InfoBytes Blog
Filter
Subscribe to our InfoBytes Blog weekly newsletter and other publications for news affecting the financial services industry.
District Court: Arbitration provision is severable from a voided loan contract
On September 16, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama granted a defendant tribal payday lender’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, ruling that an arbitration agreement in a loan contract is still valid even if an arbitration panel found the contracts were void. The plaintiff initiated an arbitration proceeding against the defendant alleging that payday loan contracts carrying interest rates between 200 and 830 percent were void because the defendant was not licensed under the Alabama Small Loans Act to extend such loans. An American Arbitration Association panel determined, among other things, that the defendant had waived any tribal sovereign immunity, “the transactions involved off-reservation commercial activities to which sovereign immunity does not apply,” and that the loans were entirely void because each of the loans was extended without a license. The plaintiff filed suit in state court to confirm the arbitration award and pursue a class action on the premise that the loans are usurious and should be declared void. The defendant removed the case to federal court and asked the court to dismiss the proposed class action and compel arbitration. The district court agreed with the defendant that the arbitration agreement in the voided loan contract remained binding despite the arbitrator’s earlier determination in the plaintiff’s favor. Specifically, the court disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument that the arbitrator’s determination meant that “no aspect of the contact survives,” stating that the plaintiff “overlooks a central tenet in binding precedential arbitration law: severability.” According to the court, “‘[a]s a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the contract.’”
9th Circuit says tribal lenders can arbitrate RICO class claims
On September 16, a split U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that “an agreement delegating to an arbitrator the gateway question of whether the underlying arbitration agreement is enforceable must be upheld unless that specific delegation provision is itself unenforceable.” The appellate court’s decision reversed a district court’s ruling that an arbitration agreement entered between tribal lenders and borrowers was unenforceable because it impermissibly waived borrowers’ rights to pursue federal statutory claims. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in April the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted class certification to residents who received loans from an online lender, allowing them to pursue class Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims based on allegations they were charged interest rates that exceeded state limits for lenders claiming tribal immunity. The class of borrowers include California residents who collected loans from an Oklahoma-based tribe, and California residents who received loans from a Montana-based tribe. The district court also ruled that the entire arbitration agreement, including provisions containing a class action waiver, was unenforceable. The lenders appealed.
On appeal, the 9th Circuit majority cited to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, which determined, among other things, that when a party challenges an entire agreement—not just an arbitration provision—deciding “gateway” issues such as enforceability must be delegated to an arbitrator. “We do not dispute that [b]orrowers have a reasonable argument that the arbitration agreement as written precludes them from asserting their RICO claims or other federal claims in arbitration. . . . And if that is true, the arbitration agreement is likely unenforceable as a prospective waiver,” the majority wrote. “But, when there is a clear delegation provision, that question is. . .for the arbitrator to decide so long as the delegation provision itself does not eliminate parties’ rights to purse their federal remedies,” the majority added.
The 9th Circuit’s opinion differs from decisions issued by other appellate courts, which found that certain delegation provisions were unenforceable for various reasons after reviewing whether an arbitration agreement as a whole was unenforceable due to prospective waiver of federal claims. (See InfoBytes coverage of the 3rd and 4th Circuit decisions here and here.) The majority stated that the other appellate courts “considered the wrong thing by ‘confus[ing] the question of who decides arbitrability with the separate question of who prevails on arbitrability.’” According to the majority, “[t]he proper question is not whether the entire arbitration agreement constitutes a prospective waiver, but whether the antecedent agreement delegating resolution of that question to the arbitrator constitutes prospective waiver.”
Maryland Court of Appeals says inspection fee ban applies to mortgage assignees and servicers
On August 27, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the Maryland Usury Law applied to assignees of mortgage loans–and not just lenders as a defendant argued–and that the law’s prohibition on property inspection fees therefore applied to the mortgage servicer, as the agent of the loan’s assignee. The borrower entered into a mortgage loan secured by a deed of trust that was later assigned to Fannie Mae and contracted to the mortgage servicer. After the borrower defaulted, the servicer allegedly threatened foreclosure and assessed “fees for drive-by inspections of the property.”
The parties entered into a loan modification agreement to resolve the default, but the borrower objected to the inclusion of the property inspection fees. The borrower later filed a complaint claiming the servicer collected property inspection fees prohibited by the Maryland Usury Law (CL §12-121). The borrower also alleged violations of the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act (MCDCA). The trial court dismissed the claims concluding, among other things, that neither Fannie Mae nor the servicer were subject to state usury prohibitions because neither entity “fit the definition of ‘lender’ in the law.” An intermediate appellate court later reversed the trial court’s dismissal.
In a 6-1 holding, the Court of Appeals concluded that “the Maryland Commissioner of Financial Regulation has taken the position that mortgage servicers. . .are subject to the prohibition on inspection fees in CL §12-121 during the life of a mortgage loan,” and that, moreover, CL §12-121 “limits the authority of a person who makes a mortgage loan to charge property inspection fees in connection with that loan.” As such, the Court of Appeals held that the addition of the definition of “lender” to the Maryland Usury Law that made the Usury Law part of the Commercial Law Article, “did not change that rule.” The Court of Appeals also stated that the borrower adequately alleged the elements of an MCDCA claim when she asserted the servicer “attempted to collect an alleged debt by asserting a right to collect inspection fees with knowledge that the right did not exist.”
Virginia announces consent judgment against investment firm
On August 24, the Virginia attorney general announced a consent judgment entered on August 16 against a Virginia-based investment company and its managing member (collectively, "defendants") to resolve allegations that they violated Virginia’s consumer finance statutes. The consent judgment settled a lawsuit in which the AG alleged that defendants “made loans to distressed homeowners and charged interest or other compensation greatly exceeding an effective annual interest rate of 12 percent, without being licensed as a consumer finance company or coming within another exemption to Virginia’s usury laws.” According to the AG, the complaint alleged that a representative of the defendant investment company approached a Virginia Beach homeowner facing foreclosure and presented her with an agreement in which the defendants would provide the amount needed to stop the foreclosure in exchange for permission to list and sell the homeowner’s separate Virginia Beach property at an above-market commission rate or, if the sale did not occur, to purchase that property at a significantly below market price. Under the terms of the consent judgment, the defendants, among other things are: (i) permanently enjoined from violating specific consumer finance statutes, including by “making any loan requiring a collateral sale and/or purchase to Virginia consumers”; (ii) required to pay $11,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs; and (iii) required to provide certain restitution and/or forbearance relief to consumers identified by the defendants pursuant to the consent judgment as well as “to any Virginia consumer who comes forward within two (2) years after entry of the Consent Judgment with evidence establishing that he or she received a loan requiring a collateral sale and/or purchase from [defendants]” during the period from January 1, 2018 to the present.
Maryland affirms penalties of over $3 million against auto lender
On August 11, the Maryland attorney general announced that a circuit court in Maryland affirmed that an auto-lending company’s transactions were illegal loans, not pawn transactions, and upheld the Consumer Protection Division’s imposition of $2.2 million in restitution and a $1.2 million penalty. In its press release, the AG alleged that the company “made predatory loans at outrageous interest rates, illegally repossessed cars, and preyed on Maryland consumers,” in violation of the Maryland Consumer Loan Law, the Maryland Interest and Usury Law, and the Installment Loan-Licensing Provision. According to the memorandum of the court, the loans issued by the company were not considered to be title pawn transactions, but were instead illegal consumer loans which “violated the consumer protection statutes as respondents were not licensed to make loans in Maryland, failed to make the required disclosures to the consumer, engaged in unfair trade practices, exceeded the statutory interest rate caps, took unpermitted security interests for loans of less than $700.00 and engaged in illegal repossession activities.”
District Court certifies “rent-a-tribe” class action
On July 20, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia certified a “rent-a-tribe” class action alleging an individual who orchestrated an online payday lending scheme violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), engaged in unjust enrichment, and violated Virginia’s usury law by partnering with federally-recognized tribes to issue loans with allegedly usurious interest rates. The plaintiffs alleged the defendant partnered with the tribes to circumvent state usury laws even though the tribes did not control the lending operation. The court ruled that, as there was “no substantive involvement” by the tribes in the lending operation and evidence showed that the defendant was “functionally in charge,” the lending operation—which allegedly charged interest rates exceeding Virginia’s 12 percent interest cap—could not claim tribal immunity. The plaintiffs moved to certify two RICO classes, distinguished from each other based on the lending entity, each with two sub-classes of borrowers: (i) a usury sub-class of borrowers who either paid any principal, interest, or fees on their loans; and (ii) a unjust enrichment subclass of borrowers who paid any amount on their loans. The defendant challenged class certification, arguing that “due to his changing roles” in the lending operation over the class period “differences between class members will result in a need for a series of complicated mini-trials.” In certifying the two RICO classes, the court called the defendant’s recommendation to bring individual lender suits “an unnecessary and untenable burden on the judicial system.” Furthermore, the court wrote that “[w]ith respect to [p]laintiffs’ unjust enrichment claims, [the defendant] also attempts to argue that some [p]laintiffs did not confer a benefit on [the defendant] because they paid back less than they received on their loans.” However, the court noted that because Virginia law states that any contract in violation of the state’s usury law is void, “any money paid on a void contract could constitute a benefit for the purposes of an unjust enrichment.”
District Court allows usury claims to proceed, calling tribal immunity “irrelevant”
On July 13, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment in a consolidated class action concerning whether a now-defunct online lender can use tribal immunity to circumvent state interest rate caps. The plaintiffs took out short-term loans carrying allegedly usurious interest rates from entities run through several federally recognized tribes. While the defendants attempted to rely on tribal immunity as a defense, the court determined that California law applies to the plaintiffs and class members who took out loans in the state. According to the court, “California, with its strong history of prohibiting usury, has the materially greater interest in enforcing its usury laws and protecting its consumers from usurious conduct than either of the relevant [t]ribal [e]ntities whose connection to the loans—while not insignificant—was temporal and whose aims were to avoid state usury laws.” Calling tribal immunity “irrelevant,” the court added that the “claims here hinge on the personal conduct of the defendants. While that conduct is based in significant part on the services defendants personally engaged in or approved to be provided to the [t]ribes, the claims do not impede on the sovereignty of the [t]ribes where the [t]ribes are not defendants in this case and no [t]ribal [e]ntities remain.”
District Court approves final settlement in tribal lending class action
On July 9, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted final approval of a revised class action settlement, certifying the settlement class, approving the settlement terms, and entering final judgment regarding allegations that an operation used tribal sovereign immunity to evade state usury laws when charging unlawful interest on loans. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in March, the plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against the operation alleging, among other things, violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, EFTA, and TILA. The settlement cancels roughly 71,000 loans, requires the operation to pay $86 million in damages, and caps fees at $15 million. According to the final approval, the court finds the revised settlement to be “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”
CFPB settles with company over misrepresenting deposit risks, loan APRs
On May 27, the CFPB announced a settlement with a Florida-based lender and the CEO of the company (collectively, “defendants”) to resolve allegations that the defendants violated the Consumer Financial Protection Act by misrepresenting the risks associated with their deposit product and the annual percentage rate (APR) associated with their consumer loans. The settlement resolves a complaint against the defendants filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida in November 2020 (covered by InfoBytes here). The CFPB alleged that the company took deposits from consumers to fund loans, claiming their deposits would have a fixed and guaranteed 15 percent annual percentage yield and would be deposited at FDIC-insured institutions. However, according to the complaint, the representations were false in that the funds were not held in FDIC-insured accounts and the rate of return was not guaranteed. The CFPB also alleged that most deposited funds were used to fund short-term, high-interest personal loans that were deceptively marketed as having an APR of 440 percent when the actual APRs are alleged to have been more than 900 percent, well in excess of the rate permitted under Florida’s criminal-usury law, causing the loans to be uncollectable and creating risk that obligations could not be met to depositors who sought to withdraw their deposited funds. The complaint claimed that the defendants had loaned a total of more than $30 million to consumers since 2017.
Under the terms of the stipulated order, the defendants are (i) subject to a judgment for monetary relief and damages for the full amount defendants received from consumers who purchased their financial products and services, around $1 million, plus all interest due to consumers under the terms of the advertised products and services purchased; and (ii) required to pay a $100,000 civil money penalty. The order also permanently bans the defendants from engaging in deposit-taking activity and from making deceptive statements to consumers.
Connecticut Supreme Court says lender protected by tribal sovereign immunity
On May 20, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a lender accused of issuing usurious consumer loans without being properly licensed is protected by tribal sovereign immunity. In 2014, the Connecticut Department of Banking initiated an enforcement action against two lenders and a tribal officer of one of the lenders, claiming the lenders violated Connecticut’s banking and usury laws by making high-interest consumer loans over the internet without a license. The commissioner issued cease-and-desist orders and imposed civil penalties on the lenders. The lenders filed a motion in Connecticut Superior Court to dismiss the administrative proceedings for lack of jurisdiction, claiming they were arms of a federally recognized tribe and entitled to tribal sovereign immunity. The Superior Court vacated the orders against the lenders and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on whether the lenders are entitled to sovereign immunity.
The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed in part the Superior Court’s order, finding that the lower court should have applied the “Breakthrough factors” adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits to determine whether the lenders were arms of the tribe. These factors include analysis of (i) “the method of creation” of the entities; (ii) the stated purpose of the entities; (iii) “the structure, ownership, and management of the entities,” which includes the amount of control the tribe has over them; (iv) the tribe’s intent with respect to extending its sovereign immunity to the entities; and (v) “the financial relationship between the tribe and the entities.” Applying these factors, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that one of the lenders was entitled to sovereign immunity because the lender was created under tribal law, is controlled by directors appointed by the tribal council for the purpose of promoting tribal economic development and welfare, and there was a “significant financial relationship” between the tribe and the lender. With respect to the other lender, the court found that there was insufficient evidence to show that it is an arm of the tribe and that further proceedings were necessary to determine its right to sovereign immunity.