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9th Circuit orders district court to reassess $7.9 million civil penalty against payments company
On January 27, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered a district court to reassess its decision “under the changed legal landscape since its initial order and opinion” in an action concerning alleged misrepresentations made by a bi-weekly payments company. The Bureau filed a lawsuit against the company in 2015, alleging, among other things, that the company made misrepresentations to consumers about its bi-weekly payment program when it overstated the savings provided by the program and created the impression the company was affiliated with the consumers’ lender. In 2017, the district court granted a $7.9 million civil penalty proposed by the Bureau, as well as permanent injunctive relief, but denied restitution of almost $74 million sought by the agency. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) The company appealed the district court’s conclusion that it had engaged in deceptive practices in violation of the Consumer Financial Protection Act, while the Bureau cross-appealed the district court’s decision to deny restitution. The 9th Circuit consolidated the appeals for consideration.
During the pendency of the cross-appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in 2020 in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, in which it determined that the director’s for-cause removal provision was unconstitutional but was severable from the statute establishing the Bureau (covered by a Buckley Special Alert). Following Seila, former Director Kathy Kraninger ratified several prior regulatory actions (covered by InfoBytes here), including the enforcement action brought against the company. At issue in the company’s appeal is whether the Bureau has authority to pursue its claims, including whether the agency’s funding mechanism is unconstitutional and whether its case is distinguishable from other actions and is entitled to dismissal for the Bureau director’s unconstitutional for-cause removal provision.
The appellate court declined to offer a position on these issues, and instead left them for the district court to consider. The 9th Circuit noted that since the district court’s 2017 order, “sister circuit courts have split” on the funding issue. “We vacate the district court’s order and remand, allowing it to reassess the case under the changed legal landscape since its initial order and opinion,” the appellate court wrote, directing the district court to “provide further consideration to [the company’s] argument on the constitutionality of the Bureau’s funding mechanism.” With respect to the Bureau’s appeal of the restitution denial, the 9th Circuit remanded the case to allow the district court to consider the effect CFPB v. CashCall and Liu v. SEC may have on the action (covered by InfoBytes here and here), as well as whether the agency “waived its claim to legal restitution by characterizing it only as a form of equitable relief before the district court.”
Respondents urge Supreme Court to wait on CFPB funding review
On January 13, respondents filed a brief in opposition to a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by the CFPB last November, which asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that the Bureau’s funding structure violates the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution (covered by InfoBytes here). The Bureau also asked the Supreme Court to consider the 5th Circuit’s decision to vacate the agency’s 2017 final rule covering “Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans” (Payday Lending Rule or Rule) on the premise that it was promulgated at a time when the Bureau was receiving unconstitutional funding. The Bureau requested that the Supreme Court review the case during its current term, which would ensure resolution of the issue by the summer of 2023. Last December, a coalition of state attorneys general from 22 states, including the District of Columbia, filed an amicus brief supporting the Bureau’s petition for a writ of certiorari, while 16 states filed an amicus brief opposing the petition (covered by InfoBytes here).
In their opposition brief, the respondents urged the Supreme Court to deny the Bureau’s petition on the premise that the 5th Circuit’s decision does not warrant review—“let alone in the expedited and limited manner that the Bureau proposes”—because the appellate court correctly vacated the Payday Lending Rule, which, according to the respondents, has “multiple legal defects, including but not limited to the Appropriations Clause issue.” Among other things, the respondents argued that the Bureau erroneously contended that the Appropriations Clause does not limit the manner in which Congress may exercise its authority, claiming that: (i) the Appropriations Clause ensures Congressional oversight of the federal fiscal and executive power; (ii) the Bureau’s funding statute nullifies Congress’s appropriations power in an unprecedented manner; (iii) the Bureau’s merit defenses, including claims that text, history, and precedent support its funding scheme, all fail; and (iv) the Bureau’s remedial defenses of the Payday Lending Rule also fail.
The respondents also maintained that the case “is neither cleanly presented . . . nor ripe for definitive resolution at this time,” and argued that the Supreme Court could address the validity of the Payday Lending Rule without addressing the Bureau’s funding issue. Explaining that the 5th Circuit’s decision “simply vacated a single regulation that has never been in effect,” the respondents claimed that the appellate court should have addressed questions about the Rule’s validity before deciding on the Appropriations Clause question. The respondents claimed that the appellate court incorrectly rejected two antecedent grounds for vacating the Payday Lending Rule: (i) the Rule’s “promulgation was tainted by the removal restriction later held invalid in Seila Law” (covered by a Buckley Special Alert); and (ii) the Rule exceeds the Bureau’s authority “because the prohibited conduct falls outside the statutory definition of unfair or abusive conduct.” “Given the significant prospect that this Court will be unable to resolve the constitutional question in this case, it should await a better vehicle,” the respondents wrote, adding that “[i]f and when some judgment in some future case has ‘major practical effects,’ [] the Bureau should seek this Court’s review then—which may well present a better vehicle.”
Further, the respondents stated that if the Supreme Court grants review of the case, it “should proceed in a more deliberative fashion than the Bureau has urged.” The respondents asked the Supreme Court to expressly include the antecedent questions by either granting the respondents’ cross-petition or adding them to the Board’s petition in order to provide clarity about whether the Supreme Court intends to consider the alternative grounds. They further urged the Supreme Court to wait until next term to review the case, writing that the Bureau “cannot justify its demand for a case of this complexity and importance to be briefed, argued, and decided in a few months at the end of a busy Term.”
States file brief in support of Biden’s student loan debt-relief program
On January 11, a coalition of 22 state attorneys general from Massachusetts, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District Of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin, filed an amicus brief with the U.S. Supreme Court in two pending actions concerning challenges to the Department of Education’s student loan debt relief program. At the beginning of December, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Biden administration’s appeal of an injunction entered by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that temporarily prohibits the Secretary of Education from discharging any federal loans under the agency’s student debt relief plan (covered by InfoBytes here). In a brief unsigned order, the Supreme Court deferred the Biden administration’s application to vacate, pending oral argument. Shortly after, the Supreme Court also granted a petition for certiorari in a challenge currently pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, announcing it will consider whether the respondents (individuals whose loans are ineligible for debt forgiveness under the plan) have Article III standing to bring the challenge, as well as whether the Department of Education’s debt relief plan is “statutorily authorized” and “adopted in a procedurally proper manner” (covered by InfoBytes here). Oral arguments in both cases are scheduled for February 28.
The states first pointed out that under the Higher Education Act, Congress gave the Secretary “broad authority both to determine borrowers’ loan repayment obligations and to modify or discharge these obligations in myriad circumstances.” The Secretary was also later granted statutory authority under the HEROES Act to take action in times of national emergency, which includes allowing “the Secretary to ‘waive or modify any statutory or regulatory provision applicable to the student financial assistance programs’ if the Secretary ‘deems’ such actions ‘necessary’ to ensure that borrowers affected by a national emergency ‘are not placed in a worse position financially’ with respect to their student loans.” The states stressed that while “the magnitude of the national emergency necessitating this relief is unprecedented, the relief offered to borrowers falls squarely within the authority Congress gave the Secretary to address such emergencies and is similar in kind to relief granted pursuant to other important federal student loan policies that have concomitantly advanced our state interests.”
The states went on to explain that the Secretary tailored the limited debt relief using income thresholds to ensure that “the borrowers at greatest risk of pandemic-related defaults receive critical relief, either by eliminating their loan obligations or reducing them to a more manageable level,” thus meeting the express goal of the HEROES Act to “prevent[] affected borrowers from being placed in a worse position because of a national emergency.” The states also stressed that the Secretary reasonably concluded that targeted relief is necessary to address the impending rise in pandemic-related defaults once repayment restarts. The HEROES Act expressly permits the Secretary to “exercise his modification and waiver authority ‘notwithstanding any other provision of law, unless enacted with specific reference to [20 U.S.C. § 1098bb(a)(1)],” the states asserted, noting that “relevant statutory and regulatory provisions related to student loan repayment and cancellation contain no such express limiting language.”
Secretary Miguel Cardona issued the following statement in response to the filing of more than a dozen amicus curiae briefs: “The broad array of organizations and experts—representing diverse communities and different perspectives—supporting our case before the Supreme Court today reflects the strength of our legal positions versus the fundamentally flawed lawsuits aimed at denying millions of working and middle-class borrowers debt relief.” A summary of the briefs can be accessed here.
Supreme Court agrees to hear second appeal over student debt relief plan
On December 12, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari in a student debt relief challenge currently pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the DOJ filed an application on behalf of the Department of Education (DOE) asking the U.S. Supreme Court to stay a judgment entered by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas concerning whether the agency’s student debt relief plan violated the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. In a brief unsigned order, the Supreme Court deferred the DOE’s application for a stay, pending oral argument. The Supreme Court said it will treat the application as a “petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment,” and announced a briefing schedule will be established to allow the case to be argued in the February 2023 argument session to resolve the legality of the program. Oral arguments are scheduled for February 28, 2023.
The Supreme Court said it will consider whether the respondents (individuals whose loans are ineligible for debt forgiveness under the plan, as covered by InfoBytes here) have Article III standing to bring the challenge. The Supreme Court will also consider whether the DOE’s plan is “statutorily authorized” and “adopted in a procedurally proper manner.”
This is the second case concerning the Biden administration’s student debt relief plan that the Supreme Court has agreed to hear. On December 1, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Biden administration’s appeal of an injunction entered by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which temporarily prohibits the Secretary of Education from discharging any federal loans under the DOE’s student debt relief plan. (Covered by InfoBytes here.)
District Court stays action against remittance provider while Supreme Court weighs CFPB’s funding structure
On December 9, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York stayed an action brought by the CFPB and the New York attorney general against a defendant remittance provider until after the U.S. Supreme Court decides if it will review whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that the Bureau’s funding structure violates the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution. Last month the DOJ, on behalf of the CFPB, submitted a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking Supreme Court review of the 5th Circuit’s decision during its current term. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) The New York AG and the Bureau sued the defendant in April for allegedly violating the EFTA and its implementing Regulation E, the Remittance Rule, and the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA), among various consumer financial protection laws, in its handling of remittance transfers. (Covered by InfoBytes here.)
The defendant argued that the district court should hold off on deciding on its motion to dismiss per the aforementioned argument, but should nonetheless rule on its pending motion to transfer. The Bureau opposed the defendant’s request for a stay, countering “that a stay would not promote efficiency” since the issue of the Bureau’s standing would not affect the claims brought in the current action. The Bureau further asserted “that the public and the parties’ interest weighs against a stay, as it would hinder Plaintiffs’ enforcement of the consumer protection laws and make obtaining evidence down the line more difficult.”
The district court disagreed, stating that the Supreme Court may address the broader issue of the Bureau’s standing to bring enforcement actions in its decision, and that, regardless, the agency’s claims in the current action “are inextricably linked to CFPB rules and regulations, which themselves may be implicated by a Supreme Court decision should it grant the petition.” The district court stayed the case in its entirety and said that it will wait to decide on both motions until after the Supreme Court decides on the Bureau’s filed petition for a writ of certiorari.
Supreme Court asked to stay judgment holding that HEROES Act does not authorize the creation of the DOE’s student debt relief plan
Recently, the DOJ filed an application on behalf of the Department of Education (DOE) asking the U.S. Supreme Court to stay a judgment entered by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas in an action related to whether the agency’s student debt relief plan violated the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the district court held that while the HEROES Act expressly exempts the APA’s notice-and-comment obligations, the district court stressed that the HEROES Act “does not provide the executive branch clear congressional authorization to create a $400 billion student loan forgiveness program,” and, moreover, does not mention loan forgiveness. On December 1, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied the DOE’s motion for stay pending appeal.
In its application, the DOE argued that the plaintiffs never asserted that the debt relief plan exceeded the education secretary’s statutory authority. Instead, the DOE argued, the plaintiffs alleged only that they were improperly denied the opportunity to comment on the plan, stressing that while the district court recognized that the HEROES Act expressly exempts the APA’s notice-and-comment obligations, it went further by holding that the plan went beyond the secretary’s authority. “The district court profoundly erred by raising and deciding a claim that respondents did not assert and could not have asserted,” the DOE stressed, further adding that the plaintiffs did not claim that providing debt relief to other borrowers would inflict injury on them. Beyond this, the secretary’s plan “falls squarely within the plain text of his statutory authority,” the DOE asserted. The DOE requested that the Supreme Court stay the district court’s judgment, or in the alternative, defer the application pending oral argument and treat it as a petition for certiorari before judgment, grant the petition, and hear the case along with a second separate action, discussed below, involving a challenge to an injunction that temporarily prohibits the Secretary of Education from discharging any federal loans under the agency’s student debt relief plan.
As previously covered by InfoBytes, on December 1, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Biden administration’s appeal of an injunction entered by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The 8th Circuit held that “the equities strongly favor an injunction considering the irreversible impact the Secretary’s debt forgiveness action would have as compared to the lack of harm an injunction would presently impose,” and pointed to the fact that the collection of student loan payments and the accrual of interest have both been suspended. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) The 8th Circuit’s opinion followed a ruling issued by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, which dismissed an action filed by state attorneys general from Nebraska, Missouri, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, and South Carolina for lack of Article III standing after concluding that the states—which attempted “to assert a threat of imminent harm in the form of lost tax revenue in the future”— failed to establish imminent and non-speculative harm sufficient to confer standing. In an unsigned order, the Supreme Court deferred the Biden administration’s application to vacate, pending oral argument. Oral arguments are scheduled for February 28, 2023.
District Court: Defendants cannot use CFPB funding argument to dismiss deceptive marketing lawsuit
On November 18, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that the CFPB can proceed in its lawsuit against a credit reporting agency, two of its subsidiaries (collectively, “corporate defendants”), and a former senior executive accused of allegedly violating a 2017 enforcement order in connection with alleged deceptive practices related to their marketing and sale of credit scores, credit reports, and credit-monitoring products to consumers. According to the court, a recent decision issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which found that the Bureau’s funding structure violates the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution (covered by a Buckley Special Alert), is a persuasive basis to have the lawsuit dismissed.
As previously covered by InfoBytes, the Bureau sued the defendants in April claiming the corporate defendants, under the individual defendant’s direction, allegedly violated the 2017 consent order from the day it went into effect instead of implementing agreed-upon policy changes intended to stop consumers from unknowingly signing up for credit monitoring services that charge monthly payments. The Bureau further claimed that the corporate defendants’ practices continued even after examiners raised concerns several times, and that the individual defendant had both the “authority and obligation” to ensure compliance with the 2017 consent order but did not do so.
The defendants sought to have the lawsuit dismissed for several reasons, including on constitutional grounds. The court disagreed with defendants’ constitutional argument, stating that, other than the 5th Circuit, courts around the country have “uniformly” found that Congress’ choice to provide independent funding for the Bureau conformed with the Constitution. “Courts are ill-equipped to second guess exactly how Congress chooses to structure the funding of financial regulators like the Bureau, so long as the funding remains tethered to a law passed by Congress,” the court wrote. The court also overruled defendants’ other objections to the lawsuit. “[T]his case is only at the pleading stage, and all the Bureau must do is plausibly allege that [the individual defendant] was recklessly indifferent to the wrongfulness of [the corporate defendants’] actions over which he had authority,” the court said, adding that the Bureau “has done so because it alleges that because of financial implications, [the individual defendant] actively ‘created a plan to delay or avoid’ implementing the consent order.”
The Bureau is currently seeking Supreme Court review of the 5th Circuit’s decision during its current term. (Covered by InfoBytes here.)
Supreme Court to fast-track review of student debt relief program
On December 1, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the Biden administration’s appeal of an injunction entered by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that temporarily prohibits the Secretary of Education from discharging any federal loans under the agency’s student debt relief plan (announced in August and covered by InfoBytes here). In a brief unsigned order, the Supreme Court deferred the Biden administration’s application to vacate, pending oral argument. The Supreme Court said it will treat the Biden administration’s application as a “petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment,” and announced a briefing schedule will be established to allow the case to be argued in the February 2023 argument session to resolve the legality of the program.
The Biden administration filed its application last month asking the Supreme Court to vacate, or at minimum narrow, the 8th Circuit’s injunction. Among other things, the Biden administration claimed that the 8th Circuit failed to “analyze the merits of the respondents’ claims, much less determine they are likely to succeed” when it granted an emergency motion for injunction pending appeal filed by state attorney generals from Nebraska, Missouri, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, and South Carolina. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the 8th Circuit determined that “the equities strongly favor an injunction considering the irreversible impact the Secretary’s debt forgiveness action would have as compared to the lack of harm an injunction would presently impose,” and pointed to the fact that the collection of student loan payments and the accrual of interest have both been suspended.
The appellate court’s “erroneous injunction leaves millions of economically vulnerable borrowers in limbo, uncertain about the size of their debt and unable to make financial decisions with an accurate understanding of their future repayment obligations,” the Biden administration said, adding that if the Supreme Court “declines to vacate the injunction, it may wish to construe this application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment, grant the petition, and set the case for expedited briefing and argument this Term to avoid prolonging this uncertainty for the millions of affected borrowers.”
In its application, the Biden administration argued that the universal injunction was overbroad. The application further argued that the states lack standing because the debt relief plan “does not require respondents to do anything, forbid them from doing anything, or harm them in any other way.” Moreover, the Secretary of Education was acting within the bounds of the HEROES Act when he put together the debt relief plan, the application contended. “The COVID-19 pandemic is a ‘national emergency declared by the President of the United States,’” the application said. “Both the Trump and Biden Administrations previously invoked the HEROES Act to categorically suspend payments and interest accrual on all Department-held loans in light of the pandemic.” The application further argued that the states “have not disputed that those actions were lawful,” and that the Secretary of Education “reasonably ‘deem[ed]’ relief ‘necessary to ensure’ that a subset of these affected individuals—namely, those with lower incomes—‘are not placed in a worse position’ in relation to their student-loan obligations ‘because of their status as affected individuals.’”
Meanwhile, on December 1, the 5th Circuit denied the Department of Education’s (DOE) opposed motion for stay pending appeal, following a ruling issued by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas related to whether the agency’s student debt relief plan violated the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the district court determined that while the HEROES Act expressly exempts the APA’s notice-and-comment obligations, the court stressed that the HEROES Act “does not provide the executive branch clear congressional authorization to create a $400 billion student loan forgiveness program,” and, moreover, does not mention loan forgiveness.
Earlier, on November 22, the Department of Education (DOE) extended the pause on student loan repayments, interest, and collections in an effort to alleviate uncertainty for borrowers. Saying “it would be deeply unfair to ask borrowers to pay a debt that they wouldn’t have to pay,” the DOE stated that payments will resume 60 days after it is allowed to implement the debt relief plan or the litigation is resolved, explaining that this will give the Supreme Court time to resolve the case during its current term. However, if the debt relief plan has not been implemented and litigation has not been resolved by June 30, 2023, borrowers’ payments will resume 60 days after that, the DOE explained.
CFPB asks Supreme Court to review 5th Circuit decision
On November 14, the DOJ, on behalf of the CFPB, submitted a petition for a writ of certiorari asking the U.S. Supreme Court to review whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that the Bureau’s funding structure violates the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution. The Bureau also asked the court to consider the 5th Circuit’s decision to vacate the agency’s 2017 final rule covering “Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans” (Payday Lending Rule) on the premise that it was promulgated at a time when the Bureau was receiving unconstitutional funding.
The Bureau’s funding is derived through the Federal Reserve instead of the annual congressional appropriations process—a process, the appellate court said, that violates the Constitution. Specifically, the 5th Circuit’s October 19 holding (covered by a Buckley Special Alert) found that although the Bureau spends money pursuant to a validly enacted statute, the structure violates the Appropriations Clause because (i) the Bureau obtains its funds from the Federal Reserve (not the Treasury); (ii) the agency maintains funds in a separate account; (iii) the Appropriations Committees do not have authority to review the agency’s expenditures; and (iv) the Bureau exercises broad authority over the economy. The 5th Circuit also rejected the Bureau’s arguments that the funding structure was necessarily constitutional because it was created by and subject to Congress, and distinguished other agencies that are funded outside of the annual appropriations process.
The case involves a challenge to the Bureau’s Payday Lending Rule, which prohibits lenders from attempting to withdraw payments for covered loans from consumers’ accounts after two consecutive withdrawal attempts have failed due to insufficient funds. As a result of the 5th Circuit’s decision, lenders’ obligation to comply with the rule (originally set for August 19, 2019, but repeatedly delayed) will be further delayed while the constitutional issue winds its way through the courts.
“No other court has ever held that Congress violated the Appropriations Clause by passing a statute authorizing spending,” the Bureau argued as it requested a prompt Supreme Court review, asserting that the 5th Circuit’s decision “threatens to inflict immense legal and practical harms on the CFPB, consumers, and the Nation’s financial sector.” The agency also stressed that “[n]ew challenges to the Bureau’s rules and other actions can be expected to multiply in the weeks and months to come, and will presumably be filed in the 5th Circuit whenever possible.” The decision also has the potential to impact past enforcement actions and rulemaking as well, the Bureau said.
The Bureau further asserted that while the 5th Circuit concluded that “‘an appropriation is required’ to authorize spending” and that “‘[a] law’ providing an agency with a funding source and spending authority ‘does not suffice,’” the appellate court failed to specify what would be required for such a law to qualify as an appropriation.
Moreover, the 5th Circuit’s reasoning was incorrect, the Bureau argued, because Congress specified that the agency could claim up to 12 percent of the Fed’s budget to fund its operations, and it is subject to, among other things, budget and financial oversight, government audits, and requirements that its director prepare and submit annual reports to the Senate and House appropriations committees concerning its fiscal operating plans and forecasts. These safeguards, the Bureau stressed, should assuage concerns about whether the agency is insulated from congressional oversight. “The court of appeals’ novel and ill-defined limits on Congress’s spending authority contradict the Constitution’s text, historical practice, and this Court’s precedent,” the Bureau said, adding that the decision also conflicts with a holding issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit where the appellate court recognized that “Congress can, consistent with the Appropriations Clause, create governmental institutions reliant on fees, assessments, or investments rather than the ordinary appropriations process.”
The Bureau asked the Supreme Court to review the case during its current term, which would ensure resolution of the issue by the summer of 2023.
4th Circuit vacates $10.6 million judgment, orders district court to reevaluate class standing
On October 28, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remanded a $10.6 million damages award it had previously approved in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in January, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment against the defendants and ordered the 4th Circuit to reexamine its decision in light of TransUnion (which clarified the type of concrete injury necessary to establish Article III standing, and was covered by InfoBytes here). Previously, a divided 4th Circuit affirmed a district court’s award of $10.6 million in penalties and damages based on a summary judgment that an appraisal practice common before 2009 was unconscionable under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (covered by InfoBytes here). During the appeal, the defendants argued that summary judgment was wrongfully granted and that the class should not have been certified since individual issues predominated over common ones, but the appellate court majority determined, among other things, that there was not a large number of uninjured members within the plaintiffs’ class because plaintiffs paid for independent appraisals and “received appraisals that were tainted.” At the time, the 4th Circuit “concluded that the ‘financial harm’ involved in paying for a product that was ‘never received’ was ‘a classic and paradigmatic form of injury in fact.’” On remand, the 4th Circuit considered questions of standing and ultimately determined that TransUnion requires the district court to reevaluate the standing of class members.