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Agencies defeat states’ valid-when-made challenge
On February 8, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted cross-motions for summary judgment in favor of the OCC and FDIC (see here and here), upholding their respective rules which clarify that interest charges that are permissible when a loan is originated “shall not be affected by the sale, assignment, or other transfer of the loan.” The judgments resolve lawsuits brought by several state attorneys general in 2020, challenging both the OCC’s final rule on “Permissible Interest on Loans that are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred” (known also as the valid-when-made rule) and the FDIC’s final rule which clarified that under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA), whether interest on a loan is permissible is determined at the time the loan is made and is not affected by the sale, assignment, or other transfer of the loan.
In the OCC matter, the states’ argued that the agency’s valid-when-made rule (which effectively reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s 2015 Madden v. Midland Funding decision, and was covered by InfoBytes here) impermissibly preempts state law, is contrary to the plain language of section 85 (and section 1463(g)(1)), and contravenes the judgment of Congress, which declined to extend preemption to nonbanks. Moreover, the states contended that the OCC failed to give meaningful consideration to the commentary received regarding the rule, essentially enabling “‘rent-a-bank’ schemes.” The OCC countered that its rule does not preempt state law but rather “merely interprets” banks’ authority to charge interest. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) The court agreed with the OCC, holding that the OCC was interpreting the scope of 12 U.S.C. § 85, not determining whether to preempt state laws, and therefore was not required to follow the procedures set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 25b as the states alleged, including consulting with the CFPB. Applying the Chevron framework, the court upheld the OCC’s interpretations of the National Bank Act and Home Owners’ Loan Act. Acting Comptroller of the Currency Michael J. Hsu issued a statement following the decision, in which he emphasized that while the court’s order “affirmed the validity of the OCC’s rule,” the “legal certainty should be used to the benefit of consumers and not be abused.” He added that the agency “is committed to strong supervision that expands financial inclusion and ensures banks are not used as a vehicle for ‘rent-a-charter’ arrangements.”
In the FDIC matter, the states argued, among other things, that the FDIC did not have the power to issue the final rule under 12 U.S.C. § 1831d, and asserted that while the FDIC may issue “regulations to carry out” the provisions of the FDIA, it cannot issue regulations that would apply to nonbanks. The states also claimed that the rule’s extension of state law preemption would facilitate evasion of state law by enabling “rent-a-bank” schemes. The FDIC countered that the states’ arguments misconstrue the rule, which does not regulate nonbanks, does not interpret state law, and does not preempt state law. Rather, the FDIC argued that the rule clarifies the FDIA by “reasonably” filling in “two statutory gaps” surrounding banks’ interest rate authority. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) The court rejected the states’ argument that the FDIC exceeded its authority, and held that under Chevron, the agency’s interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 1831d is not unreasonable. In upholding the FDIC’s interpretation, the court stated that the final rule “does not purport to regulate either the transferee’s conduct or any changes to the interest rate once a transaction is consummated.”
D.C. reaches nearly $4 million settlement with online lender to resolve usury allegations
On February 8, the District of Columbia attorney general announced a nearly $4 million settlement with an online lender to resolve allegations that lender marketed high-costs loans carrying interest rates exceeding D.C.’s interest rate cap. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the AG filed a complaint in 2020, claiming the lender violated the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA) by offering two loan products to D.C. residents carrying annual percentage rates (APR) ranging between 99-149 percent and 129-251 percent. Interest rates in D.C., however, are capped at 24 percent for loans with the rate expressed in the contract (loans that do not state an express interest rate in the contract are capped at six percent), and licensed money lenders that exceed these limits are in violation of the CPPA. According to the AG, the lender—who allegedly never possessed a money lending license in D.C.—violated the CPPA by (i) unlawfully misrepresenting it was allowed to offer loans in D.C. and failing to disclose or adequately disclose that its loans contain APRs in excess of D.C. usury limits; (ii) engaging in unfair and unconscionable practices through misleading marketing efforts; and (iii) violating D.C. usury laws.
Under the terms of the settlement, the company is required to (i) pay at least $3.3 million in restitution to refund alleged interest overcharges to D.C. borrowers; (ii) provide more than $300,000 in debt forgiveness to D.C. borrowers who would have paid future interest amounts in connection with an outstanding loan balance; and (iii) pay $450,000 to the District. According to the announcement, the company has also agreed that it “will not on its own, or working with third parties such as out of state banks, engage in any act or practice that violates the CPPA in its offer, servicing, advertisement, or provision of loans or lines of credit to District consumers.” The company is also prohibited from charging usurious interest rates, must delete negative credit information associated with its loans and lines of credit, and may not represent that it can offer loans or lines of credit in D.C. without first obtaining a D.C. money lender license.
CFPB sues pawn lenders for MLA violations
On November 12, the CFPB filed a complaint against a Texas-based pawn lender and its wholly owned subsidiary (together, “lenders”) for allegedly violating the Military Lending Act (MLA) by charging active-duty servicemembers and their dependents more than the allowable 36 percent annual percentage rate on pawn loans. According to the Bureau, between June 2017 and May 2021, the two lenders together allegedly made more than 3,600 pawn loans carrying APRs that “frequently exceeded” 200 percent to more than 1,000 covered borrowers. The Bureau further claimed that the lenders failed to make all loan disclosures required by the MLA and forced borrowers to waive their ability to sue. The identified 3,600 pawn loans only represent a limited period for which the Bureau has transactional data, the complaint stated, adding that the pawn stores located in Arizona, Nevada, Utah, and Washington that originated these loans only comprise roughly 10 percent of the Texas lender’s nationwide pawn-loan transactions. As such, that Bureau alleged that the lenders—together with their other wholly owned subsidiaries—made additional pawn loans in violation of the MLA from stores in these and other states. The Bureau seeks injunctive relief, consumer restitution, disgorgement, civil money penalties, and other relief, including a court order enjoining the lenders from collecting on the allegedly illegal loans and from selling or assigning such debts.
As previously covered by InfoBytes, the Bureau issued a prior consent order against an affiliated lender in 2013, which required the payment of $14 million in consumer redress and a $5 million civil money penalty. The affiliated lender was also ordered to cease its MLA violations. In its current action, the Bureau noted that because the Texas lender (who was not identified in the 2013 action) is a successor to the prior affiliated lender, it is therefore subject to the 2013 order. Accordingly, the Bureau alleged that the Texas lender’s violations of the MLA also violated the 2013 order.
OCC issues semi-annual Interest Rate Risk Statistics Report
On October 20, the OCC published the fall 2021 edition of the Interest Rate Risk Statistics Report. The report presents interest rate risk data gathered during examinations of OCC-supervised midsize and community banks and federal savings associations with reported data by asset size, charter type, and minority depository institutions. The OCC’s supervisory process for the fall 2021 report reviewed banks’ reported data from September 30, 2019 to June 30, 2021, including exposures, risk limits, and non-maturity deposit assumptions. The OCC notes that the statistics presented within the report “are for informational purposes only and do not represent OCC-suggested limits or exposures.”
District Court allows usury claims to proceed, says class action waivers do not bar certification
On October 14, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted class certification in an action alleging a payday lending operation violated RICO and Virginia’s usury law by partnering with federally-recognized tribes to issue loans with allegedly usurious interest rates. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants (“founders, funders, [or] closely held owners of [a lender] that serviced the high-interest loans made by certain tribal lending entities”) participated in a lending scheme to circumvent state usury laws. The plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and attorney’s fees and costs arising from claims alleging that the defendants, among other things: (i) used income derived from the collection of unlawful debt to further assist the operations of the enterprise; (ii) participated in an enterprise involving the unlawful collection of debt; (iii) collected unlawful debt; (iv) entered into unlawful agreements; (v) issued unlawful loans with interest rates exceeding 12 percent; and (vi) were thus unjustly enriched. The court granted class certification after finding that the existence of a class action waiver in loan agreements between plaintiffs and tribal lenders did not bar class certification. The court explained that “[b]ecause the class action waivers exist to ‘make unavailable to the borrowers the effective vindication of federal statutory protections and remedies,’ the prospective waiver doctrine applies.” The waivers were thus unenforceable.
CFPB examines subprime auto loans
On September 30, the CFPB released a Data Point report, titled Subprime Auto Loan Outcomes by Lender Type, which examines interest rate and default risk trends across different types of subprime lenders, including how much of the variation of interest rates charged among subprime lenders can be explained by differences in default rates and how much is left to be explained. The report found notable average differences across lender types in the borrowers they serve and the types of vehicles they finance. Banks and credit unions offering subprime auto loans typically lend to borrowers with higher credit scores compared to finance companies and buy-here-pay-here dealerships, the report noted, adding that different lenders also charge very different interest rates on average. According to the report’s sample, a bank’s average subprime loan interest rate is approximately 10 percent, compared to 15 to 20 percent at finance companies and buy-here-pay-here dealerships. The report found that higher default rates were found at lenders that charged higher interest rates, and that “the likelihood of a subprime auto loan becoming at least 60 days delinquent within three years is approximately 15 percent for bank borrowers and between 25 percent and 40 percent for finance company and buy-here-pay-here borrowers.”
However, the report presented statistical analysis that called into question whether differences in default rates fully explained the average differences in interest rates across subprime lender types. As an example, an average borrower with a 560 credit score or higher would have the same default risk whether the borrower obtained a loan from a bank or a small buy-here-pay-here lender, but the estimated interest rate would be nine percent with a bank loan versus 13 percent from a small buy-here-pay-here lender. The report noted that there are other variables, not observed in the data collected, that may explain differences in interest rates charged by different types of auto lenders, such as down payments, vehicle values, variations in borrowers’ access to information, borrowers’ financial sophistication, and variations within lenders’ business practices and incentives.
District Court: Maryland escrow law does not confer private right of action
On September 22, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland granted a national bank’s motion for summary judgment in an action claiming the bank allegedly failed to pay interest on mortgage escrow accounts. The plaintiff filed a putative class action asserting various claims including for violation of Section 12-109 of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), which requires lenders to pay interest on funds maintained in escrow on behalf of borrowers. In response, the bank filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the MCPA is preempted by the National Bank Act and by 2004 OCC preemption regulations. In 2020, the court denied the bank’s motion to dismiss after it determined, among other things, that under Dodd-Frank, national banks are required to pay interest on escrow accounts when mandated by applicable state or federal law. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) Citing previous decisions in similar escrow interest cases brought against the same bank in other states (covered by InfoBytes here and here), the court stated that Section 12-109 “does not prevent or significantly interfere with [the bank’s] exercise of its federal banking authority, because [Section] 12-109’s ‘interference’ is minimal, when compared with statutes that the Supreme Court has previously found were preempted.” The court further noted that state law—which “still allows [the bank] to require escrow accounts for its borrowers”—provides that the bank must pay a small amount of interest to borrowers if it chooses to maintain escrow accounts.
However, in its most recent ruling, the court held that the MCPA does not authorize the plaintiff to sue either. “[T]his court finds that § 12-109 does not confer a private right of action,” the court wrote, adding that the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim could not get around a notice-and-cure provision in her mortgage agreement that she had not complied with before suing. The plaintiff argued that these requirements did not apply because “her self-styled breach of contract claim is actually a statutory claim because the allegedly breached contractual provision is one which pledges general adherence to applicable law.” The court disagreed, stating that under the plaintiff’s theory “any claim for breach of contract, which also violated a federal or state law, would be vaulted to a privileged hybrid status. Such claims would enjoy an unlimited private right of action (regardless of whether the underlying statute created one) and. . .would be unbounded by any of the provisions or conditions precedent detailed in the contract itself.” The court also ruled that the plaintiff’s escrow statements, which “correctly reflected that her account was not accruing interest,” are themselves “not rendered deceptive by the mere fact that Plaintiff believes such interest is owed.”
District Court: Arbitration provision is severable from a voided loan contract
On September 16, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama granted a defendant tribal payday lender’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, ruling that an arbitration agreement in a loan contract is still valid even if an arbitration panel found the contracts were void. The plaintiff initiated an arbitration proceeding against the defendant alleging that payday loan contracts carrying interest rates between 200 and 830 percent were void because the defendant was not licensed under the Alabama Small Loans Act to extend such loans. An American Arbitration Association panel determined, among other things, that the defendant had waived any tribal sovereign immunity, “the transactions involved off-reservation commercial activities to which sovereign immunity does not apply,” and that the loans were entirely void because each of the loans was extended without a license. The plaintiff filed suit in state court to confirm the arbitration award and pursue a class action on the premise that the loans are usurious and should be declared void. The defendant removed the case to federal court and asked the court to dismiss the proposed class action and compel arbitration. The district court agreed with the defendant that the arbitration agreement in the voided loan contract remained binding despite the arbitrator’s earlier determination in the plaintiff’s favor. Specifically, the court disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument that the arbitrator’s determination meant that “no aspect of the contact survives,” stating that the plaintiff “overlooks a central tenet in binding precedential arbitration law: severability.” According to the court, “‘[a]s a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the contract.’”
9th Circuit says tribal lenders can arbitrate RICO class claims
On September 16, a split U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that “an agreement delegating to an arbitrator the gateway question of whether the underlying arbitration agreement is enforceable must be upheld unless that specific delegation provision is itself unenforceable.” The appellate court’s decision reversed a district court’s ruling that an arbitration agreement entered between tribal lenders and borrowers was unenforceable because it impermissibly waived borrowers’ rights to pursue federal statutory claims. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in April the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted class certification to residents who received loans from an online lender, allowing them to pursue class Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims based on allegations they were charged interest rates that exceeded state limits for lenders claiming tribal immunity. The class of borrowers include California residents who collected loans from an Oklahoma-based tribe, and California residents who received loans from a Montana-based tribe. The district court also ruled that the entire arbitration agreement, including provisions containing a class action waiver, was unenforceable. The lenders appealed.
On appeal, the 9th Circuit majority cited to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, which determined, among other things, that when a party challenges an entire agreement—not just an arbitration provision—deciding “gateway” issues such as enforceability must be delegated to an arbitrator. “We do not dispute that [b]orrowers have a reasonable argument that the arbitration agreement as written precludes them from asserting their RICO claims or other federal claims in arbitration. . . . And if that is true, the arbitration agreement is likely unenforceable as a prospective waiver,” the majority wrote. “But, when there is a clear delegation provision, that question is. . .for the arbitrator to decide so long as the delegation provision itself does not eliminate parties’ rights to purse their federal remedies,” the majority added.
The 9th Circuit’s opinion differs from decisions issued by other appellate courts, which found that certain delegation provisions were unenforceable for various reasons after reviewing whether an arbitration agreement as a whole was unenforceable due to prospective waiver of federal claims. (See InfoBytes coverage of the 3rd and 4th Circuit decisions here and here.) The majority stated that the other appellate courts “considered the wrong thing by ‘confus[ing] the question of who decides arbitrability with the separate question of who prevails on arbitrability.’” According to the majority, “[t]he proper question is not whether the entire arbitration agreement constitutes a prospective waiver, but whether the antecedent agreement delegating resolution of that question to the arbitrator constitutes prospective waiver.”
Massachusetts announces $27 million settlement with auto lender
On September 1, the Massachusetts attorney general announced “the largest settlement of its kind” with a Michigan-based auto finance company (defendant) resolving allegations of predatory lending and deceptive debt collection practices. The defendant allegedly made high-interest subprime auto loans that it knew or should have known that many borrowers would be unable to repay. The assurance of discontinuance states that some of the company’s borrowers were subject to hidden finance charges, which resulted in violations of Massachusetts’s 21 percent usury cap. The defendant also allegedly “failed to inform investors that it topped off securitization loan pools with higher-risk loans.” Under the terms of the settlement, the defendant must pay a total of $27.2 million and provide debt relief and credit repair to over 3,000 borrowers across the state who are expected to be eligible for settlement funds. The settlement also requires that the defendant make changes to its loan handling practices. According to the AG, this action “is part of her Office’s ongoing industry-wide review of securitization practices in the subprime auto loan market.”