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7th Circuit reverses dismissal of FDCPA case involving misleading letters
On May 20, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court’s order dismissing a suit against a debt collection firm that allegedly sent misleading letters to a debtor. According to the order, the plaintiff defaulted on a credit card debt owed to a bank, which hired the defendant for collection services. The defendant filed a collection action on behalf of the bank and obtained a judgment against the plaintiff. The defendant then sent the plaintiff a letter, referencing the plaintiff’s credit card “account,” describing the amount of the judgment as the “balance due,” and offering to settle that debt for 40 cents on the dollar if the plaintiff made the payment within a specified time frame. The plaintiff did not pay the offered settlement amount by that deadline and ultimately learned that interest on the judgment was increasing daily. The plaintiff then filed suit against the debt collector, alleging that it violated the FDCPA by sending a misleading letter that: (i) described the debt as an “account” even though it was a judgment; (ii) listed two different amounts as the “balance due” (the amount of the judgment and the offered settlement amount); and (iii) did not disclose that the debt was increasing daily. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the plaintiff had failed to allege a concrete injury because he did not allege “that he had the ability to pay the debt owed, that he actually paid other debts instead, or that he took any detrimental step as a result of the alleged confusion.”
On the appeal, the 7th Circuit held that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged an injury, finding that his allegation that he would have prioritized paying the judgment over other debts “supports the reasonable inference that he had the ability to pay the settlement and that he used his available funds on other debts.” The appellate court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff lacked standing because he was insolvent at all relevant times and could not have paid his credit card debt, finding that this argument raised a factual dispute that should have been resolved with an evidentiary hearing.
District Court grants in part/denies in part defendant’s motion in RESPA, FDCPA case
Recently, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee granted in part and denied in part a defendant mortgage servicer’s motion for summary judgment concerning allegations that the defendant improperly foreclosed on plaintiff’s property. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant wrongfully accused her of failing to remedy her default and therefore violated RESPA and the FDCPA, among other things. Ultimately, the court denied defendant’s summary judgment request as to plaintiff’s RESPA claim because the defendant failed to exercise due diligence. But the court granted defendant’s request for summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s FDCPA claim because plaintiff presented no evidence that the defendant acted deceptively.
The plaintiff’s original loan—serviced by a previous servicer—was modified in 2016. But payments again were not made, so the previous servicer notified the plaintiff in December 2018 that it had accelerated the loan’s maturity date and referred the loan to foreclosure. The plaintiff, however, again applied for another modification in early 2019. After telling plaintiff her application was complete, the previous servicer then told the plaintiff, who claimed she inherited the property, that it needed additional documents to prove plaintiff’s successor-in-interest status. Ultimately, the previous servicer did not confirm the modification because the plaintiff did not confirm her successor-in-interest status.
The plaintiff again applied for a loan modification in March 2019, after the previous servicer transferred servicing rights to the defendant, and this modification was denied. She allegedly spoke with one of defendant’s representatives about the denial and indicated that she wished to reapply for a modification. However, the representative advised that she would have to reinstate the mortgage first before any loan modification. The defendant then sent a default letter to plaintiff’s property, which advised that the loan was still in default and needed payment.
The plaintiff submitted at least one additional request for mortgage assistance after the March 2019 modification application. The defendant acknowledged receipt of the request and detailed the documents it needed to process the request. The defendant then followed up in June 2019, stating again that it could not confirm that she was the successor-in-interest on the loan without documentation. A month later the defendant advised the plaintiff again that documents were still missing that were necessary to process her loan assistance request. The loan remained in default thereafter and the defendant foreclosed in August 2019.
In adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment be denied as to the RESPA claim, the district court noted that the defendant possibly should have sought documents, specifically the successor-in-interest documentation from the previous servicer, after the plaintiff submitted an incomplete loan modification application. The court stated that “there is a question of material fact whether [defendant] exercised reasonable diligence in failing to request the successor-in-interest documentation from [the previous servicer].” The court added that “there is a requirement of reasonable diligence, and there is no evidence showing that [defendant] met this standard. Failing to address the regulatory standard creates a question that cannot be resolved on the available information. Thus, there is at least one question of material fact here.”
Regarding plaintiff’s FDCPA claim, the court noted that “there is no evidence of deception in the foreclosure of loan payment process” and that “[p]laintiff has failed to provide any evidence that [defendant] acted dishonestly in requesting additional documentation to complete the loan modification.” The court therefore granted defendant’s summary judgment motion as to the FDCPA claim.
District Court says defendant’s request for default judgment was more than "procedural mishap"
On May 11, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky partially granted and partially denied a defendant collection attorney’s (defendant’s) motion to dismiss a FDCPA suit. According to the memorandum opinion and order, the plaintiff defaulted on a loan and the defendant was hired to file a collection lawsuit on behalf of the creditor. Though the plaintiff responded to the suit, the defendant filed a motion for default judgment and motion for attorney’s fees, which was not served for the plaintiff. The defendant attempted to have the plaintiff’s employer garnish his wages, but the plaintiff challenged the garnishment. After reviewing the case, the state court vacated the default judgment and ordered the sides to arbitration. The collection suit was ultimately dismissed with prejudice. The current stage of the suit involves the plaintiff suing the defendant, alleging he violated the FDCPA by improperly seeking default judgment, failing to serve the motion for default judgment, opposing his wage garnishment challenge, and requesting disingenuous attorney’s fees. The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the attorney’s fees and the provisions related to the wage garnishment. However, in respect to the allegations related to the filing for default judgment and failure to serve, the district court denied the motion to dismiss. The district court noted that the defendant’s “request for default judgment was more than ‘procedural mishap’—it was a ‘false, deceptive, or misleading representation [] in connection with the collection of any debt’ that seemingly caused faulty default judgment to be entered.”
District Court: Emotional distress did not cause injury-in-fact
On May 10, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York granted a defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a FDCPA class action suit. According to the order, the defendant sent the plaintiff a letter seeking to collect $9,700. The collections letter identified the name of the original creditor and the name of the current creditor to whom the debt was owed. The plaintiff filed suit, claiming he suffered emotional distress, and alleging that the debt was not owed to the defendants, and that the letter “erroneously” claimed that the current creditor to whom the debt was owed was not the owner of the debt, in violation of the FDCPA. The court granted the defendant’s summary judgment, dismissing the claims and finding that the case “is at the summary judgment stage,” which “requires proof of injury-in-fact beyond the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations of an injury.” The court further stated that the “[p]laintiff states in his responding Declaration that his stress came from not knowing how his personal information was learned by Defendant,” but that the “[p]laintiff did not seek medical attention for the emotional distress he suffered.” The court continued that “failure to seek medical treatment is material in establishing the extent of Plaintiff’s injury (in [sic] any) from the emotional distress.” The court found that the plaintiff did “not establish[] that he suffered an injury-in-fact from his emotional distress arising from the dunning letter.”
Washington Court of Appeals affirms dismissal of suit accusing bank of collecting debt under a different name
On May 3, the Washington Court of Appeals, Division Three, affirmed the dismissal of an action accusing a defendant bank of violating the FDCPA by attempting to collect a debt in a name that differed from its own. The plaintiff obtained a credit card from the bank in 2006. Following a merger between the bank holding company (a separate legal entity at the time) and a card services company, the defendant bank merged with and under the charter of the card services company and notified credit card customers that the new issuer and administrator of their accounts would be the card services company. In 2014, the card services company merged into and under the charter of the national bank of the same name, who subsequently became issuer and administrator of the credit card portfolio and the named creditor of the plaintiff’s account. By 2012, the plaintiff had stopped making payments on his credit card and was sued by the card services company. While this action was pending, the 2014 merger occurred but the collection action was not updated to reflect this development. Eventually, the collection action was dismissed without prejudice, and the plaintiff sued the defendant in Washington state court, claiming the defendant violated the FDCPA because it continued its collection suit under the name of the card services company after the merger had taken place. The state court dismissed the case, and the plaintiff appealed. At issue was whether the national bank “falls under the FDCPA despite its status as a creditor because it used a name other than its own ‘which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect’ the debt owed by” the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals disagreed and held that even a least sophisticated consumer would not be confused and think that the debt had been transferred to a third-party collection agency. “Instead, a least sophisticated consumer (and even average-level consumer) might be led to believe that nothing had changed and [the card services company] was still collecting its credit card debt in its own right,” the Court of Appeals wrote. “There is no reason to think a least sophisticated consumer would be led to believe that [the bank] had acquired [the card services company’s] debt and then contracted with [it] to collect the debt.”
District Court grants class certification in FDCPA suit
On April 27, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted a plaintiff’s motion for class certification in an action against a consumer debt buyer (defendant) for allegedly violating the FDCPA by stating that a judgment may be awarded prior to the expiration of a settlement offer, even though a collection lawsuit was not filed. According to the opinion, the plaintiff received a collection letter from the defendant that offered a “discount program” for his “Legal Collections account without any further legal action,” which had to be accepted within a month. The letter also stated that “[a] judgment could be awarded by the court before the expiration of the discount offer listed in this letter,” despite the fact that at the time the letter was received, there were no pending court cases in which a judgment could be entered against the plaintiff. After receiving the letter, the plaintiff filed suit, alleging that the defendant violated the FDCPA by making false, misleading, and deceptive misrepresentations about the debt. Among other things, the defendant argued that the size of the class would be impossible to ascertain because identifying class members would require individualized inquiries into who received a letter and when. By holding that the FDCPA violation occurred when a letter was sent rather than when it was received, the court rejected the defendant’s argument and ruled instead that individualized inquiry is not necessary. According to the district court, “[r]eviewing this information will, of course, require some level of individualized inquiry. But the need for file-by-file review to identify class members is not fatal to class certification.” The district court further noted that “[c]ourts and parties must be able to determine accrual dates with some degree of certainty,” and “[t[he date of receipt may often be impossible to determine, particularly where the recipient is an individual as opposed to a commercial entity.”
CFPB and FTC release 2021 FDCPA report
On April 15, the CFPB and the FTC released their annual report to Congress on the administration of the FDCPA (see announcements here and here). The agencies are delegated joint FDCPA enforcement responsibility and, pursuant to a 2019 memorandum of understanding, may share supervisory and consumer complaint information, as well as collaborate on education efforts (covered by InfoBytes here). Among other things, the annual report provided a broad overview of the debt collection industry during the Covid-19 pandemic and highlighted enforcement actions taken by, and education and outreach efforts, policy initiatives, and supervisory findings of, the CFPB and FTC. With respect to enforcement, the report noted that: (i) the FTC resolved three FDCPA cases against 17 defendants and banned all 17 companies and individuals who engaged in serious and repeated violations of law from engaging in debt collection; (ii) there was one new public enforcement action brought in 2021 related to unlawful debt collection conduct; (iii) the Bureau resolved two pending lawsuits with FDCPA claims and also filed an action to recover a fraudulent transfer to enforce a prior judgment that penalized a defendant’s FDCPA violations, which resulted in judgments for $2.26 million in consumer redress; and (iv) by the end of 2021, the Bureau had three FDCPA enforcement actions pending in federal court. The report also noted that the CFPB handled roughly 121,700 debt collection complaints in 2021, of which the Bureau sent approximately 73,600 (or 60 percent) to companies for their review and response. Finally, the report also noted that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in AMG Capital Management v. FTC “made it much more difficult for the FTC to obtain monetary relief for unfair or deceptive debt collection practices that fall outside the scope of the FDCPA.” As previously covered by InfoBytes, in that decision the Court unanimously held that Section 13(b) of the FTC Act “does not authorize the Commission to seek, or a court to award, equitable monetary relief such as restitution or disgorgement.”
District Court rules “informational harm” does not create standing in FDCPA case
On April 6, the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut granted a defendant law firm’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in a putative class action, ruling the plaintiff lacked standing to bring a claim for abusive debt collection under the FDCPA. The plaintiff incurred a debt that was placed with a collection agency. The collection agency sent the plaintiff a letter, to which the plaintiff sent three letters disputing the debt and requesting validation of the debt as well as the agency’s authority to collect on the debt. According to the plaintiff, she never received the requested verification. The original creditor eventually hired the defendant to collect the debt. The defendant sent its own letter enclosing verification of the debt. The plaintiff sued alleging the defendant’s letter violated Section 1692g(b) of the FDCPA, which requires debt collection efforts to cease after timely dispute of a debt until the debt collector provides verification of the debt to the debtor. According to the plaintiff, her previous requests for validation triggered obligations under Section 1692g(b) with respect to the defendant, thus obligating the defendant to cease collection efforts until the validation information was provided to the plaintiff. She also asserted violations of Section 1692(e) on the grounds that an attorney did not meaningfully review her file before the defendant’s letter was sent. The defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings on two grounds: lack of standing and failure to state a claim that defendant violated the FDCPA.
The court agreed with the defendant that the plaintiff failed to show an injury-in-fact, as required for Article IIII standing, and instead only alleged informational harm including confusion caused by the defendant’s letter. The court held that confusion is not a legally cognizable injury and found that the plaintiff lacked standing because she did not suffer a cognizable injury.
3rd Circuit confirms adversary proceeding required to discharge student debt in bankruptcy
On March 25, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of an FDCPA and FCRA case against a student loan servicer and three credit reporting companies for attempting to collect a loan debt after it had been discharged in bankruptcy. After the discharge and completion of his bankruptcy case, the plaintiff filed suit, alleging the defendants violated the FDCPA and the FCRA by attempting to collect student loan debt that had been discharged. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, ruling that the plaintiff failed to state a claim because under Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, student loan debt is presumptively non-dischargeable and the plaintiff had not filed an adversary proceeding to determine otherwise.
On appeal, the plaintiff “argued that he was not required to file an adversary proceeding in Bankruptcy Court to determine the dischargeability of his student loan debt,” and that the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that the plaintiff was indigent rebuts “the presumption that his debt was nondischargeable by satisfying the exception in §523(a)(8) for undue hardship.” However, the appellate court held that “a finding of indigence is not the same as an undue hardship determination under §538(a)(8)” and that while the Bankruptcy Code does not require an adversary proceeding to discharge student loan debt, the procedures established in the Bankruptcy Rules do include such a requirement by providing that adversary proceedings include “a proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt” and are commenced by serving a summons and complaint on affected creditors. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed dismissal.
District Court rejects borrower’s RESPA, TILA mortgage servicing claims
On March 15, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted a defendant mortgage loan servicer’s motion for summary judgment in an action claiming violations of federal law based on alleged defects in the servicing of the plaintiff’s loan. According to the court, after settling similar claims against his two prior loan servicers, the plaintiff sued the companies that own and service his mortgage loan (collectively, defendants) disputing the precise amount of his delinquency and claiming the defendants failed to properly apply his mortgage payments or to respond to his notice of error (NOE). The plaintiff contended, among other things, that the defendants’ response to the NOE, misapplication of payments, and inaccurate periodic mortgage statements breached the terms of the mortgage agreement and violated RESPA, FDCPA, and TILA. In granting summary judgment, the court agreed with the defendants, finding that plaintiff’s breach of contract claim was foreclosed by a prior settlement agreement with his former servicer. The court also found that the servicer’s response to plaintiff’s NOE did not violate RESPA because it “fully addressed both ‘errors’ that the plaintiff presented,” and the perceived errors “amounted to confusion about basic arithmetic.” The court emphasized that “[n]othing in RESPA or Regulation X gives borrowers authority to dictate the parameters of a lender’s investigation,” and concluded that the servicer’s investigation and response was sufficient since the servicer provided the documents used to conclude that there was no misapplication of funds and “[e]ven a cursory investigation would have revealed that the specific errors alleged in the NOE did not occur.”
In granting the defendants’ request for summary judgment regarding claims that the plaintiff received five inaccurate mortgage statements in violation of the FDCPA and TILA, the court concluded that the periodic statements contained all the fields required under Regulation Z, and explained that allegations contesting the accuracy of the information contained in the statements did not violate TILA because “12 C.F.R. § 1026.42(d) does nothing to regulate the accuracy of information presented in a periodic statement.” As to the plaintiff’s FDCPA claim, which was premised on allegations that plaintiff’s prior servicer misapplied funds which caused defendants to collect amount that plaintiff did not owe, the court found that that the disputed periodic statement was truthful and accurate and that the plaintiff released the defendants of any liability under the FDCPA in his settlement agreement with the prior servicer.