InfoBytes Blog
Filter
Subscribe to our InfoBytes Blog weekly newsletter and other publications for news affecting the financial services industry.
DOJ revises corporate enforcement policy applicable to all criminal matters including FCPA cases
On January 17, Assistant Attorney General Kenneth A. Polite, Jr. delivered remarks at Georgetown University Law Center, during which he announced changes to the DOJ’s Criminal Division Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy. Polite provided background information on the DOJ Criminal Division’s voluntary self-disclosure incentive program, the FCPA Pilot Program, that was announced in 2016 and expanded in 2017 to become the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy (covered by InfoBytes here). This policy, Pilot said, has been applied to all corporate cases prosecuted by the Criminal Division since at least 2018, and provided, among other things, that “if a company voluntarily self-discloses, fully cooperates, and timely and appropriately remediates, there is a presumption that [the DOJ] will decline to prosecute absent certain aggravating circumstances involving the seriousness of the offense or the nature of the offender.” The policy also provided a maximum 50 percent reduction off the low end of the applicable sentencing guidelines penalty range to companies that self-disclosed violations where a criminal resolution is warranted. Last year, following a request by the Deputy Attorney General to have all DOJ components write voluntary self-disclosure policies, the Criminal Division conducted an assessment of its existing policy. Pilot said the division is now announcing the first significant changes to the policy since 2017.
Under the updated policy, companies are offered “new, significant and concrete incentives to self-disclose misconduct,” Polite said, explaining that “even in situations where companies do not self-disclose, the revisions to the policy provide incentives for companies to go far above and beyond the bare minimum when they cooperate with [DOJ] investigations.” He emphasized that the revisions clarify that companies will face very different outcomes if they do not self-disclose, meaningfully cooperate with investigations, or remediate. However, the revisions provide a path that incentivizes even more robust compliance on the front-end in order to prevent misconduct and requires even more robust cooperation and remediation on the back-end should a crime occur.
Polite stated that prosecutors might decline to bring charges against a company over crimes with aggravating factors if the company can demonstrate that it: (i) made voluntary disclosures immediately upon becoming aware of an allegation of misconduct; (ii) had an effective compliance program already in place at the time of the misconduct that allowed it to identify the misconduct and led it to voluntarily self-disclose; and (iii) provided exceptional cooperation and extraordinary remediation. Should a company fail to take these steps, it risks “increasing its criminal exposure and monetary penalties,” Polite warned, emphasizing that the DOJ’s “job is not just to prosecute crime, but to deter and prevent criminal conduct.” He added that the DOJ will recommend a reduction in fines of at least 50 percent and up to 75 percent (except in the case of a criminal recidivist) for companies that voluntarily report wrongdoing and fully cooperate with investigations. Even companies that do not voluntarily disclose wrongdoing but still fully cooperate with an investigation and timely and appropriately remediate could still receive a 50 percent reduction off the low end of the guidelines for fines, Polite said. “The policy is sending an undeniable message: come forward, cooperate, and remediate. We are going to be closely examining how companies discipline bad actors and reward the good ones.”
FinCEN solicits feedback on beneficial ownership reporting requirements
On January 17, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) published two notices and requests for comment in the Federal Register related to the reporting process the agency intends to use to collect beneficial ownership data pursuant to the Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements final rule (published last September and covered by InfoBytes here). Under the final rule, most corporations, limited liability companies, and other entities created in or registered to do business in the U.S. will be required to report information about their beneficial owners to FinCEN. The first notice and request for comments invites interested parties to provide feedback on the application that will be used to collect information from individuals who seek to obtain an optional FinCEN identifier. The second notice and request for comments requests feedback on a report that certain entities will be required to file with FinCEN. The electronically filed report will identify the reporting entity’s beneficial owners, and—in certain cases—the individual who “directly filed the document with specified governmental authorities that created the entity or registered it to do business, as well as the individual who was primarily responsible for directing or controlling such filing, if more than one individual was involved in the filing of the document.” Comments on both notices are due by March 20.
OFAC issues amended Venezuela-related GL and FAQ
On January 17, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued Venezuela-related General License (GL) 5J, which supersedes GL 5I and authorizes certain transactions otherwise prohibited under Executive Orders 13835 and 13857 related to, or that provide financing for, dealings in the Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. 2020 8.5 Percent Bond on or after April 20, 2023. GL 5J does not authorize any transactions or activities otherwise prohibited by the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations. Concurrently, OFAC updated Venezuela-related FAQ 595 to provide clarification on authorized transactions as well as licensing requirements.
OFAC issues extended counter-terrorism GL and amended FAQ
On January 12, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Counter Terrorism General License (GL) 21B, “Authorizing Limited Safety and Environmental Transactions Involving Certain Vessels,” to authorize limited safety and environmental transactions involving certain persons or vessels that are normally prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (GTSR) through 12:01 a.m. EST, April 13, 2023. OFAC explained that such transactions are authorized as long as payments to a blocked person are made into a blocked account in accordance with the GTSR. A list of authorized blocked persons and vessels listed on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List is also included. OFAC also amended related FAQ 1097 to provide additional clarification on permitted transactions.
OFAC issues and amends Iran-related FAQ
On January 11, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published an Iran-related frequently asked question (FAQ) and amended several other Iran-related FAQs. New FAQ 1110 clarifies Iran General License (GL) D-1 and GL D-2. Specifically, OFAC noted that because GL D-1 was issued in 2014, the types of software and services that support communication over the internet have changed. Therefore, to reflect technological developments in communication-related software and services since the issuance of GL D-1 (including in cloud-based services), OFAC issued GL D-2 to expand and clarify the range of U.S. software and services available to Iranians under OFAC’s sanctions program.
OFAC issues Venezuela-related general license for some transactions
On January 9, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued Venezuela-related General License (GL) 31B, “Certain Transactions Involving the IV Venezuelan National Assembly and Certain Other Persons.” GL 31B authorizes certain transactions ordinarily prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13884, as incorporated into the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations (VSR), involving the IV Venezuelan National Assembly, its Delegated Commission, any entity established by, or under the direction of, the IV National Assembly to exercise its mandate, or any person appointed or designated by, or whose appointment or designation is retained by, the IV National Assembly, its Delegated Commission, or a IV National Assembly Entity, including their respective members and staff. GL 31B also authorizes U.S. persons to engage in all transactions prohibited by E.O. 13850, as amended by E.O. 13857 (and incorporated into the VSR), involving “any person appointed or designated by, or whose appointment or designation is retained by, the IV National Assembly, its Delegated Commission, or a IV National Assembly Entity to the board of directors (including any ad hoc board of directors) or as an executive officer of a Government of Venezuela entity (including entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Government of Venezuela).” OFAC noted that GL 31B does not authorize transactions involving the Venezuelan National Constituent Assembly convened by Nicolas Maduro or the National Assembly seated on January 5, 2021 (including their respective members and staff), or any transactions otherwise prohibited by the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, including those involving blocked persons unless allowed by GL 31B or separately authorized. In conjunction with GL 31B, OFAC amended related FAQs 522, 547, 660, 679, and 680.
OFAC sanctions individuals and entities tied to ISIS
On January 5, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced sanctions pursuant to Executive Order 13224 against a key financial facilitation network of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which includes four individuals and two entities in Türkiye who are connected to the group’s recruitment and financial transfers to and from Iraq and Syria. According to OFAC, the designated network has “played a key role in money management, transfer, and distribution for ISIS in the region.” The Turkish Ministry of Treasury and Finance, in collaboration with the Ministry of Interior, also implemented an asset freeze against members of this network. As a result of the sanctions, all property and interests in property belonging to the sanctioned persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. Additionally, “any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more” by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. U.S. persons are also generally prohibited from engaging in any dealings involving the property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons. Persons that engage in certain transactions with the designated individuals or entities may themselves be exposed to secondary sanctions, OFAC warned, adding that “OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that has knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant transaction on behalf of a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT).”
OFAC sanctions suppliers of Iranian UAVs used in Russia’s war against Ukraine
On January 6, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control announced sanctions pursuant to Executive Order 13382 against six executives and board members of a U.S.-designated Iranian defense manufacturer allegedly responsible for designing and producing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that are being transferred by Iran for use in Russia’s war against Ukraine. The director of a key organization responsible for overseeing Iran’s ballistic missile programs has also been sanctioned. OFAC further announced that it is updating the defense manufacturer’s entry on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List to include its new alias. As a result of the sanctions, all property and interests in property belonging to the sanctioned individuals and entities that are in the U.S. or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. Further, “any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.” U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in any dealings involving the property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons. Persons that engage in certain transactions with the designated individuals or entities may themselves be exposed to sanctions, and “any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant financial services for any of the individuals or entities designated today pursuant to E.O. 13382 could be subject to U.S. sanctions.”
Crypto platform reaches $100 million settlement to resolve alleged compliance failures
On January 4, NYDFS issued a consent order against a cryptocurrency trading platform for engaging in alleged violations of New York virtual currency, anti-money laundering, transaction monitoring, and cybersecurity regulations. According to the consent order, in 2020, NYDFS found significant deficiencies across the respondent’s compliance program, including its Know-Your Customer/Customer Due Diligence (KYC/CDD) procedures, Transaction Monitoring System (TMS), OFAC screening program, and AML risk assessments. As a result of these findings, the respondent agreed to improve its BSA/AML and OFAC compliance programs, including engaging an independent consultant to develop a remediation plan and improve its compliance program.
In 2021, NYDFS launched an investigation to determine whether the respondent’s compliance deficiencies had resulted in any legal violations. The investigation found “substantial lapses in [the respondent’s] KYC/CDD program, its TMS, and in its AML and OFAC sanctions controls systems, as well as issues concerning [the respondent’s] retention of books and records, and with respect to meeting certain of its reporting obligations to the Department.” NYDFS noted that in late 2020 and 2021, the respondent took steps to remediate the issues identified by the Department and the independent consultant; however, substantial weaknesses remained, and its compliance system was inadequate to handle the growing volume of the respondent’s business.
Under the terms of the consent order, the respondent must pay a $50 million civil penalty to NYDFS and invest $50 million in its compliance program. Additionally, an independent third party will continue to work with the respondent for another year, which may be extended at the Department’s sole discretion. NYDFS noted that the respondent has already taken steps to build a more effective and robust compliance program under the supervision of NYDFS and the NYDFS-appointed independent monitor. According to the respondent’s press release, the company “has taken substantial measures to address these historical shortcomings” and “remains committed to being a leader and role model in the crypto space, including partnering with regulators when it comes to compliance and other areas.”
OFAC settles with Danish company for routing prohibited financial transactions though a U.S. bank
On December 30, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a more than $4.3 million settlement with a multinational Danish manufacturer to resolve allegations that its wholly owned United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based subsidiary directed customers in Iran, Syria, and Sudan to make payments to its bank account at the UAE branch of a U.S. financial institution. According to OFAC’s enforcement release, between November 2013 and August 2017, the subsidiary sold products to customers in Sudan, Syria, and Iran. Customers were instructed to remit payments to at least three accounts at banks located in the UAE, including the parent company’s U.S. branch account. OFAC further contended that the subsidiary used third-party payers to make five transfers (disguising the originator or beneficiary of the transactions) from its U.S. branch account to parties in Syria and Iran, which prevented the bank’s transactional screen filters from stopping the payments. The total value of all the transfers was roughly $16,959,683, OFAC said, claiming that by causing a U.S. financial institution to facilitate prohibited financial transactions and export financial services, the parent company violated the Iranian, Syrian, and Sudanese sanctions regulations.
While OFAC found no evidence that the parent company willfully engaged third-party payers to evade sanctions, it determined that the subsidiary “was aware since at least 2011 that using a U.S. financial institution to send or receive payments related to sanctioned jurisdictions could be prohibited.” Moreover, the subsidiary allegedly received communications from the parent company and various financial institutions regarding concerns flagged in its banking activity but continued to use the U.S. branch account to collect payments from customers in sanctioned jurisdictions. These alleged violations, OFAC stated, occurred primarily due to deficiencies in the parent company’s global sanctions compliance program.
OFAC noted that while the parent company disclosed the alleged violations, the agency was already in possession of the relevant information and therefore the submission did not qualify as a voluntary self-disclosure. However, OFAC considered various mitigating factors, including that the parent company had not received a penalty notice from OFAC in the preceding five years, and the parent company took quick action to determine the root causes of the alleged conduct and undertook significant remedial measures to prevent future violations.
Providing context for the settlement, OFAC stated that the “enforcement action highlights the risks to multinational companies, including to non-U.S. entities, that involve the U.S. financial system in commercial activity involving an OFAC- sanctioned country, region, or person,” and emphasized that “[c]ommercial activity that might not otherwise violate OFAC regulations—such as the sale of non-U.S. goods by a non-U.S. person to an entity in an OFAC-sanctioned country—can nonetheless cause a violation when the financial transactions related to that activity are processed through or involve U.S. financial institutions.”