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District court applies OCC’s valid-when-made final rule but raises true lender question
On August 12, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado reversed in part a bankruptcy court judgment, concluding that the OCC’s valid-when-made rule applied but that discovery was needed to determine whether a nonbank entity was the true lender. According to the opinion, a debtor corporation commenced an adversary proceeding against a creditor in their bankruptcy, alleging, among other things, that the interest rate of the underlying debt’s promissory note is usurious under Colorado law. The promissory note was executed between a Wisconsin state-charted bank and a Colorado-based corporation, with an interest rate of nearly 121 percent. The note included a choice of law provision dictating that federal law and Wisconsin law govern. A deed of trust, dictating that Colorado law (the property’s location) governs, was pledged as security on the promissory note and incorporated by referencing the terms of the note. Subsequently, the Wisconsin bank assigned its rights under the note and deed of trust to a nonbank entity registered in New York with a principal place of business in New Jersey. The bankruptcy court denied the debtor’s claims, concluding that the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) applied, which dictated the application of Wisconsin law, making the interest rate valid.
On appeal, the district court applied the OCC’s valid-when-made rule (which was finalized in June and covered by a Buckley Special Alert), concluding that “a promissory note with an interest rate that was valid when made under DIDMCA § 1831d remains valid upon assignment to a non-bank.” However, the district court noted that DIDMCA § 1831d does not apply to promissory notes “with a nonbank true lender” and the parties did not “conduct discovery on the factual question of whether [the nonbank entity] was the true lender.” Thus, the court reversed and remanded to the Bankruptcy Court to determine whether the nonbank entity was the true lender.
Federal Reserve Board announces revised pricing for its Municipal Liquidity Facility
On August 11, the Federal Reserve Board announced revised pricing for its Municipal Liquidity Facility. The revised pricing reduces the interest rate spread on tax-exempt notes for each credit rating category by 50 basis points and reduces the amount by which the interest rate for taxable notes is adjusted relative to tax-exempt notes. The MLF, originally covered here, was one of several facilities intended to support the flow of credit in the economy.
State AGs challenge OCC’s “valid-when-made” rule
On July 29, the California, Illinois, and New York attorneys general filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California challenging the OCC’s valid-when-made rule, arguing the rule “impermissibly preempts state law.” As previously covered by a Buckley Special Alert, on June 2 the OCC issued a final rule designed to effectively reverse the Second Circuit’s 2015 Madden v. Midland Funding decision. The “true lender” rule provides that “[i]nterest on a loan that is permissible under [12 U.S.C. 85 for national bank or 12 U.S.C 1463(g)(1) for federal thrifts] shall not be affected by the sale, assignment, or other transfer of the loan.”
The attorneys general argue in their complaint that the rule is “contrary to the plain language” of section 85 (and section 1463(g)(1)) and “contravenes the judgment of Congress,” which declined to extend preemption to non-banks. Moreover, the complaint asserts that the OCC disregarded congressional procedures for preemption by failing to perform a case-by-case review of state laws and not consulting with the CFPB before “preempting such a state consumer-protection law.” The attorneys general further contend that the OCC “failed to give meaningful consideration” to the commentary received regarding the rule essentially enabling “‘rent-a-bank’ schemes.” The result of the OCC’s actions, according to the attorneys general, is a rule that would allow “predatory lenders to evade state law by partnering with a federally chartered bank to originate loans exempt from state interest-rate caps.” These structures “have long troubled state law-enforcement efforts,” according to the complaint, and the rule will exacerbate these issues by “decreas[ing] licensing fees received by the States and increase[ing] the cost and burden of future supervisory, investigative, and law-enforcement efforts by the States.”
The complaint requests the court declare that the OCC violated the Administrative Procedures Act in issuing the rule and hold the rule unlawful.
4th Circuit affirms arbitration clause waiving statutory rights is unenforceable
On July 21, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, holding that the arbitration agreements operated as prospective waivers of federal law and were thus unenforceable. According to the opinion, a group of Virginia borrowers filed suit against two online lenders owned by a sovereign Native American tribe and their investors (collectively, “defendants”). In the action, the plaintiffs contended that they obtained payday loans from the defendants, which included annual interest rates between 219 percent to 373 percent—an alleged violation of Virginia’s usury laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The defendants moved to compel arbitration, which the district court denied, concluding that choice-of-law provisions—such as “‘[t]his agreement to arbitrate shall be governed by Tribal Law’; ‘[t]he arbitrator shall apply Tribal Law’; and the arbitration award ‘must be consistent with this Agreement and Tribal Law’”—prospectively excluded federal law, making them unenforceable.
On appeal, the 4th Circuit agreed with the district court despite a “strong federal policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements.” Most significantly, the appellate court rejected the defendants’ assertion that the choice-of-law provisions did not operate as a prospective waiver. The court noted that while the choice-of-law provisions “do not explicitly disclaim the application of federal law, the practical effect is the same,” as they limit an arbitrator’s award to “remedies available under Tribal Law,” effectively preempting “the application of any contrary law—including contrary federal law.” Moreover, the appellate court concluded that under the arbitration agreement, borrowers would be unable to effectively pursue RICO claims against the defendants, and more specifically, would be unable to “effectively vindicate a federal statutory claim for treble damages” under RICO. Thus, because federal statutory protections and remedies are unavailable to borrowers under the agreement, the appellate court concluded the entire agreement is unenforceable.
3rd Circuit: Arbitration clause limiting borrowers’ statutory rights is unenforceable
On July 14, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, holding that an arbitration clause contained within an online tribal lender’s payday loan agreement impermissibly strips borrowers of their right to assert statutory claims and is therefore unenforceable. Specifically, because this “limitation constitutes a prospective waiver of statutory rights,” the lender’s arbitration agreement “violates public policy and is therefore unenforceable.” The plaintiffs filed a putative class action contending that they obtained payday loans from the lender, which included annual interest rates between 496.55 percent to 714.88 percent—an alleged violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and various Pennsylvania consumer protection laws. The defendants moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the defendants’ arbitration request, ruling that “the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because the arbitrator is permitted only to consider tribal law,” and, therefore, the arbitrator could not consider any of plaintiffs’ federal or state law claims. The 3rd Circuit agreed, rejecting, among other things, the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs could bring RICO-like claims under tribal law and possibly receive “similar relief.” The appellate court noted: “The question is whether a party can bring and effectively pursue the federal claim—not whether some other law is a sufficient substitute.”
Online payday lender settles usury suit for $141 million
On June 26, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia approved a preliminary settlement to resolve putative class allegations against an online payday lending company and related entities (defendants) accused of issuing high interest loans through a “rent-a-tribe” lending operation. According to the class’s second amended complaint, the defendants’ “rent-a-tribe” operation was an “attempt to circumvent state and federal law by issuing high interest loans in the name of a Native American tribal business entity that purports to be shielded by the principle of tribal sovereign immunity.” The class—which consists of borrowers from throughout the U.S.—alleged that the defendants provided “financing and various lending functions” carrying “extortionately high interest rates for short-term loans” that were “far beyond legal limits,” and that the unlawful interest rates were not disclosed to borrowers during the application process. Additionally, the class alleged that the defendants failed to provide key loan terms or misrepresented the loan terms, including repayment schedules, finance charges, and the total amount of payments due. Under the terms of the settlement, the defendants will pay a $65 million cash payment, cancel $76 million in high-interest loans, and provide other non-monetary relief.
FDIC follows OCC, adopts final rule addressing Madden
On June 25, the FDIC issued a final rule clarifying that whether interest on a loan is permissible under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act is determined at the time the loan is made and is not affected by the sale, assignment, or other transfer of the loan. The FDIC’s final rule effectively reverses the Second Circuit’s 2015 Madden v. Midland Funding decision as applicable to state banks and follows the OCC’s issuance of a similar rule earlier this month for national charters. Specifically, the FDIC’s final rule states that, “[w]hether interest on a loan is permissible under section 27 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act is determined as of the date the loan was made. . . [and] shall not be affected by a change in State law, a change in the relevant commercial paper rate after the loan was made, or the sale, assignment, or other transfer of the loan, in whole or in part.” Additionally, the FDIC rule mirrors the OCC in specifying that the rule does “not address the question of whether a State bank. . .is a real party in interest with respect to a loan or has an economic interest in the loan under state law, e.g. which entity is the ‘true lender.’” Details on the effect of these rules can be found in Buckley’s Special Alert on the OCC’s issuance.
District of Columbia AG claims online lender violated usury statutes
On June 5, the District of Columbia attorney general filed a complaint against an online lender for alleged violations of the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA) by marketing high-costs loans carrying interest rates exceeding D.C.’s interest rate caps. The complaint alleges that the lender offers two loan products to D.C. residents: (i) an installment loan with an annual percentage rate (APR) range of 99-149 percent; and (ii) a second loan product with an undisclosed APR that ranges between 129-251 percent. However, interest rates in D.C. are capped at 24 percent for loans with the rate expressed in the contract (loans that do not state an express interest rate in the contract are capped at six percent), and licensed money lenders that exceed these limits are in violation of the CPPA. According to the AG, the lender—who has allegedly never possessed a money lending license in D.C.—violated the CPPA by (i) unlawfully misrepresenting it is allowed to offer loans in D.C. and failing to disclose or adequately disclose that its loans contain APRs in excess of D.C. usury limits; (ii) engaging in unfair and unconscionable practices through misleading marketing efforts; and (iii) violating D.C. usury laws. In addition, the lender allegedly violated District of Columbia Municipal Regulations Title 16 by lending money in D.C. without being licensed. The complaint seeks a permanent injunction, restitution, and civil penalties. In addition, the complaint asks the court to order the lender’s loans unenforceable and void.
Acting Comptroller Brooks will focus on responsible innovation, fintech charters
On May 29, Acting Comptroller of the Currency Brian P. Brooks issued a statement focusing on four priorities intended to help meet the challenges facing banks today. As previously covered by InfoBytes, Brooks was named Acting Comptroller following the departure of former Comptroller Joseph Otting. These priorities include building upon responsible innovation to provide regulatory certainty, flexible frameworks, and oversight that will allow banks to “evolve and capitalize on technology and innovation to deliver better products and services, to operate more efficiently, and to reduce risk in the system.” Brooks reiterated that the OCC has the authority to issue bank charters to companies engaged in “the business of banking on a national scale, including taking deposits, lending money, or paying checks,” and emphasized that the OCC will work to “clarify what true lender means, to underscore that the terms of a lawfully made contract remain valid for the duration of that contract even if it is sold by a bank to another investor, and to specify what the parameters of the ‘fintech charter’ and other special purpose charters should be.” The same day the OCC issued a final rule (covered by a Buckley Special Alert), which establishes that when a bank transfers a loan, the interest rate permissible before the transfer will still be valid after the transfer.
Among other topics, Brook also discussed the OCC’s recent issuance of a final rule to strengthen the Community Reinvestment Act (covered by a Buckley Special Alert), stating that the OCC will work to ensure that banks provide “fair access” to all customers and stressing that the agency “should not tolerate lawful entities being denied access to our federal banking system based on their popularity among a powerful few.”
Special Alert: OCC adopts final rule addressing Madden
On Acting Comptroller of the Currency Brian Brooks’ first day in that role, the OCC issued a final rule designed to effectively reverse the Second Circuit’s 2015 Madden v. Midland Funding decision.[1] As published in yesterday’s Federal Register, the rule, titled “Permissible Interest on Loans that are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred,” provides that “[i]nterest on a loan that is permissible under [12 U.S.C. 85 for national bank or 12 U.S.C 1463(g)(1) for federal thrifts] shall not be affected by the sale, assignment, or other transfer of the loan.” This rule contrasts with the Madden decision’s conclusion that a purchaser of a loan originated by a national bank could not charge interest at the rate permissible for the bank if that rate would be impermissible under the lower usury cap applicable to the purchaser. More specifically, the Madden court found that subjecting assignees to state usury law under these circumstances does not “significantly interfere” with the exercise of national bank powers -- the general preemption standard set forth in the Dodd Frank Act.[2]