InfoBytes Blog
Filter
Subscribe to our InfoBytes Blog weekly newsletter and other publications for news affecting the financial services industry.
11th Circuit: Motion to reschedule foreclosure does not violate RESPA
On June 11, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a RESPA action against a mortgage servicer, concluding that rescheduling a foreclosure sale is not a violation of Regulation X’s prohibition on moving for an order of foreclosure sale after a borrower has submitted a complete loss-mitigation application. According to the opinion, a consumer’s home was the subject of an order of foreclosure, and the mortgage servicer subsequently approved a trial loan-modification plan for a six-month period. The servicer filed a motion to reschedule the foreclosure sale so that the sale would not occur unless the consumer failed to comply with the modification plan during the trial period. The consumer filed suit, alleging that the servicer violated Regulation X––which prohibits loan servicers from moving for an order of foreclosure sale after a borrower has submitted a complete loss-mitigation application––because the servicer rescheduled the foreclosure sale instead of cancelling it. The district court dismissed the action.
On appeal, the 11th Circuit agreed with the district court, concluding that the consumer failed to state a claim for a violation of Regulation X. The appellate court reasoned that Regulation X does not prohibit a servicer from moving to reschedule a foreclosure sale as that motion is not the same as the “order of sale,” a substantive and dispositive motion seeking authorization to conduct a sale at all, as referenced in Regulation X. Moreover, the appellate court argued that the consumer’s interpretation of the prohibition is inconsistent with the consumer protection goals of RESPA because it would disincent loan servicers from offering loss-mitigation options and helping borrowers complete loss-mitigation applications, if a foreclosure sale has already been scheduled. Lastly, the appellate court noted that the motion to reschedule is consistent with the CFPB’s commentary that, “[i]t is already standard industry practice for a servicer to suspend a foreclosure sale during any period where a borrower is making payments pursuant to the terms of a trial loan modification,” rejecting the consumer’s argument that the servicer should have cancelled the sale altogether.
Maryland amends statute of limitations for UDAP actions against mortgage servicers
On May 25, the Maryland governor signed HB 0425, which amends the state’s statute of limitations applicable to certain civil actions relating to unfair, abusive, or deceptive trade practices (UDAP) filed against a mortgage servicer. Specifically, the bill requires that an action filed by a homeowner alleging damages arising out of a UDAP violation shall be filed within the earlier of: (i) 5 years after a foreclosure sale of the residential property; or (ii) 3 years after the mortgage servicer discloses its UDAP violation to the homeowner. The bill is effective October 1.
New Jersey approves mortgage lending bill package
On April 29, the New Jersey governor approved several bills related to mortgage lending in the state. According to a press release issued by the governor, the package of nine bills addresses the state’s foreclosure crisis and includes the following:
- A 4997, known as the Mortgage Services Licensing Act, requires persons who act as mortgage servicers—either directly or indirectly—to obtain a license from the New Jersey Commissioner of Banking and Insurance for each office where business is conducted. The Act provides certain licensing exemptions, including federally insured banks and credit unions and their wholly-owned subsidiaries, those already licensed under the state’s Residential Mortgage Lending Act (the Act) who meet certain criteria, and the New Jersey Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency. However, the Act stipulates that sections 9 – 12, which discuss, among other things, record-keeping requirements, late fee restrictions, and required disclosures, apply to all persons, including exempt persons, acting as mortgage servicers in the state. Among other provisions, the Act (i) outlines licensing application requirements, procedures, and expiration terms; (ii) requires licensed mortgage servicers to file annual reports about loan servicing in the state; (iii) stipulates that licenses are non-transferable; (iv) mandates mortgage servicers to file a surety bond, fidelity bond, and evidence of coverage with the Commissioner; (v) requires compliance with all applicable federal laws including RESPA and TILA; (vi) requires mortgage servicers to keep a current schedule of service-related activity fees; and (vii) prohibits mortgage servicers from engaging in unfair or deceptive practices in connection with loan servicing. Moreover, the Act grants the Commission with supervision, investigation, and examination authority. The Act takes effect in 90 days.
- A 5001 “reduces the statute of limitations in residential mortgage foreclosures from 20 years to six years from the date on which the debtor defaulted, in situations in which the date of default is used as the method to determine when the statute of limitations has expired.” A 5001 takes effect immediately and applies to all residential mortgages executed on or after the effective date.
- S 3416 states that provisions of the New Jersey Residential Mortgage Lending Act now apply to certain out-of-state persons involved in residential mortgage lending in the state “provided they are otherwise required to be licensed pursuant to the provisions of the [A]ct. . . .” S 3416 takes effect immediately.
- S 3411, among other things, (i) requires a notice of intention to foreclose on a residential mortgage to be filed within 180 days prior to commencing foreclosure, stating that if a foreclosure proceeding has not yet commenced, “the lender shall send a new written notice at least 30 days, but not more than 180 days, in advance of that action”; and (ii) limits the number of permitted reinstatements of dismissed mortgage foreclosure actions to three, with certain exceptions. S 3411 takes effect August 1, which is the first day of the fourth month following enactment.
Texas Court of Appeals affirms summary judgment for loan servicer and bank
On April 15, the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees, a loan servicer and a national bank acting as a trustee, concluding, among other things, that the appellant homeowner failed to provide sufficient evidence to support her claims that the appellees violated the Texas Debt Collection Act (TDCA) and Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). According to the opinion, the homeowner—who defaulted on a loan that was referred to foreclosure—filed a lawsuit to stop the foreclosure sale, alleging that the defendants made “fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading representations” under the TDCA by allegedly failing to (i) provide an accurate accounting of received payments and credits; (ii) apply received payments; (iii) clearly disclose “the name of the person to whom the debt had been assigned or was owed when making a demand for money”; (iv) provide requested documentation regarding the assignment of the promissory note; and (v) provide proper prior notice to the appellant concerning the foreclosure proceedings. Additionally, the appellant further alleged that the appellees violated the DTPA by using fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading representations in the collection of appellant’s debt. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision. With respect to the appellant’s TDCA claims, the appellate court held, among other things, that first, the homeowner failed to show that the appellees made affirmative misrepresentations concerning the loan’s character or amount; second, failure to apply payments is not specifically a “‘prohibited misleading practice’” under the TDCA; and third, the appellees provided evidence showing the homeowner was “appropriately notified” of her default, and that under the TDCA, “service is completed upon deposit in the mail, not actual receipt.” With respect to the appellant’s DTPA claim, the appellate court held that the DTPA only applies to the acquisition of goods and services by lease or purchase and that loan servicing, foreclosure, and loan modification activities are not goods or services under the DTPA.
Virginia provides eviction and foreclosure relief to federal employees impacted by shutdowns
On April 3, the Virginia governor signed SB 1737, which provides a 30-day stay of eviction and foreclosure proceedings for furloughed federal employees and contractors during a partial closure of the federal government. The law grants a tenant or homeowner who defaults on a housing payment after December 22, 2018, a 30-day stay on eviction or foreclosure proceedings. The tenant or homeowner must provide “written proof” that they were subject to a furlough, or were not otherwise receiving wages, as a result of the partial government shutdown that began on December 22, 2018. The tenant or homeowner must be an (i) employee of the federal government; (ii) a federal government contractor; or (iii) an employee of a contractor for the federal government. The law is effective immediately and expires on September 30.
Supreme Court: Law firms conducting nonjudicial foreclosures are not debt collectors under FDCPA
On March 20, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously affirmed a 2018 10th Circuit decision, holding that law firms performing nonjudicial foreclosures are not “debt collectors” under the FDCPA. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion, which resolves whether FDCPA protections apply to nonjudicial foreclosures conducted by law firms. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) Three considerations led to the Court’s conclusion. First, the Court held that a business pursuing nonjudicial foreclosures would be covered by the Act’s primary definition of a debt collector. However, the Act goes on to state that for the purpose of a specific section, the definition of debt collector “also includes” a business of which the principal purpose is the enforcement of security interests. The Court determined that this phrase only makes sense if such businesses were not covered by the primary definition. Second, the Court noted that Congress appeared to have chosen to differentiate between security-interest enforcers and ordinary debt collectors in order “to avoid conflicts with state nonjudicial foreclosure schemes.” Third, the Court noted that the legislative history of the FDCPA indicated that the final result was likely a compromise between two competing versions of the bill, one of which would have excluded security-interest enforcement entirely, and another that would have treated it as ordinary debt collection.
Justice Sotomayor, in a concurring opinion, wrote that the Court’s statutory interpretation was a “close case” and urged Congress to clarify the statute if the Court has “gotten it wrong.” She noted that making clear that the FDCPA fully encompasses entities pursuing nonjudicial foreclosures “would be consistent with the FDCPA’s broad, consumer-protective purposes.” Justice Sotomayor also stated that the Court’s ruling does not give license to those pursuing nonjudicial foreclosures “to engage in abusive debt collection practices like repetitive nighttime phone calls” and that enforcing a security interest does not grant an actor blanket immunity from the Act.”
District Court cites 9th Circuit, holds Fannie Mae is not a CRA
On February 26, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Fannie Mae in an action brought by a consumer alleging that Fannie Mae violated the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCCRA) and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by prohibiting lenders from providing consumers a copy of Fannie Mae’s Desktop Underwriter (DU) report. According to the opinion, two years after completing a short sale on his previous home, a consumer sought a mortgage with three lenders. One lender used Fannie Mae’s DU program to determine if the loan would be eligible for purchase by the agency, but the DU report listed his prior mortgage loan as a foreclosure rather than a short sale. The lender ultimately denied the application, rather than manually underwrite it. Upon reviewing Fannie Mae’s motion for summary judgment, the court noted that in order for the consumer to succeed on his CCRA and FCRA claims, he must establish Fannie Mae is a credit reporting agency. The court rejected the consumer’s attempts to distinguish his case from the recent 9th Circuit decision in Zabriskie v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, which held that Fannie Mae was not a credit reporting agency under the FCRA. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) The court acknowledged that even though Fannie Mae may have problems with its foreclosure recommendations in the DU system, it does not undercut the conclusion that Fannie Mae operates the DU system to assist lenders in making purchasing decisions, does not “regularly engage[] in . . . the practice of assembling or evaluating” consumer information, and therefore, is not a credit reporting agency.
1st Circuit rejects dismissal of a Massachusetts foreclosure notice action
On February 8, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of a Massachusetts homeowners’ action alleging that the mortgage holder failed to comply with the notice requirement in their mortgage before foreclosing on their property. The district court dismissed the action after concluding that the mortgage holder’s notice satisfied the notice requirements by including the default amount, a cure date, and the fact that failure to cure could result in acceleration. The homeowners appealed, arguing that the mortgage holder failed to strictly comply with the provision’s requirements because the notice provided did not include the conditions and time limitations associated with reinstatement after acceleration that were required by a separate provision in the mortgage.
On appeal, the 1st Circuit reviewed the notice under Massachusetts law, which requires mortgage holders to strictly comply with two types of mortgage terms: (i) ones “directly concerned with the foreclosure sale. . .” and (ii) ones “prescribing actions the mortgagee must take in connection with the foreclosure sale—whether before or after the sale takes place.” In overturning the District Court’s dismissal, the 1st Circuit noted that, because the notice did not contain the additional conditions and time limitations associated with reinstatement from the separate provision, dismissal was inappropriate.
D.C. act provides eviction and foreclosure relief to federal employees and contractors impacted by shutdown
On February 6, the mayor of the District of Columbia signed Act 23-5 (B23-0080) to protect federal workers, contractors, and employees of the District of Columbia Courts from eviction and foreclosure during federal government shutdowns. Among other things, the D.C. Superior Court will have the ability to grant motions to stay foreclosure and eviction proceedings for eligible impacted workers or their household members. The temporary stay would run until the earlier of “(i) 30 days after the effective date of an appropriations act or continuing resolution that funds a federal worker’s government agency; or (ii) 90 days after the date of the federal worker’s first unpaid payday” for government employees, with analogous terms for contractors. The act is effective immediately and expires on May 7. Notably, Act 23-9, signed by the Mayor on February 26, extends the expiration date for relief measures to October 9.
DOJ settles with mortgage company for alleged SCRA violations
On February 7, the DOJ announced a $750,000 settlement with a New Jersey-based mortgage company resolving allegations that the company violated the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) by foreclosing on homes owned by servicemembers without first obtaining the required court orders. The complaint, which was filed on the same day as the settlement, alleges that between 2010 and 2012 the company foreclosed on six homes of SCRA-protected servicemembers. Under the SCRA, lenders must obtain a court order before foreclosing on a servicemember’s home during, or within one year after, active military service, provided that the mortgage originated before the servicemember’s period of military service. The settlement requires the company to, among other things, (i) pay $125,000 to each affected servicemember; (ii) provide staff training to prevent unlawful foreclosures in the future; and (iii) notify the DOJ of future SCRA complaints.