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District Court: Collection can resume after debt is verified
On March 24, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment in an action concerning whether the defendants failed to adequately validate plaintiff’s debt. Plaintiff incurred a debt that was charged off and sold to one of the defendants for collection. The defendant creditor used the second defendant to manage collection of the account. An independent third party hired by the defendant creditor to collect on the debt sent an email containing a FDCPA-required validation notice to the plaintiff, who responded by sending a written validation request to the third party. In response, the second defendant sent two letters to the plaintiff, validating the debt and including the name of the original creditor, the current creditor, the last four digits of the account number, and the amount owed. The plaintiff submitted additional validation requests to the second defendant. The account was eventually placed with a different third-party collection agency, which sent a verification letter containing the same information to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sent a validation request to the new collection agency, as well as an additional request to the second defendant, and received responses to these validation requests as well.
The plaintiff sued, premising her FDCPA claims on the argument that the defendants acted deceptively when they attempted to collect on a debt by placing the account with the second collection agency while the debt was being actively disputed. The court disagreed, stating that after the defendants “provided verification of the debt, they were free to resume collection efforts.” The court explained that the plaintiff “cannot forestall collection efforts by disputing the debt into perpetuity,” and added that nothing in the FDCPA prevents the use of more than one collection agency to collect on a debt. The court also said the fact that the initial validation response was sent after the 30-day statutory validation period expired and contained a second validation notice, did not adversely impact the plaintiff nor “create actionable confusion,” particularly because “the second validation notice was sent after Plaintiff exercised her statutory right to dispute the debt.”
CFPB, New York AG ask court to lift stay after 2nd Circuit decision
On March 31, plaintiffs CFPB and the New York Attorney General moved the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to lift its stay order in their litigation against a remittance provider in response to a recent U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decision upholding the CFPB’s funding structure under the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) The plaintiffs argued that the 2nd Circuit’s binding opinion has now “answer[ed] the question at the heart of this Court’s stay order: whether the Bureau’s statutory funding mechanism violates the Constitution.”
As previously covered by InfoBytes, the district court had originally paused the proceedings at the defendant’s request when the Supreme Court was considering whether to hear an appeal in a different matter relating to the Bureau’s funding structure. The district court continued the stay after the Supreme Court agreed to review the 5th Circuit’s decision in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, where it found that the CFPB’s “perpetual self-directed, double-insulated funding structure” violated the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause. The Supreme Court is scheduled to review the 5th Circuit’s decision next term (covered by InfoBytes here).
The agencies argued primarily that (i) the 2nd Circuit “expressly considered and rejected the Fifth Circuit’s contrary view in CFSA;” (ii) it “did so notwithstanding that the Supreme Court will consider the same issue next Term”; and (iii) “[g]rants of certiorari do not change the law, and a district court remains bound by circuit precedent until the Supreme Court or the court of appeals changes that precedent.”
On April 7, the court issued an order denying the Bureau's request and electing to keep the stay in place while the Supreme Court resolves the circuit split on this issue.
District Court allows prerecorded-voice-based claims to proceed
On March 23, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York partially granted a defendant debt collector’s motion for summary judgment in an action concerning the alleged use of an automated telephone dialing system (autodialer) to collect unpaid medical debt. Plaintiff claimed the defendant repeatedly called his cell phone using an autodialer and left messages using a prerecorded voice message even after he asked the defendant to stop. These actions, the plaintiff said, violated the FDCPA and the TCPA. In partially granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court found that the plaintiff’s TCPA claims concerning the alleged use of an autodialer were “no longer viable” following the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Facebook v. Duguid (covered by a Special Alert), which narrowed the definition of autodialer under the TCPA, resulting in the law only covering equipment that generates numbers randomly and sequentially.
Although both parties agreed that the Facebook decision does not affect plaintiff’s prerecorded-voice-based-claims (which are distinct from claims based on the use of an autodialer), the parties disputed how the defendant came to possess the plaintiff’s cell phone number. The defendant maintained that the hospital that treated the plaintiff provided the cell phone number; however, the plaintiff contended that he did not recall providing his number to the hospital. The court reviewed, among other things, whether the plaintiff expressly consented to receiving calls—prerecorded or not. Under the TCPA, “[p]roviding one’s phone number to an entity constitutes consent for that entity to use the number to collect a debt, so long as ‘such number was provided during the transaction that resulted in the debt [being] owed,’” the court explained, adding that the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that the plaintiff consented to receiving the calls that allegedly used a prerecorded voice.
A purported hospital intake form submitted by the defendant that included the plaintiff’s cell phone number did not indicate that “it was filled out by, or includes information provided only by, [the plaintiff],” the court said, also writing that “this document merely demonstrates that whenever the document was typed, [the hospital] had [plaintiff’s] phone number from some source.” This is not sufficient to indicate that the plaintiff consented to be contacted, the court ruled, holding that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment based on its express consent affirmative defense. As a result, the court allowed the prerecorded-voice-based-claims to proceed to trial.
SEC charges companies and executives for operating an unregistered exchange
On March 29, the SEC filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against a cryptocurrency trading platform and its executives for allegedly failing to register as a national securities exchange, broker, and clearing agency. The SEC also claimed the founder of the platform used it to raise $8 million in an unregistered token offering and misappropriated at least $900,000 for personal use. Additionally, the SEC charged certain defendant “market makers” operating on the platform as unregistered dealers. The complaint flagged certain defendants as being responsible for maintaining and providing the platform that facilitated the crypto assets that were offered and sold as securities and cited other defendants for operating as an unregistered exchange, broker, and clearing agency or as unregistered dealers.
According to the SEC’s announcement, some of the defendants—without admitting or denying the allegations—“have agreed to perform certain undertakings, including ceasing all activities as an unregistered exchange, clearing agency, broker, and dealer; shutting down the [platform]; providing an accounting of assets and funds for the benefit of customers; transferring all customer assets and funds to each respective customer; and destroying any and all [tokens] in [one of the defendant company’s] possession.” These defendants have agreed to permanent injunctions prohibiting them from engaging in future securities law violations and will pay civil penalties collectively totaling $165,800. Two of these defendants have also agreed to pay a combined amount of $62,779 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest. The SEC said it is continuing to litigate its charges against other defendants for securities fraud and for offering unregistered tokens.
FTC to ban auto warranty operation
On March 24, the FTC announced that a Florida-based group of operators (defendants) faces a permanent ban from the extended automobile warranty industry and will be barred from any further involvement in outbound telemarketing. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the defendants allegedly violated the FTC Act and the Telemarketing Sales Rule by allegedly engaging in deceptive practices when marketing and selling automobile warranties. According to the FTC, the defendants, among other things, (i) misrepresented their affiliation with consumers’ car dealers or manufacturers; (ii) misrepresented warranty coverage; (iii) falsely promised consumers they could obtain a full refund if they cancelled within 30 days; (iv) used remotely created checks, which are illegal in telemarketing transactions; and (v) placed unsolicited calls to numbers on the do not call registry. The proposed stipulated order for permanent injunction, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, would require the defendants to pay a $6.6 million monetary judgment and would impose a permanent industry ban. However, the monetary judgment is largely suspended based on the defendants’ inability to pay.
2nd Circuit: CFPB funding is constitutional
On March 23, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the CFPB’s funding structure is constitutional—splitting from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which concluded that Congress violated the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause when it created what that Court described as a “perpetual self-directed, double-insulated funding structure.” The U.S. Supreme Court is scheduled to review the 5th Circuit’s decision next term (covered by InfoBytes here).
Meanwhile, the 2nd Circuit concluded that it “cannot find any support” for the 5th Circuit’s determination in Supreme Court precedent, the text of the Constitution text, or in the history of the Appropriations Clause. “Because the CFPB’s funding structure was authorized by Congress and bound by specific statutory provisions, we find that the CFPB’s funding structure does not offend the Appropriations Clause,” the 2nd Circuit wrote. As such, the appellate court affirmed a 2020 district court order requiring the defendant debt collection law office to comply with a civil investigative demand issued by the Bureau in June 2017. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the CID requested information from the defendant as part of a Bureau investigation into whether debt collectors, furnishers, or other persons associated with the collection of debt and furnishing of information have engaged or are engaging in unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in violation of the CFPA, FDCPA, and FCRA. The defendant objected on several grounds, including that the CID was void ab initio under Seila Law LLC v. CFPB (the defendant contended that “the CFPB Director was shielded from presidential oversight by an unconstitutional removal provision at the time the CID was issued”), and that the Bureau is unconstitutionally funded. As noted in the opinion, the Bureau ratified the CID and the enforcement action against the defendant following the Supreme Court’s decision in Seila Law, and the district court ultimately granted the Bureau’s petition to enforce the CID.
On review, the 2nd Circuit affirmed the district court’s order, concluding that the CID was not void ab initio because “there is no dispute that the CFPB Director who issued the CID was properly appointed.” The appellate court pointed to the majority opinion in the Supreme Court’s decision in Collins v. Yellen (covered by InfoBytes here), which held that “‘an unconstitutional removal restriction does not invalidate agency action so long as the agency head was properly appointed[,]’” and therefore the Bureau’s actions are not void and do not need to be ratified, unless a plaintiff can show that “the agency action would not have been taken but for the President’s inability to remove the agency head.” The panel further noted that “[s]ince the CID was issued, there have been three different CFPB Directors appointed by two different presidents, each of whom has been subject to at-will removal at some point in their tenure. There is nothing to suggest that the Director’s removal protection affected the issuance of the CID or the investigation into [the defendant].” The 2nd Circuit further concluded that “the CFPB’s funding structure is not constitutionally infirm under either the Appropriations Clause or the nondelegation doctrine, and that the CID served on [the defendant] is not an unduly burdensome administrative subpoena.”
9th Circuit: Law firm did not violate FCRA by accessing credit report
On March 17, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a defendant law firm that allegedly accessed a plaintiff’s credit report to obtain her current address after it was hired to collect unpaid homeowner association (HOA) assessments. The plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit claiming, among other things, that the defendant violated the FCRA by accessing her credit report without her consent and that neither the HOA nor the defendant are creditors within the meaning of the FCRA. The district court disagreed, concluding that the HOA was in fact a creditor for purposes of the FCRA. “Under the [a]greement, the HOA determines the assessment amount for a full year and then makes it payable in installments over the course of the year. Thus, it regularly extends credit,” the district court wrote, explaining that because the HOA is a creditor, its attorneys, in collecting on the account, have the right to review a consumer’s credit report without consent. Moreover, the district court determined that the defendant had established the requisite “direct link” between the credit transaction and its request for the plaintiff’s credit report.
The 9th Circuit concluded that the “[d]efendant’s reading of the statute was not objectively unreasonable” because the plaintiff “had a grace period during which she could receive half a month’s services that she had not yet paid for,” which “could be considered an extension of credit.” While concurring with the panel, one of the judges commented, however, that “[i]t is hard to imagine that Congress intended FCRA, a statute that protects consumer privacy, to empower HOAs composed of neighboring homeowners to run their neighbors’ credit reports if homeowners fall two weeks behind in their payments.” The judge recommended that the appellate court “revisit the issue,” noting that it is unclear under current case law whether an HOA assessment qualifies as a “credit transaction” under the FCRA.
District Court: Failure to investigate duplicate reporting dispute could violate the FCRA
On March 10, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois ruled a defendant credit union failed to properly report an individual’s debt to a consumer reporting agency or investigate his dispute. Plaintiff obtained a credit card from the defendant but fell behind on his payments. After his account was later sent to a third-party collection agency, the plaintiff obtained a copy of his credit report where he noticed that his credit card debt was listed twice—once as a “individual” and “revolving” account with a balance of $10,145, and another time as an “open” collections account with a different balance. Plaintiff sent identical dispute letters to the three major credit reporting agencies (CRAs), acknowledging the delinquent credit card but expressing confusion as to why the account was listed twice. He submitted additional similar disputes with the CRAs, claiming that the error caused him to be denied the opportunity to rent an apartment and made it difficult for him to obtain a mortgage. During discovery, two corporate witnesses testified on behalf of the defendant—one of whom is responsible for reviewing consumer credit disputes and verified the information being reported was accurate. A second witness also testified that while the defendant understood that the plaintiff was alleging inaccuracies due to the debt being reported twice, it chose to focus its investigation on verifying that the information in the plaintiff’s credit report matched the information in its internal system.
In denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court noted that while the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit “has not decided whether double-reporting of a single debt on a credit report is an FCRA violation, district courts across the country have found that whether the practice is misleading and violates the FCRA is an issue of fact.” The court explained that an issue of fact exists as to whether double reporting the debt created a misleading impression that the plaintiff has two separate debts totaling $22,000 rather than a single debt of roughly $10,000. Moreover, even though the plaintiff’s dispute contained the message “duplicate,” the defendant did not address this issue nor did it request that a change be made to the plaintiff’s credit report. “A jury could reasonably conclude [] that [defendant’s] investigation was inadequate under the FCRA,” the court wrote. “[W]hether [defendant’s] investigation or protocol may qualify as a willful violation giving rise to statutory or punitive damages is an issue for a jury as well.”
DOJ, CFPB: Lenders that rely on discriminatory appraisals violate the FHA and ECOA
On March 13, the DOJ and CFPB filed a statement of interest saying that a “lender violates both the [Fair Housing Act (FHA)] and ECOA if it relies on an appraisal that it knows or should know to be discriminatory.” (See also CFPB blog post here.) Pointing out that the case raises important legal questions regarding the issue of appraisal bias, the agencies explained that the DOJ has enforcement authority under both the FHA and ECOA, and the Bureau has authority to interpret and issue rules under ECOA and enforce the statute’s requirements.
The case, which is currently pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, concerns whether an appraiser, a real estate appraisal company, and an online mortgage lender (collectively, “defendants”) violated federal and state law by undervaluing plaintiffs’ home on the basis of race and denying a mortgage refinancing application based on the appraisal. Plaintiffs, who are Black, claimed their home was appraised for a lower amount on the basis of race, and maintained that the lender denied their loan even after being told the appraisal was discriminatory. Additionally, plaintiffs claimed that after they replaced family photos with pictures of white people and had a white colleague meet a new appraiser, that appraiser appraised the house for $750,000—a nearly 60 percent increase despite there not being any significant improvements made to the house or meaningful appreciation in the value of comparable homes in the market.
The defendant appraiser filed a counterclaim against the plaintiffs providing technical arguments for why he valued the home at $472,000, including that the property next door was listed for $500,000, but was later reduced to $475,000, only 10 days after he completed the appraisal. He further claimed that the second appraisal failed to include that property as a comparison and relied on home sales that had not happened as of the time of the first appraisal. The lender argued that it should not be held liable because it was relying on a third-party appraiser and that “it can be liable only if it took discriminatory actions that were entirely separate from [the appraiser’s].”
While the statement does not address the issue of vicarious liability, the DOJ and CFPB asserted that lenders can be held liable under the FHA and ECOA for relying on discriminatory appraisals. They explained that it is “well-established that a lender is liable if it relies on an appraisal that it knows or should know to be discriminatory.” The statement also provided that for disparate treatment claims under the FHA and ECOA, “plaintiffs need only plead facts that plausibly allege discriminatory intent.” The agencies also argued that a violation of Section 3617 of the FHA (which includes “a prohibition against retaliating in response to the exercise of fair housing rights”) “does not require a ‘predicate violation’ of the FHA.
District Court approves $1.75 million data breach settlement
On March 3, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California granted final approval of a $1.75 million class action settlement resolving allegations related to a 2020 data breach that compromised nearly 100,000 individuals’ personally identifiable information, including financial information, social security numbers, health records, and other personal data. The affected individuals are students, parents, and guardians who were enrolled in a system used to manage student data in a California school district. According to class members, by failing to adequately safeguard users’ login credentials and by failing to timely notify individuals of the breach, the company violated, among other things, California’s unfair competition law, the California Customer Records Act, and the California Consumer Privacy Act.
Under the terms of the settlement, the company is required to pay a non-reversionary settlement amount of $1.75 million, which will be used to compensate class members and pay for attorney fees and costs, service awards, and administrative expenses. Additionally, as outlined in the motion for preliminary approval of the class action settlement, class members are eligible to submit claims for “ordinary losses” (capped at $1,000 per person), as well as “extraordinary losses” (capped at $10,000 per person). Ordinary losses include expenses such as bank fees, long distance phone charges, certain cell phone charges, postage, gasoline for local travel, “[f]ees for additional credit reports, credit monitoring, or other identity theft insurance products,” and up to 40 hours of time, at $25/hour, for at least one full hour used to deal with the data breach. Extraordinary losses are described as those “arising from financial fraud or identity theft” where the “loss is an actual, documented, and unreimbursed monetary loss” and is “fairly traceable to the data breach” and not already covered by another reimbursement category. Class members must also show that they made “reasonable efforts to avoid, or seek reimbursement for, the loss.” All class members will be offered 12 months of credit monitoring and identity theft protection at no cost, and the company will implement “information security enhancements” to prevent future occurrences.