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FCC warns telecoms to stop carrying “mortgage scam” robocalls
On January 24, the FCC’s Enforcement Bureau announced it had ordered telecommunications companies to effectively mitigate robocall traffic originating from a Florida-based real estate brokerage firm selling mortgage scams. The FCC also sent a cease-and-desist letter to a voice service provider carrying the allegedly illegal robocall traffic. According to the FCC, several state attorneys general filed lawsuits late last year against the firm for allegedly using “misleading robocalls to ‘swindle’ and ‘scam’ residents into mortgaging their homes in exchange for small cash payments.” (See state AG press releases here, here, and here.) Additionally, last month, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Sherrod Brown (D-OH), along with Senators Tina Smith (D-MN) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) sent a letter to the FTC and the CFPB requesting a review of the firm’s use of exclusive 40-year listing agreements marketed as a “loan alternative.” (Covered by InfoBytes here.) In shutting down the robocalls, FCC Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel stressed that sending junk calls to financially-stressed homeowners in order to offer “deceptive products and services is unconscionable.” Enforcement Bureau Chief Loyaan A. Egal added that the voice service provider should have been applying “Know Your Customer” principles before allowing the traffic on its networks.
Colorado AG releases consumer lending study
On January 23, the Colorado attorney general announced that it sent a study examining the availability of consumer lending in the state to the Colorado General Assembly. Among other things, the study analyzed the availability of safe and affordable credit in Colorado and focused on the availability of two types of loans: (i) small-dollar loans, defined as loans up to $1,000, and (ii) larger installment loans.
Regarding small-dollar loans in Colorado, Proposition 111 enacted in 2018, capped rates on deferred deposit loans at 36 percent. As such, the study noted that there was a significant decrease in the number of lenders who were making deferred deposit (payday) loans and the number of licensed locations as of 2018. It was reported that 95,747 individuals in Colorado obtained alternative charge loans in 2021, which represented a significant decline from 2018. The study also found that, while there was a drop in the number of retail outlets, available evidence indicates consumers who qualify are able to obtain alternative charge loans, given the growth of online lending.
The affordability of alternative charge borrowers is mixed, according to the report. It appears that about one in five borrowers experience substantial difficulty in making the required payments. Other measures suggest a substantially lower percentage struggle.
Regarding larger installment loans, 39,295 consumers obtained “Other Supervised Loans” (defined as loans with an APR above 12 percent) from non-depositories, and non-depositories took by assignment an additional 87,880 Other Supervised Loans in 2021. The number of originated Other Supervised Loans in 2021 was nearly identical to the number originated in 2019. Overall, 25.9 percent of consumers who applied for Other Supervised Loans were approved.
California: TILA does not preempt state laws on commercial financial disclosure
On January 20, California Attorney General Rob Bonta sent a comment letter to CFPB Director Rohit Chopra in response to a preliminary determination issued by the Bureau in December, which concluded that commercial financial disclosure laws in four states (New York, California, Utah, and Virginia) are not preempted by TILA. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the Bureau issued a Notice of Intent to Make Preemption Determination under the Truth in Lending Act seeking comments pursuant to Appendix A of Regulation Z on whether it should finalize its preliminary determination. The Bureau noted that a number of states have recently enacted laws requiring improved disclosures of information contained in commercial financing transactions, including loans to small businesses, to mitigate predatory small business lending and improve transparency. In making its preliminary determination, the Bureau concluded that the state and federal laws do not appear “contradictory” for preemption purposes, explaining, among other things, that the statutes govern different transactions (commercial finance rather than consumer credit).
Under the California Commercial Financing Disclosures Law (CFDL), companies are required to disclose various financing terms, including the “total dollar cost of the financing” and the “total cost of the financing expressed as an annualized rate.” Bonta explained that the CFDL only applies to commercial financing arrangements (and not to consumer credit transactions) and “was enacted in 2018 to help small businesses navigate a complicated commercial financing market by mandating uniform disclosures of certain credit terms in a manner similar to TILA’s requirements, but for commercial transactions that are unregulated by TILA.” He pointed out that disclosures required under the CFDL do not conflict with those required by TILA, and emphasized that there is no material difference between the disclosures required by the two statutes, even if TILA were to apply to commercial financing. According to Bonta, should TILA preempt the CFDL’s disclosure requirements, there would be no required disclosures at all for commercial credit in the state, which would make it challenging for small businesses to make informed choices about commercial financing arrangements.
While Bonta agreed with the Bureau’s determination that TILA does not preempt the CFDL, he urged the Bureau to “articulate a narrower standard that emphasizes that preemption should be limited to situations where it is impossible to comply with both TILA and the state law or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the full purposes [of] TILA, which is to provide consumers with full and meaningful disclosure of credit terms in consumer credit transactions.” He added that the Bureau “should also reemphasize certain principles from prior [Federal Reserve Board] decisions, including that state laws are preempted only to the extent of actual conflict and that state laws requiring additional disclosures—or disclosures in transactions not addressed by TILA—are not preempted.”
NYDFS gives custodial guidance on crypto insolvency
On January 23, NYDFS reiterated expectations for sound custody and disclosure practices for entities that are licensed or chartered to custody or temporarily hold, store, or maintain virtual currency assets on behalf of customers (virtual currency entities or “VCEs”). NYDFS explained that under the state’s virtual currency regulation (23 NYCRR Part 200), VCEs operating under the BitLicense and Limited Purpose Trust Charter are required to, among other things, “hold virtual currency in a manner that protects customer assets; maintain comprehensive books and records; properly disclose the material terms and conditions associated with their products and services, including custody services; and refrain from making any false, misleading or deceptive representations or omissions in their marketing materials.”
The regulatory guidance on insolvency clarifies standards and practices intended to ensure that VCEs are providing high levels of customer protection with respect to licensed asset custody. Specifically, the guidance addresses customer protection concerns regarding:
- The segregation of and separate accounting for customer virtual currency. VCEs “should separately account for, and segregate a customer’s virtual currency from, the corporate assets of the VCE Custodian and its affiliated entities, both on-chain and on the VCE Custodian’s internal ledger accounts.”
- VCEs limited interest in and use of customer virtual currency. VCEs that take possession of a customer’s assets should do so “only for the limited purpose of carrying out custody and safekeeping services” and must not “establish a debtor-creditor relationship with the customer.”
- Sub-custody arrangements. VCEs may choose, after conducting appropriate due diligence, to safekeep a customer’s virtual currency through a third-party sub-custody arrangement provided the arrangement is consistent with regulatory guidance and approved by NYDFS.
- Customer disclosures. VCEs are “expected to clearly disclose to each customer the general terms and conditions associated with its products, services and activities, including how the VCE Custodian segregates and accounts for the virtual currency held in custody, as well as the customer's retained property interest in the virtual currency.” Additionally, a customer agreement should be transparent about the parties’ intentions to enter into a custodial relationship as opposed to a debtor-creditor relationship.
Company to pay $45 million to SEC, states for unregistered crypto-lending product
On January 19, the SEC charged a Cayman Islands digital asset firm for allegedly failing to register the offer and sale of its retail crypto-asset lending product. According to the SEC’s cease-and-desist order, the company’s product allowed U.S. investors to tender certain crypto assets with the company, which were then deposited in interest-yielding accounts and used by the company to generate income and fund interest payments to investors.
The SEC maintained that the company’s product was marketed as an opportunity for investors to earn interest on their crypto assets, and that company actions “included staking, lending, and engaging in arbitrage on purportedly ‘decentralized’ finance platforms; investing in certain crypto assets; loaning funds to retail and institutional borrowers; and entering into options and swap contracts with respect to the crypto assets tendered”— resulting in the company acquiring $2.7 billion in assets from approximately 112,000 investors. The SEC found that because the product qualified as a security and did not qualify for an exemption from registration under the Securities Act of 1933, the company was required to register its offer and sale of the product, which it failed to do.
The company did not admit or deny the SEC’s findings, but agreed to pay $22.5 million to the SEC, and said it would stop offering and selling the unregistered lending product to U.S. investors. The SEC considered remedial actions promptly taken by the company, as well as its cooperation with Commission staff in determining the settlement amount. The SEC reported that the company voluntarily stopped offering its product to new U.S. investors and ceased paying interest on new funds added to existing accounts after the SEC announced charges against a different company that offered a similar crypto investment product. The company also announced that the product would stop being offered in certain states and that it was phasing out all of its products and services in the U.S.
The company also agreed to pay another $22.5 million to state regulators from California, Kentucky, Maryland, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Vermont, and Washington in a parallel action claiming the company offered interest-earning accounts without first registering the investment products as securities. According to the announcement, the company allegedly failed to comply with state securities registration requirements, and, among other things, deprived investors “of critical information and disclosures necessary to understand the potential risks of the [product].”
NYDFS issues check-cashing fee regulations
On January 18, NYDFS announced that it has adopted an updated check cashing regulation. As previously covered by InfoBytes, NYDFS issued a proposed check cashing regulation in June 2022, following an emergency regulation announced in February 2022, that halted annual increases on check-cashing fees and locked the current maximum fee set last February at 2.27 percent (covered by InfoBytes here). The regulation establishes a new fee methodology that evaluates the needs of licensees and consumers who use check cashing services. Two tiers of fees for licensed check cashers are recommended: (i) the maximum fee that a check casher may charge for a public assistance check issued by a federal or state government agency (including checks for Social Security, unemployment, retirement, veteran’s benefits, emergency relief, housing assistance, or tax refunds) is set at 1.5 percent; and (ii) the maximum fee a check casher is permitted to charge for all other checks, drafts, or money orders is $1 or 2.2 percent, whichever is greater. According to NYDFS Superintendent Adrienne Harris, “the existing fee methodology wasn’t just outdated, but inappropriate and punitive to consumers.” She further noted that “[c]heck cashers should not be entitled to automatic, annual fee increases.”
States file brief in support of Biden’s student loan debt-relief program
On January 11, a coalition of 22 state attorneys general from Massachusetts, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District Of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin, filed an amicus brief with the U.S. Supreme Court in two pending actions concerning challenges to the Department of Education’s student loan debt relief program. At the beginning of December, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Biden administration’s appeal of an injunction entered by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that temporarily prohibits the Secretary of Education from discharging any federal loans under the agency’s student debt relief plan (covered by InfoBytes here). In a brief unsigned order, the Supreme Court deferred the Biden administration’s application to vacate, pending oral argument. Shortly after, the Supreme Court also granted a petition for certiorari in a challenge currently pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, announcing it will consider whether the respondents (individuals whose loans are ineligible for debt forgiveness under the plan) have Article III standing to bring the challenge, as well as whether the Department of Education’s debt relief plan is “statutorily authorized” and “adopted in a procedurally proper manner” (covered by InfoBytes here). Oral arguments in both cases are scheduled for February 28.
The states first pointed out that under the Higher Education Act, Congress gave the Secretary “broad authority both to determine borrowers’ loan repayment obligations and to modify or discharge these obligations in myriad circumstances.” The Secretary was also later granted statutory authority under the HEROES Act to take action in times of national emergency, which includes allowing “the Secretary to ‘waive or modify any statutory or regulatory provision applicable to the student financial assistance programs’ if the Secretary ‘deems’ such actions ‘necessary’ to ensure that borrowers affected by a national emergency ‘are not placed in a worse position financially’ with respect to their student loans.” The states stressed that while “the magnitude of the national emergency necessitating this relief is unprecedented, the relief offered to borrowers falls squarely within the authority Congress gave the Secretary to address such emergencies and is similar in kind to relief granted pursuant to other important federal student loan policies that have concomitantly advanced our state interests.”
The states went on to explain that the Secretary tailored the limited debt relief using income thresholds to ensure that “the borrowers at greatest risk of pandemic-related defaults receive critical relief, either by eliminating their loan obligations or reducing them to a more manageable level,” thus meeting the express goal of the HEROES Act to “prevent[] affected borrowers from being placed in a worse position because of a national emergency.” The states also stressed that the Secretary reasonably concluded that targeted relief is necessary to address the impending rise in pandemic-related defaults once repayment restarts. The HEROES Act expressly permits the Secretary to “exercise his modification and waiver authority ‘notwithstanding any other provision of law, unless enacted with specific reference to [20 U.S.C. § 1098bb(a)(1)],” the states asserted, noting that “relevant statutory and regulatory provisions related to student loan repayment and cancellation contain no such express limiting language.”
Secretary Miguel Cardona issued the following statement in response to the filing of more than a dozen amicus curiae briefs: “The broad array of organizations and experts—representing diverse communities and different perspectives—supporting our case before the Supreme Court today reflects the strength of our legal positions versus the fundamentally flawed lawsuits aimed at denying millions of working and middle-class borrowers debt relief.” A summary of the briefs can be accessed here.
Ohio will grant occupational licenses to applicants experienced in another state
On January 2, the Ohio governor signed SB 131, which, among other things, requires “an occupational licensing authority to issue a license or government certification to an applicant who holds a license, government certification, or private certification or has satisfactory work experience in another state under certain circumstances.” The Act eases licensing burdens by allowing licensed professionals to apply for and be granted a license to work provided they meet certain criteria. Specifically, a licensing authority shall issue a license or government certification to an applicant if the authority determines that the applicant meets several conditions, including: (i) the applicant holds either a “substantially similar out-of-state occupational license that authorizes the applicant to engage in the same profession, occupation, or occupational activity as the license or government certification for which the applicant is applying in this state” or a “government certification in the same profession, occupation, or occupational activity as the license or government certification for which the applicant is applying in this state from one of the uniformed services or a state that does not issue an out-of-state occupational license for the respective profession, occupation, or occupational activity”; (ii) the applicant possesses a valid out-of-state license for at least one year immediately preceding the date the application is submitted and has been actively engaged in the profession (a licensing authority may choose to waive this requirement); (iii) the applicant is in good standing; (iv) the applicant satisfied minimum education, training, or experience requirements or passed an examination to receive an out-of-state occupational license or government certification (this provision is waived if applicable law does not require these requirements); (v) the applicant has not surrendered or had revoked a license, out-of-state occupational license, or government certification, and does not have any disqualifying criminal history or is the subject of a complaint, allegation, or investigation related to unprofessional conduct or a violation of a law; and (vi) the applicant pays the required fees. The Act also discusses additional pathways for licensure through private certification.
Credit unions to pay $4 million in GAP fee refunds
On January 4, the Colorado attorney general announced settlements with two credit unions that will pay a combined $4 million in refunds to borrowers in the state who were entitled to “guaranteed automobile protection” (GAP) fee refunds. An investigation conducted by the Consumer Protection Section of the Colorado Department of Law found that the credit unions historically failed to refund unearned GAP fees owed to consumers. According to the state, the credit unions act as creditors by purchasing retail installment sales contracts from auto dealers that include GAP purchased by Colorado consumers. The state explained in its announcement that borrowers pay the full GAP fee when they purchase a car (the fee is typically only earned gradually over the loan’s lifetime). However, should a borrower prepay the loan prior to maturity or the car is repossessed and sold at auction before the loan is paid off, Colorado law requires lenders to refund the unearned portion of the GAP fee to the borrower, the state said.
The assurances of discontinuance (see here and here) apply to all consumer credit transactions entered into with consumers in the state related to any alleged unfair conduct committed by the credit unions related to GAP fee refund practices. In additional to paying consumer remediation and $100,000 each to the state, the credit unions also agreed to alter their business practices to ensure that applicable refunds will be provided to consumers going forward.
3rd Circuit: Now-invalid default judgment still in effect when debt collection attempts were made
On January 11, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of defendants accused of violating the FDCPA when attempting to collect on a judgment that was later vacated. According to the opinion, the plaintiff was sued in state court for an unpaid debt. Contradictory orders were entered by the Superior Court, one which dismissed the action due to one of the defendant’s failure to attend trial, and another that entered default judgment against the plaintiff (which was confirmed two years later by the state court).
A few years later, an attempt was made to collect on the debt. The plaintiff disputed the debt and later sued, claiming the defendants “knew or should have known” that the debt was unenforceable. The plaintiff later filed a motion in state court to vacate the default judgment and declare it “void ab initio,” which was eventually granted by the state court after it determined that the judgment was erroneously entered by the clerk after the court had already dismissed the case due to the debt collector’s failure to appear for trial. The plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment in the district court.
The district court, however, found that the defendants’ alleged efforts to collect the debt were not false or misleading because the now-invalid default judgment at issue was technically still valid and existed when the collection attempts were made. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the summary judgment violated the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the district court “‘could not have reached the decision that it did without necessarily supplanting’ the Superior Court’s order vacating the judgment against her.” The plaintiff also argued that the district court erred when it found the Superior Court judgment against the plaintiff to be “in effect . . . until such time as it was vacated, . . . rather than ‘per se not valid’” when the defendants engaged in their efforts to collect the debt.
On appeal, the 3rd Circuit disagreed with the plaintiff’s assertions. According to the appellate court, the plaintiff satisfied none of the four requirements to trigger the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, adding that regardless of whether the state court declared the judgment “void ab initio,” it was in effect when the defendant attempted to collect on the debt. Moreover, the appellate court noted that the plaintiff “failed to present a triable issue that any communication from Defendants to [the plaintiff] regarding the collection of the default judgment was made unlawful retroactively upon the Superior Court vacating its default judgment order.”