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2nd Circuit: Convicted SEC whistleblower cannot claim award
On November 15, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied a petition from a plaintiff to review a decision by the SEC to not grant him his whistleblower award because he pled guilty to participating in the crime he reported. According to the order, the plaintiff provided information to the SEC that assisted in a successful agency enforcement action with respect to an international bribery scheme. The plaintiff timely filed an application for a whistleblower award in connection with both the action for which he had provided information and another related action. He pled guilty to bribery charges but had not yet been sentenced. The order further noted that because of the guilty plea, the SEC determined that the plaintiff had been “convicted of a criminal violation related to” the bribery scheme that was at issue in both actions. The order noted that, generally, the SEC is required under federal law to pay a monetary award to a whistleblower when that whistleblower “voluntarily provided original information to the Commission that led to the successful enforcement” of “any judicial or administrative action brought by the Commission under the securities laws that results in monetary sanctions exceeding $1,000,000.” The order further noted that the SEC may not make an award "to any whistleblower who is convicted of a criminal violation related to the judicial or administrative action for which the whistleblower otherwise could receive an award.”
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that he was not “convicted” under 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2)(B). The plaintiff also claimed that the fact that he had not yet been sentenced—even though a court has accepted his guilty plea—means that he had not been “convicted.” The appellate court found that he did not raise this issue before the agency and therefore it need not address the plaintiff’s argument about the meaning of “convicted.” But even if it were to excuse the forfeiture, the plaintiff’s argument would fail, the appellate court concluded. The plaintiff also argued that the bribery charges to which he pled guilty were not connected to the actions he was a whistleblower on, and that the SEC did not support its finding of a connection with any substantial evidence. The appellate court disagreed with this argument as well, stating the SEC and the plaintiff interpret the meaning of “related to” differently. The appellate court further explained that “[t]he SEC interprets the term to mean that 'the conduct underlying the criminal conviction must be connected to or stand in some relation to the Covered Action.'" The order stated, “[the plaintiff] suggests that the term requires the whistleblower to have been 'a part of the conduct underlying the ... enforcement action' and to have known about the conduct during its occurrence.’”
CFPB asks Supreme Court to review 5th Circuit decision
On November 14, the DOJ, on behalf of the CFPB, submitted a petition for a writ of certiorari asking the U.S. Supreme Court to review whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that the Bureau’s funding structure violates the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution. The Bureau also asked the court to consider the 5th Circuit’s decision to vacate the agency’s 2017 final rule covering “Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans” (Payday Lending Rule) on the premise that it was promulgated at a time when the Bureau was receiving unconstitutional funding.
The Bureau’s funding is derived through the Federal Reserve instead of the annual congressional appropriations process—a process, the appellate court said, that violates the Constitution. Specifically, the 5th Circuit’s October 19 holding (covered by a Buckley Special Alert) found that although the Bureau spends money pursuant to a validly enacted statute, the structure violates the Appropriations Clause because (i) the Bureau obtains its funds from the Federal Reserve (not the Treasury); (ii) the agency maintains funds in a separate account; (iii) the Appropriations Committees do not have authority to review the agency’s expenditures; and (iv) the Bureau exercises broad authority over the economy. The 5th Circuit also rejected the Bureau’s arguments that the funding structure was necessarily constitutional because it was created by and subject to Congress, and distinguished other agencies that are funded outside of the annual appropriations process.
The case involves a challenge to the Bureau’s Payday Lending Rule, which prohibits lenders from attempting to withdraw payments for covered loans from consumers’ accounts after two consecutive withdrawal attempts have failed due to insufficient funds. As a result of the 5th Circuit’s decision, lenders’ obligation to comply with the rule (originally set for August 19, 2019, but repeatedly delayed) will be further delayed while the constitutional issue winds its way through the courts.
“No other court has ever held that Congress violated the Appropriations Clause by passing a statute authorizing spending,” the Bureau argued as it requested a prompt Supreme Court review, asserting that the 5th Circuit’s decision “threatens to inflict immense legal and practical harms on the CFPB, consumers, and the Nation’s financial sector.” The agency also stressed that “[n]ew challenges to the Bureau’s rules and other actions can be expected to multiply in the weeks and months to come, and will presumably be filed in the 5th Circuit whenever possible.” The decision also has the potential to impact past enforcement actions and rulemaking as well, the Bureau said.
The Bureau further asserted that while the 5th Circuit concluded that “‘an appropriation is required’ to authorize spending” and that “‘[a] law’ providing an agency with a funding source and spending authority ‘does not suffice,’” the appellate court failed to specify what would be required for such a law to qualify as an appropriation.
Moreover, the 5th Circuit’s reasoning was incorrect, the Bureau argued, because Congress specified that the agency could claim up to 12 percent of the Fed’s budget to fund its operations, and it is subject to, among other things, budget and financial oversight, government audits, and requirements that its director prepare and submit annual reports to the Senate and House appropriations committees concerning its fiscal operating plans and forecasts. These safeguards, the Bureau stressed, should assuage concerns about whether the agency is insulated from congressional oversight. “The court of appeals’ novel and ill-defined limits on Congress’s spending authority contradict the Constitution’s text, historical practice, and this Court’s precedent,” the Bureau said, adding that the decision also conflicts with a holding issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit where the appellate court recognized that “Congress can, consistent with the Appropriations Clause, create governmental institutions reliant on fees, assessments, or investments rather than the ordinary appropriations process.”
The Bureau asked the Supreme Court to review the case during its current term, which would ensure resolution of the issue by the summer of 2023.
District Court says university is a financial institution exempt from state privacy law
On November 4, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted a defendant university’s motion to dismiss Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act claims (BIPA), ruling that because the defendant participates in the Department of Education’s Federal Student Aid Program, it is a “financial institution” subject to Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) and therefore exempt from BIPA. Plaintiff sued the defendant claiming the university used technology to collect biometric identifiers to surveil students taking online exams. According to the plaintiff, the defendant’s use of this technology violated students’ biometric privacy rights because the defendant did not obtain students’ written consent to collect and use that data, failed to disclose what happens with the data after collection, and failed to adhere to BIPA’s retention and destruction requirements.
The court disagreed and dismissed the putative class action. The court explained that the defendant’s direct student lending and participation in the Federal Student Aid Program allows it to qualify as a “financial institution,” defined by the GLBA as “any institution the business of which is engaging in financial activities.” As such, it is expressly exempt from BIPA. The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the defendant did not fit within this definition because it is in the business of higher education rather than financial activities because at least five other courts that have also concluded that “institutions of higher education that are significantly engaged in financial activities such as making or administering student loans” qualify for exemption. The court also referred to a 2000 FTC rule issued when the Commission had both enforcement and rulemaking authority under the GLBA. The rule considered colleges and universities to be financial institutions if they “appear to be significantly engaged in lending funds to consumers,” which the court found to be “particularly persuasive because it evidences longstanding, consistent, and well-reasoned interpretation of the statute that it had been tasked to administer.”
District Court denies dismissal of RESPA "dual-tracking" suit
On November 1, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio declined to grant summary judgment in favor of a mortgage servicer defendant in a Regulation X, RESPA, and Ohio Residential Mortgage Lending Act (RMLA) suit against the mortgage servicer and a law firm (collectively, “defendants”). The case concerned a loan modification that plaintiff had allegedly sought from defendants, for which the defendant mortgage servicer ultimately denied, and the defendant law firm initiated a foreclosure action. The defendant mortgage servicer challenged the count in the complaint alleging that the defendant mortgage servicer’s moving for summary judgment in the state foreclosure action violated Regulation X and RESPA’s prohibition on dual tracking. Dual tracking “occurs when a lender ‘actively pursues foreclosure while simultaneously considering the borrower for loss mitigation options.’” The defendant mortgage servicer argued that the prohibition on moving for summary judgment found in Regulation X did not apply because the plaintiff rejected the loan modification. The defendant mortgage servicer based this argument on the fact that it did not receive the plaintiff’s executed modification by a certain date. Because of this, the defendant mortgage servicer argued that it was permitted to move forward with a foreclosure judgment, and its decision to reverse the denial of the modification was at its discretion and not subject to the requirements of 12 C.F.R.1024.41(g).
The court found, however, that there was a genuine dispute as to whether the plaintiff returned the loan modification agreement by the designated date. The court continued, “[the defendant mortgage servicer’s] explanation regarding all three of the exceptions found at §41(g) subsections (1) through (3) each expressly depend upon the factual assertion that [the plaintiff] did not return a signed modification agreement and thereby rejected same. Inasmuch as there is evidence that [the plaintiff] did so, the court cannot conclude that [the defendant mortgage servicer] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law regarding the exceptions in §41(g) of Regulation X.” Among other things, the court also found that the defendant mortgage servicer “failed to act with reasonable care and diligence, in good faith, to safeguard and account for money tendered by [the plaintiff].” The court concluded by finding that the plaintiff sufficiently identified plausible damages as a result of a RESPA violation, further permitting her claims to stand.
District Court approves payday settlement
On November 10, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi issued a final settlement order resolving allegations that a Mississippi-based payday lender violated the CFPA in connection with check cashing services and small dollar loans. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the CFPB filed a complaint against two Mississippi-based payday loan and check cashing companies for allegedly violating the CFPA’s prohibition on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices.
In March 2018, a district court denied the payday lenders’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, rejecting the argument that the Bureau's structure unconstitutional and that the agency’s claims violate due process. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed to hear an interlocutory appeal on the constitutionality question, and, prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, a divided panel held that the CFPB’s single-director structure is constitutional, finding no constitutional defect with allowing the director of the Bureau to only be fired for cause (covered by InfoBytes here). The order noted that the 5th Circuit voted sua sponte to rehear the case en banc and issued an opinion in which the majority vacated the district court’s opinion as contrary to Seila Law. The majority did not, however, direct the district court to enter judgment against the Bureau because, though the Supreme Court had found that the director’s for-cause removal provision was unconstitutional, it was severable from the statute establishing the Bureau (covered by a Buckley Special Alert). The majority determined that the “time has arrived for the district court to proceed” and stated it “place[s] no limitation on the matters that that court may consider, including, without limitation, any other constitutional challenges.”
According to the settlement, the owner and president of the company must pay a civil money penalty of $899,350 to the Bureau “by reason of the [UDAAP violations] alleged in the Complaint.” However, the order further noted that the amount is remitted by $889,350 because he paid “that amount in fines to the Mississippi Department of Banking and Consumer Finance.” The district court also entered a separate order dismissing the lawsuit with prejudice.
8th Circuit pauses student debt relief program
On November 14, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted an emergency motion for injunction pending appeal filed by state attorneys general from Nebraska, Missouri, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, and South Carolina to temporarily prohibit the Secretary of Education from discharging any federal loans under the agency’s student debt relief plan (announced in August and covered by InfoBytes here). Earlier in October, the 8th Circuit issued an order granting an emergency motion filed by the states, which requested an administrative stay prohibiting the discharge of any student loan debt under the cancellation plan until the appellate court had issued a decision on the states’ motion for an injunction pending an appeal. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) The October order followed a ruling issued by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, which dismissed the states’ action for lack of Article III standing after concluding that the states—which attempted “to assert a threat of imminent harm in the form of lost tax revenue in the future”— failed to establish imminent and non-speculative harm sufficient to confer standing.
In granting the emergency motion, the appellate court disagreed with the district court’s assertion that the states lacked standing. The 8th Circuit reviewed whether the state of Missouri could rely on any harm the Missouri Higher Education Loan Authority (MOHELA) might suffer as a result of the Department of Education’s cancellation plan. The appellate court found that the relationship between MOHELA and the state is relevant to the standing analysis, especially as Missouri law specifically directs MOHELA (which receives revenue from the student loan accounts it services) to distribute $350 million into the state’s treasury. As such, “MOHELA may well be an arm of the State of Missouri” under this reasoning, the appellate court wrote, adding that several district courts have concluded that MOHELA is an arm of the state. However, regardless of whether MOHELA is an arm of the state, the resulting financial impact due to the cancellation plan would, among other things, affect the state’s ability to fund public higher education institutions, the 8th Circuit noted. “Consequently, we conclude Missouri has shown a likely injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, and which is actual or imminent, traceable to the challenged action of the Secretary, and redressable by a favorable decision,” the appellate court wrote, adding that since one party likely has standing it does not need to address the standing of the other states. The appellate court also determined that “the equities strongly favor an injunction considering the irreversible impact the Secretary’s debt forgiveness action would have as compared to the lack of harm an injunction would presently impose.” The 8th Circuit explained that it considered several criteria, including the fact that the collection of student loan payments and the accrual of interest have both been suspended. The Missouri attorney general released a statement applauding the 8th Circuit’s decision.
The 8th Circuit’s decision follows a recent ruling issued by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, which found that the student loan forgiveness program is “an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s legislative power.” (Covered by InfoBytes here.)
California appellate court affirms arbitration denial
On November 8, the Sixth Appellate District Court in the Court of Appeal in California affirmed a lower court’s decision denying a defendant collection agency’s motion to compel arbitration in a California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (RFDCPA) suit. According to the order, the defendant was hired to collect unpaid credit card debt from the plaintiff on behalf of a creditor. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant “engaged in a routine practice of sending initial communications that failed to provide notice as required by Civil Code section 1788.14, subdivision (d)(2), which governs attempts to collect ‘time-barred’ debts—those that are ‘past the date of obsolescence set forth in Section 605(a) of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act.’” The defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration, submitting two cardholder agreements produced by the original creditor that did not reference the plaintiff’s name, account number, or the plaintiff’s signature. The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the defendant failed to link the plaintiff to the “generic documents” and denied ever seeing or receiving the agreements before. The trial court ruled the documents were not admissible because there was no evidence that they were ever sent to the plaintiff. The trial court concluded that failing to show evidence of mutual assent, the defendant “could not show that the card agreements were enforceable binding arbitration agreements, and thus it denied the motion to compel arbitration.” The defendant appealed.
The appellate court noted that while the custodian of records for the original creditor declared that the agreements submitted by the defendant were linked to the plaintiff’s account, the custodian did not declare how or if the agreements were provided to the plaintiff for his review and acceptance. The appellate court further found that since the plaintiff declared that he never received the agreements, the burden to prove the existence of a valid arbitration agreement shifted back to the defendant.
District Court blocks student loan forgiveness program
On November 10, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas ruled that the Biden administration’s $400 billion student loan forgiveness program under the HEROES Act of 2003 is “an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s legislative power.” As previously covered by InfoBytes, the three-part debt relief plan was announced in August to provide, among other things, up to $20,000 in debt cancellation to Pell Grant recipients with loans held by the Department of Education (DOE) and up to $10,000 in debt cancellation to non-Pell Grant recipients for borrowers making less than $125,000 a year or less than $250,000 for married couples. Plaintiffs, whose loans are ineligible for debt forgiveness under the program, sued the DOE and the DOE secretary claiming the agency violated the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures and arbitrarily decided the program’s eligibility criteria. Plaintiffs further contended that the DOE secretary does not have the authority under the HEROES Act to implement the program. Defendants countered that the plaintiffs lacked standing.
The court entered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (rather than granting preliminary injunctive relief as requested) after determining it was appropriate to proceed to the merits of the case. Concerning defendants’ assertion regarding lack of standing to challenge the DOE’s program because it is conferring a benefit and therefore “nobody is harmed by the existence of that benefit,” (as the court characterized defendants’ argument), the court ruled that the U.S. Supreme Court has actually “recognized that a plaintiff has standing to challenge a government benefit in many cases.” The court next reviewed whether plaintiffs suffered a concrete injury based on the denial of their procedural rights under the APA by not being afforded the opportunity to provide meaningful input to protect their concrete interests. While the HEROES Act expressly exempts the APA’s notice-and-comment obligations, the court stressed that the HEROES Act “does not provide the executive branch clear congressional authorization to create a $400 billion student loan forgiveness program,” and, moreover, does not mention loan forgiveness. “If Congress provided clear congressional authorization for $400 billion in student loan forgiveness via the HEROES Act, it would have mentioned loan forgiveness,” the court wrote. Shortly after the ruling was issued, the DOJ filed a notice of appeal on behalf of the DOE with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Secretary of Education Miguel Cardona released a statement following the ruling expressing disappointment in the decision.
3rd Circuit says defendants conducted reasonable investigations into FCRA claims
On November 9, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of defendants in an FCRA reasonable investigation suit. According to the opinion, the plaintiff obtained a credit card from one of the defendants, exceeded her credit limit, and was past due on payments. Another of the defendants (furnishing defendant) acquired her account and reported the outstanding debt to the consumer reporting agencies (CRAs). Plaintiff disputed the tradeline as inaccurate with two of the CRAs claiming several alleged inaccuracies, including that the date the account was opened and the original balance were inaccurate, and the payment history was incomplete, among other things. The CRAs notified the furnishing defendant of the disputes, and the furnishing defendant conducted an investigation in accordance with its FCRA dispute policies and procedures, which revealed that the account status, payment history, current balance, amount past due, and account number were accurate. Discrepancies in the spelling of the plaintiff’s name and street address were corrected however. It was not until after the plaintiff sued the defendants for violations of the FCRA that she asserted the furnishing defendant should have been aware she was enrolled in a credit protection program and that it was therefore liable for the original creditor’s failure to apply the program’s benefits to her credit card account. The opinion noted that the plaintiff also filed a “similarly vague dispute” against a student loan servicer for allegedly misreporting information about her account with the CRAs.
In agreeing with the district court, the 3rd Circuit concluded that summary judgment in favor of the defendants was properly granted as the plaintiff “failed to introduce any direct or circumstantial evidence” showing either of the defendants failed to “conduct reasonable investigations with respect to the disputed information.” Additionally, the plaintiff’s disputes were vague and failed to provide specifics as to the alleged errors or explain why the information was inaccurate or incomplete. “To the extent that [plaintiff] claims that the investigations were unreasonable because a reasonable investigation would have revealed the inaccuracies alleged, her conclusory assertion is insufficient to defeat summary judgment,” the appellate court wrote.
States reach multi-million dollar CRA data breach settlement
On November 7, a coalition of 40 state attorneys general, co-led by Massachusetts and Illinois, reached settlements with a credit reporting agency (CRA) and a telecommunications company related to data breaches in 2012 and 2015 that impacted the personal information of millions of consumers nationwide. According to the announcement, in 2012, an identity thief posing as a private investigator accessed and retrieved sensitive personal information, such as names, Social Security numbers, addresses, and/or phone numbers from a database company that the CRA purchased. The states claimed that the identity thief (who has since pleaded guilty to federal criminal charges for wire fraud, identity fraud, access device fraud, and computer fraud and abuse, among other charges) accessed the information prior to the acquisition and continued to do so afterwards. Affected consumers were allegedly never informed of the data breach. Later, in 2015, the CRA reported it experienced a data breach affecting personal information, including consumers’ driver’s license and passport numbers, as well as information used by the telecommunications company to make credit assessments, which the CRA stored on behalf of the telecommunications company. Following the breach, the CRA offered two years of credit monitory services to affected consumers.
Under the terms of the settlements (see here and here), the CRA has agreed to pay a combined total of $13.67 million to the states in connection with the 2012 and 2015 data breaches, and will strengthen its data security practices. According to the announcement, these measures will require the CRA to (i) maintain comprehensive incident response and data breach notification plans; (ii) strengthen the vetting and oversight of third parties that have access to consumers’ personal information; (iii) develop an Identity Theft Prevention Program to detect potential red flags in customer accounts; (iv) not misrepresent to consumers the extent to which the privacy and security of their personal information is protected; (v) strengthen due diligence provisions to ensure the CRA properly vets acquisitions and evaluates data security concerns prior to integration; and (vi) implement data minimization and disposal requirements, including undertaking specific efforts designed to reduce the use of Social Security numbers as an identifier. The CRA will also offer affected consumers five years of free credit monitoring services, during which time consumers will be able to receive two free copies of their credit report annually.
Separately, the telecommunications company agreed to pay more than $2.43 million to the states, and will maintain a written information security program, including vendor management provisions to ensure vendors take reasonable security measures to safeguard consumers’ personal information. This will involve, among other things, maintaining a third-party risk management team to oversee vendors’ security, outlining specific security requirements in vendor contracts, and employing a variety of security assessment and monitoring practices to confirm vendor compliance. The telecommunications company will also provide employee training on the requirements of its information security measures and implement a written cyber incident and response plan to prepare for and respond to security events.