InfoBytes Blog
Filter
Subscribe to our InfoBytes Blog weekly newsletter and other publications for news affecting the financial services industry.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issue servicing updates
On September 26, Fannie Mae issued SVC-2018-07, which includes changes to the foreclosure and third party sale program. In order to encourage more third-party foreclosure sales, Fannie Mae is now requiring the use of Fannie Mae vendors for foreclosure sale marketing services in certain jurisdictions and encouraging the use of Fannie Mae vendors for public foreclosure auctions in certain jurisdictions. Servicers must implement the requirements for all sales scheduled on or after January 1, 2019. Additionally, effective October 28, Fannie Mae will now allow servicers to accept payment changes with future effective dates.
Freddie Mac released Guide Bulletin 2018-16, which announces new and revised requirements to facilitate a secondary market for mortgages in support of affordable housing preservation and rural housing, including (i) allowing the sale of Community Land Trust Mortgages to Freddie Mac (effective November 5); (ii) updating requirements for mortgages secured by properties subject to resale restrictions (effective November 5); and (iii) revising the Home Possible mortgage requirements to permit sweat equity as a source of funds to cover the entire amount of cash to close for the down payment and/or closing costs (effective September 26).
Agencies issue guidance to institutions affected by storms in Gulf Coast and Hurricane Lane in Hawaii
On September 5, the OCC issued a proclamation permitting OCC-regulated institutions to close their offices affected by Tropical Storm Gordon in the Gulf Coast Region. OCC Bulletin 2012-28 provides further guidance on natural disasters and other emergency conditions.
On August 30, the Department of Veterans Affairs issued Circular 26-18-17, requesting relief for homeowners impacted by Hurricane Lane in Hawaii. Among other things, the Circular (i) encourages loan holders to extend forbearance to borrowers in distress because of the storms; (ii) requests that loan holders establish a 90-day moratorium on initiating new foreclosures on loans affected by the major disaster; and (iii) waives late charges on affected loans. The Circular is effective until October 1, 2019.
Find continuing InfoBytes coverage on disaster relief here.
Court denies law firm’s request for judgment on Texas debt collection claim
On August 14, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas entered judgment in favor of a bank, mortgage loan servicer, and servicer’s law firm (defendants) on all but one Texas Debt Collection Practices Act (TDCPA) claims, among others, brought by homeowner plaintiffs, but determined the law firm was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law regarding its attempted foreclosure on the property despite an attorney exemption provision in the TDCPA. The court agreed with the defendants that the plaintiff failed to allege material facts that support the majority of the claims brought, but disagreed with the law firm as to the remaining TDCPA claim. According to the opinion, the plaintiffs alleged the law firm violated the TDCPA by operating as a third-party debt collector in Texas without the surety bond required by law. The law firm moved for judgment, arguing, among other things, that it was not subject to the TDCPA bond requirement because it simply “assisted” the mortgage servicer with the foreclosure, which is not considered debt collection absent a collection attempt on a deficiency judgment. The court rejected this argument as a matter of law. The court also rejected the law firm’s argument that it was not a “third-party debt collector,” concluding there was a genuine dispute about whether the law firm was a debt collector under the TDCPA despite the attorney exemption, due to whether the letters sent were in its capacity as attorneys for the servicer or as a debt collector.
FHA updates loss mitigation options for mortgages in certain areas of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands
On August 15, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) released Mortgagee Letter 2018-05 (ML 2018-05), which updates loss mitigation options for certain FHA-insured mortgages located in Puerto Rico or Virgin Islands. The properties must be located in Presidentially-Declared Major Disaster Areas (PDMDAs) as a result of Hurricane Maria. In adition, FHA is also instituting a 30-day foreclosure moratorium on certain properties located in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands that FEMA has declared to be eligible for individual assistance. (As previously covered by InfoBytes, ML 2018-03 had extended an existing moratorium through August 16.) Additionally, in order to reduce foreclosures and minimize losses to the Insurance Fund, ML 2018-05 provides updated loss mitigation options “designed to provide greater alternatives to foreclosure for mortgagees to use with borrowers in the designated PDMDAs.” The new options supersede the previous ones offered in ML 2018-01 and rearrange the loss mitigation waterfall in order to provide expedited permanent loss mitigation solutions by considering “Disaster Standalone Partial Claims” earlier. This option would allow borrowers, among other things, to maintain their pre-disaster monthly payment of principle and interest and does not change interest rate and term of the mortgage. These loss mitigation options must be implemented by September 15 and expire May 1, 2019. The foreclosure mortgage moratorium is effective immediately and applies to the initiation of foreclosures and foreclosures already in process.
Court holds RESPA loss mitigation claim is ripe prior to a foreclosure sale
On August 14, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that RESPA (and its implementing Regulation X) does not require a plaintiff to wait until a property is foreclosed upon to bring an action for a violation of Regulation X’s loss mitigation requirements. The plaintiff filed a complaint against her mortgage servicer for (among other claims) allegedly violating RESPA when the company initiated a foreclosure action while she had a pending loss mitigation application, even though the company did not ultimately foreclose on the property. The company moved to dismiss the RESPA claim as unripe and the court disagreed, finding there is no language in the statute or implementing regulation that states a plaintiff must wait. Conversely, the implementing regulation “expressly states that the prohibited action is a servicer making ‘the first notice or filing required by applicable law…’” and, therefore, the plaintiff’s claim did not fail for lack of ripeness. The court ultimately dismissed the plaintiff’s action against the company, however, finding the plaintiff did not adequately plead actual damages, and granted the plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint.
Court enters summary judgment in favor of bank in wrongful foreclosure action
On August 3, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts entered summary judgment in favor of a national bank regarding a mortgage borrower’s allegations that the bank engaged in, among other things, predatory lending, wrongful foreclosure, and violations of Massachusetts’ unfair or deceptive practices (UDAP) law. As to the wrongful foreclosure claim, the borrower alleged that the bank lacked the legal authority to foreclose on his property because the chain of title was compromised and the mortgage transfers were invalid prior to the bank becoming the holder of the mortgage through assignments. The court rejected the borrower’s arguments because Massachusetts law allows for “splitting the note” as long as the mortgage documents are unified at the time of foreclosure, and there was no reason to question the validity of the prior assignments. The court rejected the borrower’s predatory lending claim because the bank was not the original lender of the mortgage note and had no duty to negotiate a modification because the borrower was already in default when the bank became the holder of the mortgage. The court also dismissed the UDAP claim on procedural grounds.
5th Circuit affirms dismissal of automatic stay violation claim on grounds of judicial estoppel
On July 27, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision following a bench trial to dismiss plaintiffs’ allegations that a bank violated an automatic stay imposed during one of the plaintiff’s (debtor) bankruptcy schedules when it took foreclosure action, holding that the plaintiffs were barred by judicial estoppel from pursuing claims because the debtor failed to amend his bankruptcy schedules to disclose a quitclaim deed for his mortgage or note a change in his financial status. In this case, the debtor filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, but failed to list the address or creditor information for a property in which he had entered into an equity sharing agreement with his son. When the son signed a quitclaim deed conveying the property to the debtor, the deed was recorded but not listed on the bankruptcy schedules.
According to the appellate court, the debtor failed to “disclose an asset to a bankruptcy court, but then pursue[d] a claim in a separate tribunal based on that undisclosed asset” when it filed a lawsuit against the bank for wrongful foreclosure. The doctrine of judicial estoppel requires that three elements be met: (i) “the party against whom estoppel is sought has asserted a position plainly inconsistent with a prior position”; (ii) “a court accepted the prior position”; and (iii) "the party did not act inadvertently.” The court held the first two elements were met by the plaintiff’s failure to amend his bankruptcy schedules to disclose the quitclaim deed or his legal action against the bank. The court noted, however, the debtor’s actions were not inadvertent because he was aware of the inconsistency and had a motive to conceal the asset. The appellate court specifically noted the motive to conceal was “self-evident” because the debtor’s failure to disclose his changed financial status had the potential to provide a financial benefit to the debtor. The appellate court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, and that, moreover, the plaintiffs failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it chose to exclude several of their exhibits.
9th Circuit affirms dismissal of SCRA private action, applies federal four-year catch-all statute of limitations
On July 26, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a private suit alleging a mortgage servicer violated the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) prohibition on foreclosure on the grounds that the claim was time-barred, holding that the federal catchall four-year statute of limitations applies to private suits under the SCRA. The decision results from a 2016 lawsuit filed by a United States Marine veteran (the plaintiff) alleging that the August 2010 foreclosure sale on his home violated section 303(c) of the SCRA as it occurred within nine months of the end of his active military service. While the SCRA does not provide a specific statute of limitations for a private right of action, the defendants moved to dismiss the case as time-barred, arguing that the court should apply the closest state-law analogue to the SCRA. The plaintiff argued that the court should look to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) as the most analogous statute, which does not limit the period for filing claims. In response to the plaintiff, the defendants added an alternative argument that the court should apply 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a), which establishes a four-year limitation period for any claims arising from a federal law enacted after 1990, which does not delineate a specific limitations period. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, rejecting the plaintiff’s arguments, and applied the four-year statute of limitations found in the Washington State Consumer Protection Act.
In affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff’s case on an alternate ground, the court noted that while the SCRA’s protection against foreclosure existed prior to 1990, Congress did not add a private right of action until 2010. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the private right of action was “implied” prior to the 2010 because there was no evidence Congress intended to create one under the SCRA’s predecessor, the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act. The court held that because a private right of action was not provided until 2010, the four-year catch-all provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) applied, and the plaintiff’s claim under the SCRA was time-barred.
New Jersey appeals court says statute of limitations does not apply in allegedly fraudulent mortgage application
On July 13, the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division reversed a trial court’s decision, ruling that a deceased homeowner’s family (defendants) had provided sufficient evidence to show that a division of a national bank (lender) had knowingly engaged in predatory lending practices when it approved a fraudulent mortgage application in violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (Act). According to the opinion, in 2007 when the now deceased homeowner purchased a house, the lender may have been complicit in creating and approving a fraudulent loan application that, among other things, stated falsely that (i) the homeowner was a small business owner with a monthly income of $30,000 rather than $1,500, and (ii) the down payment came from the homeowner, when it supposedly came from a second mortgage offered to him from the same lender. The homeowner defaulted on payments in 2010 and passed away in 2012. In 2015, the defendants responded to a foreclosure complaint filed by the bank, alleging that the Act barred plaintiff’s claims due to the lender’s fraudulent actions, including the aforementioned material misrepresentations. However, the trial court granted summary judgment to the lender on the grounds that claims of fraud brought by the defendants were “untenable” and outside the statute of limitations. The appellate court disagreed and remanded to allow for discovery, ruling that the defendants were permitted to introduce evidence of fraud in defense of the homeowner’s estate even through the statute of limitations had expired. “The doctrine of equitable recoupment permits a defendant to assert an otherwise stale claim and avoid the statute of limitations, where the defendant uses the claim as a shield instead of a sword,” the appellate court stated.
Florida Supreme Court: Lender may file second suit for deficiency claim provided foreclosure court has not adjudicated the claim
On July 5, the Florida Supreme Court held that Section 702.06, Florida Statutes (2014), allows a lender pursuing a deficiency claim in a foreclosure action in one court to bring a separate action against the homeowner in another court provided the foreclosure court that has reserved jurisdiction has not yet adjudicated the deficiency claim. Section 702.06 provides in part that, “In all suits for the foreclosure of mortgages . . . . [t]he complainant shall also have the right to sue at common law to recover for such deficiency, unless the court in the foreclosure action has granted or denied a claim for a deficiency judgment.” At issue was a residential property that was foreclosed by final judgment. In the judgment, the foreclosure court expressly reserved jurisdiction to rule on any future deficiency claim, although no one tried to adjudicate the claim in that forum. The mortgage loan purchaser filed a separate action against the homeowner in a different court and obtained a deficiency judgment. On appeal from that action, the First District Court of Appeal disagreed with several other Florida appellate courts and concluded that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the original foreclosure court had previously reserved jurisdiction. The high court unanimously disagreed, holding that a “reservation of jurisdiction is not a grant or denial of the claim. The foreclosure court would have only ‘granted or denied’ the deficiency judgment if it had adjudicated the claim. Therefore, [§ 702.06, Fla. Stat.] plainly precludes the separate action only where the foreclosure court has actually ruled on the claim—as held by the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal.” In issuing its ruling, the high court quashed the decision of the First District Court of Appeal and approved the certified conflict decisions of the four other appellate courts.