InfoBytes Blog
Filter
Subscribe to our InfoBytes Blog weekly newsletter and other publications for news affecting the financial services industry.
Colorado extends suspension of 2020 property tax deadlines
On May 1, the Colorado governor issued an executive order extending the temporary suspension of calendar year 2020 statutory deadlines concerning taxpayer filing requirements for certain taxable property in light of the spread of Covid-19. The State Board of Equalization within the Department of Local Affairs is permitted to promulgate any necessary emergency rules regarding the extension of filing deadlines.
Massachusetts regulator urges premium finance companies to work with customers
On May 1, the Massachusetts Division of Banks issued guidance to insurance premium finance companies, stating that it “expects” them to provide relief and flexibility to customers during the Covid-19 pandemic. The division issued the guidance in light of a March 23 bulletin in which the Massachusetts Division of Insurance urged Massachusetts insurance carriers to take steps to preserve individual access to insurance coverage.
Massachusetts regulator updates foreclosure moratorium FAQs
On May 1, the Massachusetts Division of Banks issued updated FAQs regarding Chapter 65 of the Acts of 2020, an April 20 state law establishing a temporary moratorium on certain residential foreclosures. The updated FAQs restate that, until the end of the moratorium, which is currently set to expire on August 18, 2020, lenders cannot charge fees other than those contractually scheduled and calculated as if the borrower made all payments in full and on time. The updates also clarify that the foreclosure and forbearance provisions of Chapter 65 do not apply to residential investment properties, residential properties that are not owner-occupied, and residential properties taken in whole or in part as collateral for a commercial loan.
5th Circuit: Collection letters misrepresenting legal enforceability of underlying debt violate FDCPA
On April 29, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that letters seeking the collection of time-barred debt that include ambiguous offers and contain threats misrepresenting the legal enforceability of the underlying debt violate section 1692e of the FDCPA. In 2011, a creditor placed the plaintiff’s debt with the defendant for collection. Six collection letters were initially sent to the plaintiff for which there was no response, and in 2017, the defendant sent four more letters to the plaintiff. While it was undisputed that the four-year statute of limitations to sue to collect the debt had expired, none of the letters mentioned that the debt was time-barred or that a partial payment may restart the statute of limitations clock. The plaintiff filed suit claiming the 2017 letters violated the Texas Debt Collection Act and were false or misleading and unfair or unconscionable in violation of FDCPA §§ 1692e and 1692f respectively. The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff on the 1692e claim, but ruled that “‘there is a growing consensus’ that a claim under § 1692f is a ‘backstop’ to catch conduct outside that barred by § 1692e and other provisions,” and granted summary judgment to the defendant on the 1692f claim. The defendant appealed the 1692e decision.
On appeal, the 5th Circuit affirmed and held that, read as a whole, the letters misrepresented the legal enforceability and character of the debt in violation of § 1692e. The appellate court found that the 2017 letters were ambiguous and failed to even mention when the debt was incurred, which may have provided some insight to the plaintiff as to whether the debt might be legally enforceable. The appellate court also took issue with the 2017 letters’ use of unexplained “urgent” language and vague collection threats, and stated that “the complete silence in these letters works in conjunction with their vague language to mislead the unsophisticated consumer that the debt is enforceable.”
4th Circuit: Disgorgement calculation lacks necessary casual connection between profits and violations
On April 27, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a district court’s disgorgement calculation for a banker found in contempt of a consent order rested on “an erroneous legal interpretation of the terms of the underlying consent order” and “lacked the necessary causal connection” between profits and a violation. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the banker settled RESPA and state law allegations with the CFPB and the Maryland Attorney General concerning his participation in a mortgage-kickback scheme. The 2015 final judgment order banned the defendant from participating in the mortgage industry for two years but did not prohibit him “from acting solely as a personnel or human-resources manager for a mortgage business operated by a FDIC-insured banking institution. . . .” In 2018, the banker was held in civil contempt for violating the final judgment order, and the district court ordered the disgorgement of over half-a-million dollars of his contemptuous earnings. The banker appealed the contempt finding and disgorgement.
On appeal, the 4th Circuit first held that the district court properly found the banker in violation of the consent order, determining among other things that, while the final judgment order did not broadly prohibit his participation in the mortgage industry, there was sufficient evidence that he “continued to communicate impermissibly with third-party businesses engaged in settlement services” and that he failed to follow various reporting requirements, such as uploading the consent order to a national registry and notifying regulators of a change in residence and business activity. However, the 4th Circuit found that the district court erred in its approach to calculating disgorgement because it assumed that “managing the business was improper and set out identifying [the banker’s] profits from his business because any such profit was contemptuous income.” (Emphasis in the original.) Holding that the district court’s view relied on an overbroad interpretation of the consent order and lacked the causal connection between the banker’s profits and a violation, the 4th Circuit vacated the disgorgement order and remanded the case to the district court to reassess the disgorgement calculation based on the banker’s more limited conduct that did not comply with the order.
CFPB partially grants confidentiality request and modifies CID’s notification of purpose
On April 13, the CFPB released a Supplemental Decision and Order partially granting a payment technology company’s request for confidential treatment of its petition that sought to set aside a 2019 CID seeking information related to, among other things, the company’s payment processing activities. The CFPB noted in its supplemental decision and order that while the company’s initial confidentiality arguments were rejected, it provided the company an opportunity to make an additional submission following a U.S. Supreme Court decision that clarified the standard for determining what information may be withheld under Exemption 4 of FOIA. The Bureau ultimately granted the company’s confidentiality request with respect to its payment processor information only.
The supplemental decision and order is related to the company’s now-published original petition to set aside the CID, in which it asserted that it is not a covered person under the Consumer Financial Protection Act because even though it sells various products and services, it does not provide payment processing services. The company also argued that it is not a service provider because it does not offer or provide consumer financial products or services, nor does it provide services to a covered person. Furthermore, because it is not a financial institution, the company claimed that the CFPB has no EFTA authority over it. The original petition requested that the CID be set aside because it exceeds the Bureau’s jurisdictional authority. The Bureau responded that the company’s arguments did not warrant setting aside the CID because the investigation was “not patently outside” its authority, but it partially modified the CID’s Notification of Purpose to provide greater detail about the conduct the Bureau was investigating. The Bureau also contended that the fact that the company is not a financial institution does not affect whether the Bureau can conduct an investigation into potential violations of section 1005.10(b) of Regulation E (EFTA), which “applies to any person.”
GSEs to cover servicer advances on mortgages in forbearance
On May 1, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac filed their first quarter 10-Qs, which included statements clarifying that in the coming months Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, not loan servicers, will assume responsibility for advances on loans in forbearance that meet certain criteria. Fannie Mae’s 10-Q states that effective August 2020 “after four months of missed borrower payments on a loan…we will make the missed scheduled principal and interest payments…so long as the loan remains in the MBS trust.” As previously covered by InfoBytes, FHFA announced on April 21 that servicers are only obligated to advance principal and interest payments for up to four months on single-family loans. Likewise, Freddie Mac’s 10-Q similarly stated, “we expect to advance significant amounts to cover principal and interest payments to security holders for loans in forbearance in the coming months.”
CFPB: Substantial decline in credit applications in March
On May 1, the CFPB released a report examining the early effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on credit applications in March, concluding there was a substantial decline compared to previous years. Specifically, the report compared “hard inquiry” volume from credit checks for auto loans, mortgages, and credit cards by lenders during the month of March with the same data from previous years. Among other things, the report notes that auto loan inquiries dropped by 52 percent, new mortgage inquiries dropped by 27 percent, and credit card inquiries declined by 40 percent, as compared to usual data patterns from previous years. The report noted variations based on credit score and geography. The drops in inquiries were more pronounced for consumers with higher credit scores, and in states in the Northeast and California. The report noted a strong correlation between states with a higher Covid-19 case rate and the significance of the drop in auto loan and new mortgage inquiries. A similar correlation was also found between states with a larger share of workers entering unemployment and a drop in the same credit inquires.
5th Circuit: Non-signatories not compelled to arbitrate FCRA claims
On April 21, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s order denying a plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that two credit reporting agencies (CRAs) are not subject to arbitration because of their contractual relationships with a bank. The plaintiff sued the bank and the CRAs, alleging violations of the FCRA and that the bank additionally violated the TCPA and the Fair Credit Billing Act in connection with disputed, unfamiliar charges that appeared on his credit card. The bank moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a provision in its credit card agreement, and the CRA defendants moved to stay the claims against them pending the outcome of the arbitration between the plaintiff and the bank. While the plaintiff opposed the bank’s motion to compel arbitration, he simultaneously moved to compel the CRAs to arbitration in the event that the bank’s motion was granted. The district court granted the bank’s motion to compel arbitration and denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel the CRAs to arbitration, reasoning that “‘there is a rebuttable presumption that non-signatories to a contract cannot be bound by arbitration agreements.’”
On appeal, the 5th Circuit agreed with the district court, concluding that because the CRAs were not signatories to the credit card agreement and were neither expressly nor implicitly parties to the agreement, they could not be compelled to arbitrate the plaintiff’s FCRA claims. Furthermore, while Alabama law governed the agreement, the appellate court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that equitable estoppel and third-party beneficiary theories under Alabama common law required the CRAs to arbitrate the claims.
OCC appeals judgment in NYDFS fintech charter challenge
On April 23, the OCC filed its opening brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to appeal a district court’s final judgment in an NYDFS lawsuit that challenged the agency’s decision to allow non-depository fintech companies to apply for Special Purpose National Bank charters (SPNB charter). As previously covered by InfoBytes, last October the district court entered final judgment in favor of NYDFS, ruling that the SPNB regulation should be “set aside with respect to all fintech applicants seeking a national bank charter that do not accept deposits,” rather than only those that have a nexus to New York State. The judgment followed the court’s denial of the OCC’s motion to dismiss last May (covered by InfoBytes here), in which the court concluded, among other things, that the OCC failed to rebut NYDFS’s claims that the proposed national fintech charter posed a threat to the state’s ability to establish its own laws and regulations, and that engaging in the “business of banking” under the National Bank Act (NBA) “unambiguously requires receiving deposits as an aspect of the business.” Highlights of the OCC’s appeal include:
- The OCC claims that NYDFS lacks standing and that its claims are unripe because its alleged injuries are premised on a non-depository fintech company receiving a SPNB charter and commencing business in the state. However, the OCC has yet to receive even an application. The OCC also argues that NYDFS “would not be prejudiced by waiting to resolve these claims until OCC takes affirmative steps to approve an application” because the period between preliminary conditional approval and final approval would provide “ample opportunity to challenge such an application.”
- The OCC argues that the district court erred in holding that the agency’s decision to accept SPNB charter applications from non-depository fintechs was not entitled to Chevron deference. Specifically, the term “business of banking” under the NBA is “ambiguous” on whether it requires deposit-taking, and the OCC’s resolution of that ambiguity is reasonable as it is consistent with U.S. Supreme Court case law.
- The OCC argues that even if NYDFS’s claims were justiciable (and even if the OCC’s interpretation was not entitled to Chevron deference), any relief NYDFS is entitled to receive must be limited to the state. The OCC contends that the district court’s decision to grant nationwide relief was improper because it is inconsistent with Article III, which establishes that “remedies should not extend beyond what is necessary to redress the plaintiff’s alleged injuries,” as well as equitable principles and the Administrative Procedure Act.