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District Court decides in favor of bank despite alleged FDCPA and RESPA violations
On February 15, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California granted a bank defendant’s motion to dismiss certain claims presented in the plaintiff’s complaint alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and Real Estate Settlement Practices Act (RESPA).
With respect to the FDCPA claim, the court found that the defendant did not qualify as a “debt collector” within the meaning of the statute because the defendant acquired the loan through its merger with the original creditor of the plaintiff’s mortgage. The court noted that several other district courts have held that an entity that acquires a debt through its merger with another creditor is not a “debt collector” under the FDCPA even if the merger occurred following the borrower’s default on the debt.
With respect to the plaintiff’s RESPA claim, the court found that the plaintiff failed to allege a violation of the statute because the plaintiff’s letter to the defendant, which requested a copy of the original promissory note underlying the deed of trust as well as a loan payoff amount, did not constitute a “qualified written request” triggering the defendant’s obligations under RESPA to respond.
District Court addresses plain meaning of “pattern or practice of noncompliance” under RESPA.
On February 7, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland granted in part and denied in part a defendant mortgage company’s motion to dismiss a class action lawsuit alleging RESPA violations related to escrow account management for borrowers. Class action plaintiffs claim that the defendant’s failure to pay their property taxes in a timely manner, resulting in their homes being potentially subject to local tax sale procedures for unpaid taxes, created a “pattern or practice of noncompliance” within the meaning of RESPA.
In moving to dismiss, defendant argued that alleged violations of servicing obligations that fall under separate subsections of RESPA cannot create a “pattern or practice of noncompliance” for obligations of the section setting for the escrow-handling obligations. While noting that “case law interpreting RESPA statutory damages claims is still developing,” the court found that the statute does not require identical violations from the same subsection of RESPA to state a “pattern or practice” claim. The court reasoned that the absence of the word “subsection” from the statute is noteworthy, and it indicates that Congress did not intend to confine “pattern or practice” to a single subsection, and held that the plain meaning of the provision only requires plaintiffs to allege repeated violations of the “[s]ervicing of mortgage loans and administration of escrow accounts” section of RESPA (i.e., all of the obligations set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 2605). The court also rejected defendant’s argument that plaintiffs failed to state a claim because they “cannot rely upon their own allegations or the existence of public complaints and lawsuits which have not resulted in a judgment against it for violations of RESPA,” finding that allegations of servicing violations from multiple named plaintiffs in separate jurisdictions was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
Separately, the court dismissed allegations that defendant violated RESPA by failing to respond to plaintiffs’ qualified written requests, finding that plaintiffs’ claims of “emotional distress, without more, do[] not establish the causal link necessary to show actual damages,” and that plaintiffs did not support claims that voluntary postage costs for sending correspondence to defendants could be recognized as economic damages.
Plaintiffs seek preliminary approval of $9 million class action settlement involving unsolicited texts
On February 8, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington received an unopposed motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement against a broker-dealer alleging that the defendant violated the Washington Commercial Electronic Mail Act (CEMA) and the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA) by having consumers send “unsolicited advertising text messages” to other Washingtonians through a referral program. The proposed settlement would establish a $9 million settlement fund that would compensate an estimated one million affected class members, consisting of consumers who received a referral program text message during the relevant period, were Washington residents, and did not “clearly and affirmatively” consent to receive referral program text messages.
Supreme Court agrees with Third Circuit that consumers may sue “any” government entity under FCRA
On February 8, the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously decided that a consumer can sue any government agency—in this case the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)—for damages for violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, as amended by the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 (the Act). The court found that government agencies are expressly included in the definition of any “person” who violates the statute. On appeal from the 3rd Circuit, the case involved an individual who sued the USDA for monetary damages under FCRA, alleging that the USDA furnished incorrect information to a credit reporting company stating that his account was past due, damaging his credit score and impairing his ability to access affordable credit.
In affirming the 3rd Circuit’s reversal of the lower court’s dismissal of the case, the Supreme Court noted that, while the U.S. is “generally immune” from monetary judgment suits as a sovereign body, Congress can waive this immunity. Applying a “clear statement” rule, the Supreme Court interpreted the Act’s statutory language that authorizes consumer suits for money damages against “[a]ny person” who willfully or negligently fails to comply with [the law]” to constitute a clear waiver of federal government sovereign immunity. As the Court explained, “the Act defines the term ‘person’ to include “any . . . governmental . . . agency,” therefore “FCRA clearly waives sovereign immunity in cases like this one.”
Third Circuit finds Pennsylvania lending law does not regulate collection of charged-off debt
On February 7, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a lower court’s decision to grant a debt collector’s (the defendant) motion for judgment. The defendant argued that its efforts to collect plaintiff’s charged-off debt via a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding was not limited by, or in violation of, the Pennsylvania Consumer Discount Company Act (CDCA). The plaintiff, who obtained a loan from a third-party small-dollar lender licensed under the CDCA, defaulted on the loan and the licensed lender subsequently charged off and sold plaintiff’s debt to a company that was not licensed under the CDCA.
After filing for bankruptcy, the plaintiff sued the defendant and alleged a FDCPA violation when the defendant filed a proof of claim during the bankruptcy proceeding to collect the outstanding balance on the charged-off loan. The plaintiff’s argument was premised on claims that the defendant could not lawfully collect the debt because the CDCA dictates that a licensee may not sell CDCA-authorized contracts to an unlicensed person or entity. As such, the plaintiff argued the proof of claim violated the FDCPA’s prohibition against “false, deceptive, or misleading” representations in connection with the collection of a debt. The 3rd Circuit disagreed.
Relying in part on a letter from the Pennsylvania Department of Banking and Securities confirming that the CDCA does not apply to an unlicensed entity that purchases or attempts to collect on charged-off consumer loan accounts of debtors in bankruptcy, the appellate court held that “[t]he CDCA is a loan statute, not a debt collection statute,” and that “entities in the business of purchasing and collecting charged-off consumer debt are not subject to the CDCA’s regulatory scheme.” The 3rd Circuit held that selling charged-off obligations is not the same as selling the defaulted loan contract. Rather, it is selling unsecured debt, which falls outside of the CDCA’s scope. The court concluded that the CDCA’s prohibitions were inapplicable and could not be the basis for the FDCPA violation.
District Court finds “negative emotions” alone do not establish standing under the FDCPA
Recently, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted a debt collector’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff’s allegations of injury after receiving one letter that violated the FDCPA did not establish standing. The plaintiff sued the debt collector under Sections 1692e and 1692g of the FDCPA, alleging that the defendant (i) made false and misleading representations, and (ii) continued to collect the debt without proper validation by sending the plaintiff a collection letter with the wrong account number and purporting the plaintiff is personally liable for her deceased husband’s medical debt. The plaintiff asserted her injuries because of receiving the letter included expending time and money to mitigate the risk of future financial harm and fear, anxiety, and stress, which “manifested physically in the form of increased heartrate.”
The court found that the plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts to establish, or for the court to infer, a tangible injury because the plaintiff only stated she lost money without providing additional detail on what that entailed. Additionally, the court relied on the holdings of Courts of Appeals and found that the plaintiff’s alleged emotions of fear, anxiety, and stress alone do not state a cognizable or “particularized, concrete” injury.
District Court receives proposed settlement agreement of $6.3 million for alleged breach of contract
On February 6, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee received the plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement agreement as part of their lawsuit against a large bank for alleged breach of contract. According to the motion, the class action started when the plaintiffs allegedly sustained damages after the bank’s predecessor breached its contract. The contract in dispute provided consumers a high-interest market investment account that had an interest rate that was “guaranteed [to] never fall below 6.5%”; however, in 2018, the predecessor bank dropped the interest rate on all accounts below the “guaranteed” floor of 6.5 percent, down to 1.05 percent, and then to nearly zero. While the plaintiffs alleged this to be a breach of contract, the bank’s representative allegedly testified they did not have to honor the guaranteed interest rates “because the signature cards (signed by some account holders) allowed FNB to ‘adjust’ the interest rate.”
One hundred and twenty-one plaintiffs are seeking court approval of their class action settlement. As part of the proposed settlement, plaintiffs want the defendant to pay $6.3 million to settle the class action. Additionally, the named plaintiffs want to receive $10,000 per plaintiff. The court neither granted nor denied the plaintiffs’ motion, but the defendant bank did not oppose the plaintiffs’ motion. A final hearing to consider entry of a final order is outstanding.
California appeals court vacates a ruling on enjoining enforcement of CPRA regulations
On February 9, California’s Third District Court of Appeal vacated a lower court’s decision to enjoin the California Privacy Protection Agency (CPPA) from enforcing regulations implementing the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA). The decision reverses the trial court’s ruling delaying enforcement of the regulations until March 2024, which would have given businesses a one-year implementation period from the date final regulations were promulgated (covered by InfoBytes here).
The CPRA mandated the CPPA to finalize regulations on specific elements of the act by July 1, 2022, and provided that “the Agency’s enforcement authority would take effect on July 1, 2023,” a one-year gap between promulgation and enforcement. The CPPA did not issue final regulations until March of 2023, but sought to enforce the rules starting on the July 1, 2023, statutory date. In response, in March 2023, the Chamber of Commerce filed a lawsuit in state court seeking a one-year delay of enforcement for the new regulations. The trial court held that a delay was warranted because “voters intended there to be a gap between the passing of final regulations and enforcement of those regulations.” On appeal, the court emphasized that there is no explicit and unambiguous language in the law prohibiting the agency from enforcing the CPRA until at least one year after final regulations are approved, and that and found that while the mandatory dates included in the CPRA “amounts to a one-year delay,” such a delay was not mandated by the statutory language. The court further found that there is no indication from the ballot materials available to voters in passing the statute that the voters intended such a one-year delay. The court explained that the one-year gap between regulations could have been interpreted to give businesses time to comply, or as a period for the agency to prepare for enforcing the new rules, or there may also be other reasons for the gap.
Accordingly, the appellate court held that Chamber of Commerce “was simply not entitled to the relief granted by the trial court.” As a result of the court’s decision, businesses are now required to commence implementing the privacy regulations established by the agency.
District Court dismisses FDCPA class action lawsuit for lack of standing on alleged concrete injuries suffered
On January 31, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed an FDCPA class action lawsuit for lack of standing. According to the order, plaintiff alleged numerous violations of the FDCPA related to two debt collection letters sent to the plaintiff and his girlfriend. In September 2023, a debt collector (defendant) reportedly sent two letters to the plaintiff which allegedly did not contain the requisite information mandated by the FDCPA for communication with consumers, including validation and itemization details. One of the letters purportedly demanded payment by September 29, falling within the 30-day validation period. Additionally, plaintiff asserted that one of the letters was addressed to his girlfriend who bore no responsibility for the debt. Plaintiff claimed two concrete injuries: (i) the letters allegedly strained his relationship with his girlfriend, causing emotional distress; and (ii) due to the omission of critical information in the letters, plaintiff felt confused and uncertain about how to effectively respond.
In considering the plaintiff’s claims, the court discussed the elements required to state a claim for publicity given to private life and examines a specific case where such a claim was rejected by the court. It highlights that for such a claim to succeed, the matter publicized must be highly offensive to a reasonable person and not of legitimate public concern. Additionally, mere communication of private information to a single person typically does not constitute publicity, unless it has the potential to become public knowledge. Although Congress explicitly prohibits debt collectors from sharing consumer financial information with third parties, the court noted that it “does not automatically transform every arguable invasion of privacy into an actionable, concrete injury.” Therefore, the plaintiff's injury, as pleaded, was deemed insufficiently concrete for standing purposes. Regarding the second alleged injury, the court argued that confusion alone does not suffice as a concrete injury for standing purposes, and courts have determined that mere confusion or frustration does not qualify as an injury. Additionally, the court compared the case to other cases where plaintiffs had alleged confusion yet had also demonstrated further injuries.
Trade associations sue OCC, FDIC, and Federal Reserve on their Proposed Rules for the CRA
On February 5, a group of trade, banking, and business associations filed a class-action complaint for injunctive relief against the OCC, Federal Reserve, and FDIC (the Agencies) for their enforcement of the new rulemaking (the Rule) implementing the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA). The plaintiffs argued that the Rule creates a “wholesale and unlawful change” to a successful fifty-year-old statute. After listing several problems, the plaintiffs requested the Court to “enjoin, hold unlawful, vacate, and set aside” the Rule; additionally, plaintiffs requested the Court declare that the Rule violates the CRA and the Administrative Procedures Act.
As previously covered by InfoBytes, the Rule was approved by the Agencies on October 24, 2023, published in the Federal Register on February 1, 2024, and would take effect on April 1, 2024. The plaintiffs state that the new regulatory rules are “extraordinarily and unnecessarily complex” since they require a “staggering” 649 pages. (An FDIC Vice Chairman was quoted as labeling the rules as “by far the longest rulemaking the FDIC has ever issued.”) In detail, the plaintiffs support their claims by pointing out the Rule creates different performance tests that differ “radically” from the previous regulatory framework, e.g., the Retail Lending Test is a two-part test, and that each of these tests includes “multiple sub-parts and sub-parts of sub-parts” that create complexity in the Rule. Banks will be given two years (until January 1, 2026) to comply with the Rule. Plaintiffs argue that banks must act immediately, citing the OCC’s own words that the estimated compliance costs are over $90 million during the first year.
The plaintiffs argue the Rule violates the APA by exceeding the Agencies’ statutory authority by “assessing banks on their responsiveness to credit needs outside of their geographic deposit-taking footprint” (Count I), and by issuing a rule that is arbitrary and capricious by failing to give reasonable notice of the areas and products that will be assessed and the market benchmarks against which performance will be evaluated; failing to conduct an adequate cost benefit analysis; and failing to consider the implications of the Rule (Count II).