accounts, as required by New York General Obligation Law § 5-601. The bank moved to dismiss both complaints, arguing that the NBA preempts the state law. The district court disagreed, concluding that the plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract can proceed, while dismissing the others. The court concluded there is “clear evidence that Congress intended mortgage escrow accounts, even those administered by national banks, to be subject to some measure of consumer protection regulation.” As for the OCC’s 2004 preemption regulation, the court determined that there is no evidence that “at this time, the agency gave any thought whatsoever to the specific question raised in this case, which is whether the NBA preempts escrow interest laws,” citing to and agreeing with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lusnak v. Bank of America (which held that a national bank must comply with a California law that requires mortgage lenders to pay interest on mortgage escrow accounts, previously covered by InfoBytes here). Lastly, the court applied the preemption standard from the 1996 Supreme Court decision in Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, and found that the law does not “significantly interfere” with the banks’ power to administer mortgage escrow accounts, noting that it only “requires the Bank to pay interest on the comparatively small sums” deposited into the accounts and does not “bar the creation of mortgage escrow accounts, or subject them to state visitorial control, or otherwise limit the terms of their use.”
District Court approves final Madden class action settlement
On September 10, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a final order and judgment to approve a class action settlement agreement, which ends litigation dating back to 2011 concerning alleged violations of state usury limitations. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the plaintiffs brought claims against a debt collection firm and its affiliate alleging violations of the FDCPA and New York state usury law when the defendants attempted to collect charged-off credit card debt with interest rates above the state’s 25 percent cap that was purchased from a national bank. In 2017, upon remand following the 2nd Circuit’s decision that a nonbank entity taking assignment of debts originated by a national bank is not entitled to protection under the National Bank Act from state-law usury claims (covered by a Buckley Special Alert here), the district court certified the class and allowed the FDCPA and related state unfair or deceptive acts or practices claims to proceed.
Following a fairness hearing, the court granted the parties’ joint motion for final approval, which divides the approximately 58,000 class members into two subclasses: claims alleging state-law violations, and claims alleging FDCPA violations. Under the terms of the settlement, the defendants are required to, among other things, (i) provide class members with $555,000 in monetary relief; (ii) provide $9.2 million in credit balance reductions; (iii) pay $550,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs; (iv) pay class representatives $5,000 each; and (v) agree to comply with all applicable laws, regulations, and case law regarding the collection of interest, including the collection of usurious interest.
OCC wants final judgment in NYDFS fintech charter challenge
On May 30, the OCC filed a letter with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York notifying the court that it intends to work with NYDFS to issue a proposed final order to the court in the action challenging the OCC’s decision to allow fintech companies to apply for a Special Purpose National Bank Charter (SPNB). As previously covered by InfoBytes, in May, the court denied the OCC’s motion to dismiss, concluding that, among other things, the OCC failed to rebut NYDFS’s claims that the proposed national fintech charter posed a threat to the state’s ability to establish its own laws and regulations, and therefore, the challenge “is ripe for adjudication.” In its letter, the OCC states that while it “disagrees with the Court’s decision, and reserves its right to appeal, it believes that the decision renders entry of final judgment in this matter appropriate.” An entry of final judgment, would allow the OCC to challenge the decision with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit.