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District Court grants MSJ for plaintiff in FDCPA suit
On November 21, the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied a defendant debt collection company’s motion for summary judgment and granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in an FDCPA suit. According to the opinion, the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant disputing the accuracy of the information being reported to the credit reporting agency, saying the amount of the debt was incorrect. The defendant received the letter on February 1, 2021, and on February 3, the defendant reported the debt to the CRA, but failed to note that the debt was disputed. The CRA then communicated information about plaintiff’s debt to additional third parties. The next reporting cycle for the plaintiff’s account closed on March 3, 2021. At that time, the defendant correctly reported that plaintiff’s debt was disputed. The defendant explained that although the servicer received the plaintiff’s dispute letter on February 1, 2021, “no one was able to analyze, process, and review” it until February 4, 2021, by which time it had already reported the debt to the CRA.
The defendant argued that it can take up to seven business days for its credit review team to review a dispute letter that it receives, and information about a disputed debt may be communicated to third parties in the interim. The defendant also argued that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue because there was no negative impact on her credit score as a result of the dispute not being transmitted.
According to the court, the defendant’s “system tolerates the communication of false information in cases where disputes arrive at its doorstep at the close of its monthly reporting periods, and it lacks procedures for promptly correcting information it later discovers was false at the time it was communicated to a third party.” The court also found that the plaintiff’s constitutional standing does not depend on proof of damage to her credit score.
ECJ invalidates AML directive granting public access to beneficial ownership information
On November 22, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) announced a ruling invalidating a provision of the 2018 amended EU anti-money laundering directive that guaranteed public access to the beneficial ownership information of legal entities incorporated within member states. The case was referred to the ECJ by a Luxembourg court following two actions that disputed the compatibility of this directive with the beneficial owners’ fundamental right to privacy. The ECJ was asked to issue a preliminary ruling on a series of questions concerning the interpretation of “exceptional circumstances” and “disproportionate risk,” as well as the directive’s compatibility with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter) and the GDPR. Under the directive, member states are required to enter and maintain beneficial ownership information in registers that are accessible to the general public. The directive is intended to prevent the financial system from being exploited for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and requires, with limited exemptions, that member states provide information on “the beneficial owner’s name, month and year of birth, nationality and country of residence, as well as the nature and extent of his or her beneficial interests.”
In its announcement, the ECJ said that public access to beneficial ownership information “constitutes a serious interference with the fundamental rights to respect for private life and the protection of personal data” provided in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. “[T]he potential consequences for the data subjects resulting from possible abuse of their personal data are exacerbated by the fact that, once those data have been made available to the general public, they can not only be freely consulted, but also retained and disseminated,” the ECJ wrote in the judgment, adding that “in the event of such successive processing, it becomes increasingly difficult, or even illusory, for those data subjects to defend themselves effectively against abuse.”
While the ECJ found that, by the measure at issue, the EU legislature is pursuing “an objective of general interest capable of justifying even serious interferences with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, and that the general public’s access to information on beneficial ownership is appropriate for contributing to the attainment of that objective,” the “interference entailed by that measure is neither limited to what is strictly necessary nor proportionate to the objective pursued.” Additionally, the ECJ held that the amended “directive amounts to a considerably more serious interference with the fundamental rights guaranteed in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter” without being offset by any benefits that may result from the amended directive as compared to the previous version in terms of combating money laundering and terrorist financing. However, the ECJ did recognize that civil society and the press have a legitimate interest in accessing such information, given their role in the fight against money laundering.
States say student loan trusts are subject to the CFPA’s prohibition on unfair debt collection practices
On November 15, a bipartisan coalition of 23 state attorneys general led by the Illinois AG announced the filing of an amicus brief supporting the CFPB’s efforts to combat allegedly illegal debt collection practices in the student loan industry. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in February, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware stayed the Bureau’s 2017 enforcement action against a collection of Delaware statutory trusts and their debt collector after determining there may be room for reasonable disagreement related to questions of “covered persons” and “timeliness.” The district court certified two questions for appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit related to (i) whether the defendants qualify as “covered persons” subject to the Bureau’s enforcement authority; and (ii) whether the case can be continued after the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in Seila Law v. CFPB (which determined that the director’s for-cause removal provision was unconstitutional but was severable from the statute establishing the Bureau—covered by a Buckley Special Alert). Previously, the district court concluded that the suit was still valid and did not need ratification because—pointing to the majority opinion in the Supreme Court’s decision in Collins v. Yellen (covered by InfoBytes here)—“‘an unconstitutional removal restriction does not invalidate agency action so long as the agency head was properly appointed[,]’” and therefore the Bureau’s actions are not void and do not need to be ratified, unless a plaintiff can show that “the agency action would not have been taken but for the President’s inability to remove the agency head.” The district court later acknowledged, however, that Collins “is a very recent Supreme Court decision” whose scope is still being “hashed out” in lower courts, which therefore “suggests that there is room for reasonable disagreement and thus supports an interlocutory appeal here.”
The states argued that they have a “substantial interest” in protecting state residents from unlawful debt collection practices, and that this interest is implicated by this action, which addresses whether the defendant student loan trusts are “covered persons” subject to the prohibition on unfair debt collection practices under the CFPA. Urging the 3rd Circuit to affirm the district court’s decision to deny the trusts’ motion to dismiss, the states contended among other things, that hiring third-party agencies to collect on purchased debts poses a large risk to consumers. These types of trusts, the states said, “profit only when the third parties that they have hired are able to collect on the flawed debt portfolios that they have purchased.” Moreover, “[d]ebt purchasing entities, including entities like the [t]rusts, are thus often even more likely than the original creditors to resort to unlawful tactics in undertaking collection activities,” the states stressed, explaining that in order to combat this growing problem, many states apply their prohibitions on unlawful debt collection practices “to all debt purchasers that seek to reap profits from these illegal activities, including those purchasers that outsource collection to third parties.” The Bureau’s decision to do the same is therefore appropriate under the CFPA, the states wrote, adding that “as a practical matter, these debt purchasers are as problematic as debt purchasers that collect on their own debt. The [t]rusts’ request to be treated differently because of their decision to hire third party agents to collect on the debts that they have purchased (and reap the profits on) should be rejected.”
District Court issues judgment against company bilking 9/11 first responders
On November 23, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York entered a stipulated final judgment and order against a finance company, two related entities, and the companies’ founder and owner (collectively, “defendants”) for engaging in deceptive and abusive acts or practices under the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA) related to the offering of cash advances to people on their settlement payouts from victim-compensation funds established for certain first responders to the World Trade Center attack on September 11, 2001.
As previously covered by InfoBytes, in 2017, the CFPB and the New York attorney general filed a complaint alleging that the defendants engaged in deceptive and abusive acts by misleading consumers into selling expensive advances on benefits to which they were entitled by mischaracterizing extensions of credit as assignments of future payment rights, thereby causing the consumers to repay far more than they received. In March 2022, the district court ruled that the CFPB could proceed with its 2017 enforcement action against the defendants (covered by InfoBytes here) two years after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated a 2018 district court order dismissing the case on the grounds that the Bureau’s single-director structure was unconstitutional, and that, as such, the agency lacked authority to bring claims alleging deceptive and abusive conduct by the company (covered by InfoBytes here).
The 2nd Circuit remanded the case to the district court, determining that the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Seila Law LLC v. CPFB (holding that the director’s for-cause removal provision was unconstitutional but severable from the statute establishing the Bureau, as covered by a Buckley Special Alert) superseded the 2018 ruling. The appellate court further noted that following Seila, former Director Kathy Kraninger ratified several prior regulatory actions (covered by InfoBytes here), including the enforcement action brought against the defendants, and as such, remanded the case to the district court to consider the validity of the ratification of the enforcement action. The defendants later filed a petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that the Bureau could not use ratification to avoid dismissal of the lawsuit, but the Supreme Court declined the petition. (Covered by InfoBytes here). In 2021, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Bureau’s enforcement action on the grounds that “it was brought by an unconstitutionally constituted agency” and that the Bureau’s “untimely attempt to subsequently ratify this action cannot cure the agency’s constitutional infirmity.” (Covered by InfoBytes here). The district court turned to the Supreme Court’s June 2021 majority decision in Collins v. Yellen, which held that “‘an unconstitutional removal restriction does not invalidate agency action so long as the agency head was properly appointed[.]’” Accordingly, the agency’s actions are not void and do not need to be ratified, unless a plaintiff can show that “the agency action would not have been taken but for the President’s inability to remove the agency head.” (Covered by InfoBytes here).
In the amended complaint, filed in July 2022, the Bureau and the New York AG alleged that, among other things, the defendants engaged in deceptive acts by misrepresenting to consumers that the company’s contracts created valid and enforceable assignments of their payment proceeds when, in fact, the assignments were not valid and enforceable. The amended complaint also alleged that the company misrepresented to consumers when they would receive funds from the company, often promising consumers an earlier date of disbursement than the actual disbursement. Additionally, the joint complaint alleged that the defendants violated state law by collecting on purported assignments that are void, unenforceable, and uncollectable, or alternatively, by collecting on contracts that functioned as loans with interest rates that exceed usury limits under state law, which are also void and on which no payment is due.
Under the terms of the final judgment, defendants must pay a $1 civil money penalty to the Bureau and must not take any action to collect any unpaid or future amounts owed by the harmed responders, which totals at least $600,000. Under the order, defendants must also refrain from participating in offering, brokering, or providing credit or advances of funds to individuals entitled to payments from governmentally created funds established to compensate victims of 9/11.
District Court: Defendants cannot use CFPB funding argument to dismiss deceptive marketing lawsuit
On November 18, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that the CFPB can proceed in its lawsuit against a credit reporting agency, two of its subsidiaries (collectively, “corporate defendants”), and a former senior executive accused of allegedly violating a 2017 enforcement order in connection with alleged deceptive practices related to their marketing and sale of credit scores, credit reports, and credit-monitoring products to consumers. According to the court, a recent decision issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which found that the Bureau’s funding structure violates the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution (covered by a Buckley Special Alert), is a persuasive basis to have the lawsuit dismissed.
As previously covered by InfoBytes, the Bureau sued the defendants in April claiming the corporate defendants, under the individual defendant’s direction, allegedly violated the 2017 consent order from the day it went into effect instead of implementing agreed-upon policy changes intended to stop consumers from unknowingly signing up for credit monitoring services that charge monthly payments. The Bureau further claimed that the corporate defendants’ practices continued even after examiners raised concerns several times, and that the individual defendant had both the “authority and obligation” to ensure compliance with the 2017 consent order but did not do so.
The defendants sought to have the lawsuit dismissed for several reasons, including on constitutional grounds. The court disagreed with defendants’ constitutional argument, stating that, other than the 5th Circuit, courts around the country have “uniformly” found that Congress’ choice to provide independent funding for the Bureau conformed with the Constitution. “Courts are ill-equipped to second guess exactly how Congress chooses to structure the funding of financial regulators like the Bureau, so long as the funding remains tethered to a law passed by Congress,” the court wrote. The court also overruled defendants’ other objections to the lawsuit. “[T]his case is only at the pleading stage, and all the Bureau must do is plausibly allege that [the individual defendant] was recklessly indifferent to the wrongfulness of [the corporate defendants’] actions over which he had authority,” the court said, adding that the Bureau “has done so because it alleges that because of financial implications, [the individual defendant] actively ‘created a plan to delay or avoid’ implementing the consent order.”
The Bureau is currently seeking Supreme Court review of the 5th Circuit’s decision during its current term. (Covered by InfoBytes here.)
DOJ, FTC, Wisconsin AG sue timeshare scammers
On November 22, the DOJ, FTC, and the Wisconsin attorney general announced a civil enforcement action against 16 defendants for allegedly using deceptive sales practices to sell timeshare “exit services” to consumers, mostly involving senior citizens. The complaint, which was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, alleged that the defendants failed to assist consumers in exiting their timeshare contracts while collecting large fees for the incomplete service. The complaint also alleged that the defendants deceived consumers into registering for timeshare exit services by, among other things, falsely claiming that consumers could not exit timeshare contracts on their own, and that the defendants were affiliated with legitimate companies. The complaint further alleged that the defendants failed to notify consumers of their rights under federal and state law to cancel their contracts with defendants within three business days. The complaint noted that the defendants allegedly deceived consumers into paying over $90 million to the defendant companies for services that were not delivered. The complaint also stated that the defendants’ actions violated the FTC Act, the FTC’s rule concerning the cooling-off period for sales made at home or other locations, and certain Wisconsin state laws concerning fraudulent misrepresentations and direct marketing. The complaint seeks monetary relief, civil penalties, and injunctive relief. According to the DOJ, the defendants’ timeshare exit services are also the subject of lawsuits filed by the Alaska and Missouri attorneys general in June 2022.
FTC, CFPB weigh in on servicemembers’ right to sue under the MLA
On November 22, the FTC and CFPB (agencies) announced the filing of a joint amicus brief with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit seeking the reversal of a district court’s decision that denied servicemembers the right to sue to invalidate a contract that allegedly violated the Military Lending Act (MLA). (See corresponding CFPB blog post here.) The agencies countered that the plain text of the MLA allows servicemembers to enforce their rights in court. Specifically, the agencies argued that Congress made it clear that when a lender extends a loan to a servicemember that fails to comply with the MLA, the loan is rendered void in its entirety. Moreover, Congress amended the MLA to unambiguously provide servicemembers certain legal rights, including an express private right of action and “the right to rescind and seek restitution on a contract void under the criteria of the statute.”
The case involves an active-duty servicemember and his spouse who financed the purchase of a timeshare from the defendants. Plaintiffs entered into an agreement with the defendants, made a down payment, and agreed to pay the remaining balance in monthly installments carrying an interest rate of 16.99 percent, in addition to annual assessments and club dues. None of the loan documents provided to the plaintiffs discussed the military annual percentage rate, nor did the defendants make any supplemental oral disclosures. Additionally, the agreement contained a mandatory arbitration clause (the MLA prohibits creditors from requiring servicemembers to submit to arbitration) and purportedly waived plaintiffs’ right to pursue a class action and their right to a jury trial. Plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit alleging the agreement violated the MLA on several grounds, and sought an order declaring the agreement void. Plaintiffs also sought recission of the agreement, restitution, statutory, actual, and punitive damages, and an injunction requiring defendants to comply with the MLA going forward.
Defendants moved to dismiss, countering “that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had not suffered any concrete injury and, even if they had, whatever injury they suffered was not traceable to the alleged MLA violations.” Defendants also argued that the loan was exempt under the MLA’s exemption for residential mortgages, and claimed that the MLA does not authorize statutory damages, nor did the plaintiffs state a claim for declaratory or injunctive relief. Further, defendants stated the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of standing, agreeing with the magistrate judge that, among other things, plaintiffs “failed to allege ‘that the inclusion of the arbitration provision impacted [their] decision to accept the contract,’ and that they could not ‘seek[] relief based on a mere technicality that has not impacted them in any way.’”
Disagreeing with the district court’s ruling, the agencies argued that plaintiffs have a legal right to challenge the contract in court because (i) they made a down payment on an illegal and void loan; (ii) the injuries are traceable to the challenged conduct since “their monetary losses are the product of the illegal and void loan"; and (iii) their injuries “are redressable by an order of the court awarding restitution for the amounts that plaintiffs have already paid on the loan, and by a declaration confirming that the loan is void and that the plaintiffs have no obligation to make additional payments going forward.” The agencies asserted that courts have recognized that economic injury is exactly the sort of injury that courts have the power to redress.
Moreover, the agencies pointed out that the district court’s ruling “risks substantially curtailing private enforcement of the MLA and limiting servicemembers’ ability to vindicate their rights under the statute. It does so by reading the MLA’s voiding provision out of the statute and reading into the statute an atextual materiality requirement. But it may be very difficult, if not impossible, for servicemembers to demonstrate that certain MLA violations had a direct effect on their decision to procure a financial product or caused them to pay money they would not otherwise have paid.”
Supreme Court to fast-track review of student debt relief program
On December 1, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the Biden administration’s appeal of an injunction entered by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that temporarily prohibits the Secretary of Education from discharging any federal loans under the agency’s student debt relief plan (announced in August and covered by InfoBytes here). In a brief unsigned order, the Supreme Court deferred the Biden administration’s application to vacate, pending oral argument. The Supreme Court said it will treat the Biden administration’s application as a “petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment,” and announced a briefing schedule will be established to allow the case to be argued in the February 2023 argument session to resolve the legality of the program.
The Biden administration filed its application last month asking the Supreme Court to vacate, or at minimum narrow, the 8th Circuit’s injunction. Among other things, the Biden administration claimed that the 8th Circuit failed to “analyze the merits of the respondents’ claims, much less determine they are likely to succeed” when it granted an emergency motion for injunction pending appeal filed by state attorney generals from Nebraska, Missouri, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, and South Carolina. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the 8th Circuit determined that “the equities strongly favor an injunction considering the irreversible impact the Secretary’s debt forgiveness action would have as compared to the lack of harm an injunction would presently impose,” and pointed to the fact that the collection of student loan payments and the accrual of interest have both been suspended.
The appellate court’s “erroneous injunction leaves millions of economically vulnerable borrowers in limbo, uncertain about the size of their debt and unable to make financial decisions with an accurate understanding of their future repayment obligations,” the Biden administration said, adding that if the Supreme Court “declines to vacate the injunction, it may wish to construe this application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment, grant the petition, and set the case for expedited briefing and argument this Term to avoid prolonging this uncertainty for the millions of affected borrowers.”
In its application, the Biden administration argued that the universal injunction was overbroad. The application further argued that the states lack standing because the debt relief plan “does not require respondents to do anything, forbid them from doing anything, or harm them in any other way.” Moreover, the Secretary of Education was acting within the bounds of the HEROES Act when he put together the debt relief plan, the application contended. “The COVID-19 pandemic is a ‘national emergency declared by the President of the United States,’” the application said. “Both the Trump and Biden Administrations previously invoked the HEROES Act to categorically suspend payments and interest accrual on all Department-held loans in light of the pandemic.” The application further argued that the states “have not disputed that those actions were lawful,” and that the Secretary of Education “reasonably ‘deem[ed]’ relief ‘necessary to ensure’ that a subset of these affected individuals—namely, those with lower incomes—‘are not placed in a worse position’ in relation to their student-loan obligations ‘because of their status as affected individuals.’”
Meanwhile, on December 1, the 5th Circuit denied the Department of Education’s (DOE) opposed motion for stay pending appeal, following a ruling issued by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas related to whether the agency’s student debt relief plan violated the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the district court determined that while the HEROES Act expressly exempts the APA’s notice-and-comment obligations, the court stressed that the HEROES Act “does not provide the executive branch clear congressional authorization to create a $400 billion student loan forgiveness program,” and, moreover, does not mention loan forgiveness.
Earlier, on November 22, the Department of Education (DOE) extended the pause on student loan repayments, interest, and collections in an effort to alleviate uncertainty for borrowers. Saying “it would be deeply unfair to ask borrowers to pay a debt that they wouldn’t have to pay,” the DOE stated that payments will resume 60 days after it is allowed to implement the debt relief plan or the litigation is resolved, explaining that this will give the Supreme Court time to resolve the case during its current term. However, if the debt relief plan has not been implemented and litigation has not been resolved by June 30, 2023, borrowers’ payments will resume 60 days after that, the DOE explained.
District Court sends overdraft fee suit to arbitration
On November 16, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted a defendant’s motion to compel arbitration regarding claims that consumers are charged significant overdraft or non-sufficient funds fees on bank accounts linked to discount cards issued by the gas-discount company. According to the plaintiff’s putative class action suit, the defendant advertises fuel discounts through a mobile app and payment card system while claiming that its service acts “like a debit card” by “‘effortlessly deduct[ing]’ funds from linked checking accounts at the time of purchase[.].” While these payments and discounts are represented as being “automatically applied,” the plaintiff alleged that paying with the discount card results in significant processing delays. These delays, the plaintiff contended, cause users to run the risk of having insufficient fees in their checking accounts before the payment is processed, thus resulting in overdraft fees. Additionally, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant does not verify whether a consumer has sufficient funds in the checking account before payments are withdrawn. The defendant moved to compel arbitration, or in the alternative, moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that during the sign-up process, the plaintiff was presented with terms and conditions that explicitly require users to arbitrate any disputes, claims, or controversies. Moreover, the defendant argued that users cannot sign up for the program unless they first check a button that says “I agree” with the terms of use. While the parties agreed that the plaintiff was presented at a minimum a hyperlink to the terms and conditions, they disputed whether the sign-up process required the plaintiff to affirmatively assent to them. According to the plaintiff, there was no such checkbox button when he signed up for the program.
The court disagreed, ruling that the plaintiff had notice of and agreed to terms and conditions that included an arbitration clause and class action waiver. According to the court, the defendant adequately showed that the checkbox button was part of the process when the plaintiff signed up and that the defendant obtained his affirmative asset to the agreement. Further, the plaintiff failed to support his claim with any specific evidence that the checkbox button may not have been there during the sign-up process, the court maintained.
9th Circuit says number generator does not violate TCPA
On November 16, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court’s dismissal of a proposed TCPA class action, holding that in order for technology to meet the definition of an “automatic telephone dialing system” (autodialer), the system must be able to “generate and dial random or sequential telephone numbers under the TCPA’s plain text.” Plaintiff claimed he began receiving marketing texts from the defendant after he provided his phone number to an insurance company on a website. Plaintiff sued alleging violations of the TCPA and asserting that the defendant used a “sequential number generator” to select the order in which to call customers who had provided their phone numbers. This type of number generator qualifies as an autodialer under the TCPA, the plaintiff contended, referring to a footnote in the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Facebook v. Duguid (covered by a Buckley Special Alert), which narrowed the definition of an autodialer under the TCPA and said “an autodialer might use a random number generator to determine the order in which to pick phone numbers from a preproduced list.” Defendant countered, however, that its system is not an autodialer, and “that the TCPA defines an autodialer as one that must generate telephone numbers to dial, not just any number to decide which pre-selected phone numbers to call.”
The 9th Circuit was unpersuaded by the plaintiff’s argument, calling it an “acontextual reading of a snippet divorced from the context of the footnote and the entire opinion.” The appellate court pointed out that nothing in Facebook suggests that the Supreme Court “intended to define an autodialer to include the generation of any random or sequential number.” The 9th Circuit further explained that “[u]sing a random or sequential number generator to select from a pool of customer-provided phone numbers would not cause the harms contemplated by Congress.”