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District Court certifies payday lending class action
On October 31, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey certified two classes of consumers alleging a payday lender and its subsidiaries charged usurious, triple-digit interest rates on short-term loans originated by a nonparty entity run by a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe. The lawsuit—which alleges, among other things, usury and consumer fraud in violation of New Jersey law, common law restitution and unjust enrichment, and violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act—was filed in 2016 with the defendants arguing that the claims were subject to an arbitration provision accompanying the loan agreement. However, as previously covered by InfoBytes, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the district court’s decision that the tribal arbitration forum referenced in the loan agreement does not actually exist and, “because the loan agreement’s forum selection clause is an integral, non-severable part of the arbitration agreement,” the entire arbitration agreement is unenforceable.
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants evaded state law usury limits by attempting to use the sovereignty of an Indian tribe, with most loans carrying an annual percentage interest rate of 139 percent. While the defendants challenged the notion that common questions about the loan agreements predominated over the individual concerns of each class member, the court determined that the loan agreements at issue have an identical structure of interest amortized over a fixed payment schedule. “Plaintiffs have therefore shown that they can use common evidence to prove their [Consumer Fraud Act] claims, and that common questions predominate,” the court stated. “Namely the nearly identical, allegedly usurious loan agreements, which caused an out of pocket loss in the form of usurious interest.” The court also dismissed the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs’ suit was inferior to a 2018 CFPB action, which resulted in a $10.3 million civil money penalty but no restitution (previous InfoBytes coverage here), stating that “[i]ncredibly, [d]efendants argue that this CFPB action, which denied any recovery to the putative class members here, is a superior means for them to obtain relief.”
District Court allows claims to proceed against car dealership
On October 17, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey issued an opinion allowing consumer protection claims to proceed against a car dealership related to fees added to vehicle purchase prices, while granting two other related entities’ motions to dismiss. The plaintiff’s complaint against the dealership and related entities alleged that the dealership charged her additional mandatory fees when purchasing the vehicle, required her to spend $3,500 on a service contract in order to obtain financing, and charged interest on the contract even though, the plaintiff alleged, the contract constituted a fee related to the extension of credit and therefore was not subject to interest. These actions, the plaintiff alleged, violated TILA, the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act, and the Consumer Service Contract Act (CSCA). According to the plaintiff, the contracts contained cancellation provisions that guaranteed a full refund if a request was submitted within a specified period with a guaranteed 10 percent penalty for each 30-day period for which the refund was unpaid. The plaintiff executed timely refund requests but claimed that the entities failed to refund the fees within the allotted contractual period. In separate motions to dismiss, the entities argued that, while the allegations could be considered contractual breaches, they were not sufficient to constitute violations under the alleged consumer protection statutes. The court agreed and granted the entities’ motions, ruling that their contract language complied with the CSCA and that, although the entities allegedly failed to perform under their contracts, they would only have violated the CFA if they knew at the time the contract was formed that they did not intend to fulfill their contractual duties. Moreover, the court referred to a New Jersey Supreme Court holding, which said that a breach of warranty or contract, “‘is not per se unfair or unconscionable. . .and. . .alone does not violate a consumer protection statute” unless there are “substantial aggravating circumstances.” As such, the court determined, the entities’ alleged breaches of the cancellation provisions were not “‘unconscionable commercial practices’” as required under the CFA. However, the plaintiff can amend her claims.
Moreover, the court ruled that the allegations against the dealership can proceed, and denied the dealership’s bid to send the case to arbitration. According to the court, the dealership’s argument that it never received notices that the plaintiff had initiated arbitration proceedings because of a “clerical error” or a wrong mailing address were unpersuasive, and referred to the American Arbitration Association’s decision to decline “to administer the case due to the failure of [the dealership] to pay the required arbitration fees.”
District Court denies MSJ because of ambiguities in bank’s ATM fee contract language
On October 7, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California denied a national bank’s motion for partial summary judgment in a class action alleging the bank wrongfully charged ATM fees in violation of the bank’s standardized account agreement. According to the opinion, the plaintiffs filed the action asserting that the bank charges its customers two out-of-network (OON) fees when an account holder conducts a balance inquiry and then obtains a cash withdrawal at an OON ATM. The bank moved for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, arguing that the terms and conditions of the contract provide for the charge of a fee “for each balance inquiry, cash withdrawal, or funds transfer undertaken at a non-[bank] branded ATM.” After conducting a limited discovery on the breach of contract issue, the district court denied the bank’s motion, concluding there are “ambiguities regarding the contract terms.” Specifically, the court noted that contract documents describe a “Foreign ATM Fee” as “initiated at an ATM other than a [bank] ATM” and that it uses the singular term of “fee” while providing “no further explanation as to what ‘initiated’ means.” According to the court, there is “ambiguity in the term ‘initiate’ that is ‘susceptible to at least two reasonable alternative interpretations.’” Moreover, the court also concluded that certain onscreen warnings about the right to cancel caused “uncertainty and ambiguity” regarding the assessment of fees, and because there are ambiguities regarding the fee terms, the court could not conclude that the plaintiffs failed to prove a breach of contract.
6th Circuit: Collection fee authorized under contractual agreement valid under FDCPA
On August 21, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit affirmed a district court’s determination that a collection fee charged by a debt collector seeking to recover past due homeowner’s association fees was expressly authorized by a contractual agreement and did not violate the FDCPA. According to the opinion, after the plaintiffs fell behind on their homeownership association assessments and fees, the account was placed for collection with the defendant, who sought to collect both the past-due amount plus additional fees it charged the association for its collection services. The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging that the debt collector violated the FDCPA by collecting the collection fees directly from the plaintiffs without authorization and attempting to collect an amount after agreeing to a settlement. The district court held a bench trial, which returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, finding that collecting the fees directly from the plaintiff was expressly authorized by the language in an agreement creating the debt (the Declaration). The plaintiffs appealed, arguing, among other things, that (i) the Declaration did not expressly authorize the collection of fees directly from them, and that moreover, because the association had not yet incurred the costs the additional fees should not have been collected until the original debt was paid; and (ii) the costs should have been limited to legal fees and costs.
On appeal, the 6th Circuit agreed with the district court, citing a provision in the Declaration providing that “‘[e]ach such assessment, together, with interest, costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees’. . . ‘shall also be the personal obligation’ of the property owner.” Additionally, the 6th Circuit noted that if the defendant waited to collect the additional fees, it would create an impractical, never-ending cycle of collections. Moreover, the appellate court was not persuaded by the plaintiffs’ argument that the Declaration limited the authorization of costs, noting that “[b]ecause collection often occurs outside of litigation, it makes little sense to read the Declaration to silently limit ‘costs’ to ‘legal costs’ associated only with litigation.”
District Court rejects stop-payment fee class action against bank
On August 13, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the majority of an EFTA class action against a national bank, allowing only one claim by the lead plaintiff to proceed. In this case, two customers filed a class action against the bank alleging that it violated the EFTA and California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) by charging a $30 stop-payment fee. The bank moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ third amended complaint arguing, among other things, that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the EFTA does not prohibit stop payment fees, and the California UCL claims are preempted by the National Banking Act. While the district court found that the lead plaintiff had standing to assert the claims against the bank, the court also held that the EFTA, its legislative history, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit precedent “unambiguously does not prohibit stop payment fees.” Moreover, the court noted that the EFTA and its legislative history say nothing about “how the reasonableness of any such fees should be determined.” The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ class action claims with prejudice.
2nd Circuit: Consumer plausibly alleged discrepancies between collection letters and mortgage note
On July 22, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part a district court’s dismissal of a consumer’s FDCPA claims concerning communications received from a creditor and a collection firm (defendants) related to his defaulted mortgage. The consumer alleged that the letter he received in November 2015 listed an inaccurate amount of debt in violation of FDCPA section 1692g (concerning “initial communications”), and that subsequent letters received were inconsistent because they listed varying amounts of debt. Additionally, the consumer contended that the defendants violated sections 1692e (“false, deceptive, or misleading representations”) and 1692f (“unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt”). The district court ruled that the consumer failed to plausibly state a claim or provide factual support for his allegations.
On review, the appellate court agreed that the consumer failed to state a claim under section 1692g, explaining that “the least sophisticated consumer” would not be misled by the various debt collection letters concerning the amount of the debt. The appellate court emphasized that the consumer ignored the creditor’s acceleration of the underlying mortgage loan—which accounted for the core differences in the communications about the outstanding debt—and rejected the consumer’s allegations that the letters were inaccurate and inconsistent. However, the 2nd Circuit disagreed with the district court, holding that the consumer’s claims under sections 1692e and 1692f survived the defendants’ motion to dismiss because the consumer plausibly alleged discrepancies between the collection letters and mortgage note concerning late fees and charges.
7th Circuit holds collection fee was authorized by contract, did not violate FDCPA
On July 19, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that a percentage-based collection fee was expressly authorized by the contractual agreement and therefore, did not violate the FDCPA. According to the opinion, a consumer entered into a contract with an amusement park for a monthly pass, which stated the consumer would “be billed for any amounts that are due and owing plus any costs (including reasonable attorney’s fees) incurred by [the park] in attempting to collect amounts due.” After the consumer fell behind on payments for the pass, he received a collection letter from a collection agency, seeking the principal amount owed, plus $43.28 in costs to be paid directly to the collection agency or to the amusement park. The consumer filed a class-action lawsuit alleging that the debt collector “charged a fee not ‘expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt’” in violation of the FDCPA. The district court held a bench trial and found that the collection fee was expressly authorized by the language in the consumer’s contract.
On appeal, the 7th Circuit agreed with the district court, but noted its decision was in contrast to previous decisions by the 11th and 8th Circuits (both of which have held that percentage-based fees do violate the FDCPA when the underlying contract uses the term “costs.”) The appellate court noted that the contract “allows for ‘any costs,’ and the most reasonable reading of that term is to include fees paid in attempting to collect.” Moreover, the contract “explicitly provided that the term ‘costs’ includes attorney’s fees,” and therefore, the appellate court declined “to hold that the term ‘costs’ bears such a narrow meaning when the contract explicitly tells [the court] that the term is broad enough to include more.” Therefore, the collection fee, according to the appellate court, fell within the contract’s language authorizing “any costs” of the collection and did not violate the FDCPA.
NY extends law allowing licensed lenders to charge annual fees
On July 3, the New York governor signed SB 6100, which extends for an additional two years the existing provision of the banking law allowing licensed lenders to charge annual fees on open-end personal loans. Effective immediately, the law will now remain in full force and effect until June 30, 2021.
VA updates fee guidance for IRRRLs
On June 28, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) issued Circular 26-19-17, which provides new funding fee guidance to lenders and servicers concerning Interest Rate Reduction Refinancing Loans (IRRRLs). The new guidance, effective immediately, requires, among other things, that: (i) a Certificate of Eligibility (COE) be obtained for IRRRLs to ensure the funding fee exemption information is up to date at the time of closing; (ii) lenders ask active duty servicemembers if they have a pre-discharge claim pending, and, if so, contact the Regional Loan Center to request assistance in obtaining a proposed or memorandum rating in the event the servicemember is eligible for a funding fee exemption; and (iii) if a lender or servicer is notified by the VA or the veteran of an overpayment of a funding fee, such lender initiate a refund request in the Funding Fee Payment System (FFPS) within three business days.
Court dismisses FDCPA action after plaintiff admits possibility of late charges
On June 20, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted a debt collector’s motion to dismiss in an FDCPA action after the plaintiff conceded that it was possible for late charges to be imposed on his account in the future. The consumer filed an action against the debt collector after he received a collection notice stating that, “[a]s of the date of this letter, you owe the total balance due reflected above. Because of interest, late charges, and other charges that may vary from day to day, the amount due on the day you pay may be greater.” The consumer argued the letter violated the FDCP’s prohibition on using any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt, because the debt was not subject to the imposition of late charges, because his original creditor, the Department of Education, allegedly “‘did not have the legal or contractual authority to assess late charges on the [debt],’ and [the debt collector] was ‘never authorized . . . to charge or add late charges to the balance of the [debt].’” After discussing conflicting precedents, the court noted that it need not reach the issue because the plaintiff conceded that it would be possible for his account to be assessed late charges in the future should he rehabilitate his debt and subsequently fail to make timely payments. Because late charges could “conceivably be assessed” the debt collector’s letter was not inaccurate, as the plaintiff alleged and therefore, the court dismissed the action.