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New Hampshire amends licensing requirements for nondepository mortgage bankers, pawnbrokers
On May 15, the New Hampshire governor signed HB 649 to, among other things, amend the state licensing requirements for nondepository mortgage bankers, brokers, and servicers, as well as pawnbrokers and moneylenders. Specifically, licensing applicants must file with the banking commissioner a written verified application through the Nationwide Multistate Licensing System and Registry (NMLS) using the NMLS form, or by providing all the same information required on the application using the NMLS. Applicants must also file a statement of net worth. Finally, HB 649 defines what constitutes a “significant event” pertaining to a licensee’s practices with respect to consumer credit, small loans, debt adjustments, and money lending. The act became effective immediately.
Georgia amends mortgage lender licensing laws
On May 7, the Georgia governor signed HB 185, which amends various state laws related to financial institutions, including the licensing requirements for mortgage lenders and mortgage loan originators. The bill specifies that any licensed mortgage lender is authorized to engage in all activities that are authorized for a mortgage broker and therefore, is not required to obtain a mortgage broker license. Additionally, the bill specifies that a mortgage loan originator license shall become inactive in the event that a mortgage loan originator is no longer sponsored by a mortgage lender or mortgage broker that is licensed. The bill becomes effective July 1.
10th Circuit: Compliance employees must show they went beyond established protocols to obtain FCA whistleblower retaliation protection
On April 30, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a former employee’s False Claims Act (FCA) whistleblower retaliation claims, holding that employees with compliance responsibilities bear the burden of showing that their alleged protected activities are not simply part of their job responsibilities. The case concerned a qui tam relator who alleged her former employer systemically violated the FCA when it knowingly and fraudulently billed the government for inadequately or improperly completed work, and then fired her in retaliation for trying to end the alleged fraud. According to the plaintiff—who was previously employed as a senior quality control analyst responsible for reviewing investigators’ work and documenting incomplete investigations—the company violated the FCA by: (i) “falsely certifying that it performed complete and accurate investigations”; (ii) “falsely certifying that it did proper case reviews and quality-control checks”; and (iii) “falsifying corrective action reports.” The district court, however, entered summary judgment for the company on all counts, determining that the plaintiff’s qui tam claims were “‘substantially the same’ as those that had been publically [sic] disclosed” in previous investigations and news reports, and dismissing her claims under the public disclosure bar. Her retaliation claim was dismissed after the district court determined that she had failed to properly plead that the company was on notice that she was engaging in protected activity.
On appeal, the 10th Circuit concluded that the district court erred in its legal determinations on the qui tam claims, vacated the order for summary judgment, and remanded those claims for further proceedings. However, the 10th Circuit agreed with the district court’s decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s whistleblower retaliation claim, stating that in order to establish FCA whistleblower liability, an employer must know that the employee’s actions were connected to a claimed FCA violation, and an employee “must overcome the presumption that her internal reports of fraud were part of her job.” The appellate court held that because the plaintiff’s allegations did not show that she went outside of established protocols or broke her chain of command, she failed to allege adequately that the company was on notice of her claimed FCA-protected activity.
Colorado enacts student loan servicer act
On May 13, the Colorado governor signed SB19-002, the “Colorado Student Loan Servicers Act,” which requires an entity that services a student education loan owned by a Colorado resident to be licensed by the state. Under the bill, “student loan servicer” is generally defined as a person that receives a scheduled periodic payment from a student loan borrower and applies the payments of principal and interest with respect to the amounts received from such a borrower, and provides other similar administrative services. The bill requires any person seeking to act as a student loan servicer to be licensed through the state on or after January 31, 2020, and specifies the procedures for obtaining and renewing the license. Federal student loan servicers are automatically issued the license under the bill.
Among other things, the bill also specifies particular acts that are required of the student loan servicer, including (i) providing substantive responses within 30 days of receiving a written inquiry from a borrower; (ii) inquiring of borrowers as to how to apply overpayments; and (iii) applying partial payments in a manner that minimizes late fees and negative credit reporting. Additionally, the bill specifies prohibited acts, including (i) engaging in an unfair or deceptive practice toward any person or misrepresenting or omitting any material information in connection with servicing student loans; (ii) misapplying payments to the loan balance; and (iii) failing to report both favorable and unfavorable payment history to a consumer reporting agency. A violation of the bill is considered a deceptive trade practice, and the bill provides a private right of action for borrowers to seek punitive damages for violations. The bill is expected to take effect on August 2.
9th Circuit revives FCRA suit against credit reporting agency
On May 17, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit revived a putative class action lawsuit against a national credit reporting agency for allegedly failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy in the plaintiffs’ credit reports, in violation of the FCRA. According to the opinion, the credit reporting agency failed to delete all the accounts associated with a defunct loan servicer, despite statements claiming to have done so in January 2015. As of October 2015, 125,000 accounts from the defunct loan servicer were still being reported, and the accounts were not deleted until April 2016. A consumer filed the putative class action alleging the credit reporting agency violated the FCRA by continuing to report her past-due account, even after deleting portions of the positive payment history on the account. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the credit reporting agency on the consumer’s claim that the credit reporting agency failed to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy” in her credit report.
On appeal, the court determined that a “reasonable jury could conclude that [the credit reporting agency]’s continued reporting of [the account], either on its own, or coupled with the deletion of portions of [the consumer’s] positive payment history on the same loan, was materially misleading.” Moreover, the appellate court noted that a jury could conclude that the credit reporting agency’s reading of the FCRA “runs a risk of error substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless,” and that the length of delay in implementing the decision to delete the defunct loan servicers accounts “entail[ed] ‘an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.’”
25 state AGs reject CFPB payday proposal in comment letter
On May 15, a group of 25 Democratic Attorneys General submitted a comment letter in response to the CFPB’s February proposal to rescind certain provisions related to the underwriting standards of the “Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans” (the Rule) (covered by InfoBytes here). In the comment letter, the Attorneys General argue, among other things, that the elimination of the underwriting provisions of the Rule: (i) is inconsistent with the Bureau’s obligations to protect consumers under the Dodd-Frank Act; (ii) ignores state experiences with payday and vehicle title lending; and (iii) would reduce states’ ability to protect their residents from predatory lending.
Specifically, the letter argues that the Bureau’s reasoning for repealing the underwriting requirements—that the findings of the Rule “were not supported by sufficiently ‘robust and reliable’ evidence”—would saddle the Bureau with an unreasonably high evidentiary standard that would prevent the Bureau from regulating unfair and abusive practices. Additionally, the letter states that the Bureau’s conclusion that the underwriting requirements would harm consumers by reducing consumer’s access to credit and ability to choose lenders offering credit ignores “the experiences of numerous states that have implemented restrictions on payday and vehicle title lending—restrictions that have protected consumers without unreasonably limiting consumers’ access to credit.” States’ restrictions on payday and vehicle title lending, according to the letter, have “benefited consumers and expanded access to manageable credit.” Lastly, the letter asserts that maintaining a federal regulatory floor on lending activities is “crucial to supporting and complementing state oversight,” and removal of the floor will “enable lenders to continue trying to avoid state regulation and continue marketing expensive and often unlawful products to consumers without providing borrowers an opportunity for negotiation or comparison.”
The comment letter was written by the Attorneys General of the District of Columbia, New Jersey, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
As previously covered by InfoBytes, the same group of Attorneys General had urged the CFPB via a previous comment letter not to delay the August 19, 2019 compliance date for any aspect of the Rule, and had warned that they would consider taking legal action if the Bureau did so.
OCC releases April 2019 enforcement actions
On May 16, the OCC released a list of recent enforcement actions taken against national banks, federal savings associations, and individuals currently and formerly affiliated with such entities. The new enforcement actions include personal cease-and-desist orders, removal and prohibition orders, notice of charges against an individual, and terminations of existing enforcement actions against individuals and banks. The release also includes two civil money penalty orders discussed below.
On April 9, the OCC assessed $35,000 in civil money penalties against an Oklahoma-based bank for an alleged pattern or practice of violations of the Flood Disaster Protection Act and its implementing regulations. Additionally, on April 24, the OCC assessed $136,000 in civil money penalties against a Texas-based bank for an alleged pattern or practice of failing to ensure timely notification and force-placement of flood insurance on property in special flood hazard areas, in violation of the National Flood Insurance Act.
Kansas updates GAP waiver guidance
On May 19, the Office of the State Bank Commissioner of Kansas published in the Kansas Register an amended Administrative Interpretation No. 1004 covering Guaranteed Asset Protection (GAP). In general, the interpretation provides guidance for creditors to follow to exclude the cost of GAP waiver agreements from the calculation of the finance charge with consumer credit sales and closed-end consumer loans pursuant to the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. The revision amends paragraph 3(g) of the interpretation, which requires clear disclosure on how to contact the GAP provider in connection with claims for GAP coverage. Paragraph 3(g) states that the information must be written in bold font and the word “claims” must be bolded and underlined. Additionally, the form must also advise Kansas consumers that they can contact the Kansas Office of State Bank Commissioner with complaints about their GAP waiver agreement. The revised interpretation was effective on May 15.
Iowa amends licensing requirements for service companies
On May 16, the Iowa governor signed SF 619, which, among other things, amends the state’s service contract provider provisions to require any provider that issues, offers for sale, or sells motor vehicle service contracts in the state to be licensed as a service company. Persons who provide support services or work under the direction of a licensed service company, including those who provide marketing, administrative, or technical support, are not subject to the licensure requirements. In addition, SF 619 also prohibits a licensed service company that offers motor vehicle service contracts from making certain false, deceptive, or misleading statements regarding (i) the service company’s affiliations with a manufacturer or importer; (ii) a warranty’s validity or expiration date; or (iii) whether a contract holder must obtain a new service contract in order to maintain coverage under an existing contract or warranty. Furthermore, SF 619 prohibits a lending institution from requiring “the purchase of a motor vehicle service contract or residential service contract as a condition of a loan or the sale of any property or motor vehicle.” The amendments are effective immediately.
7th Circuit agrees with reduction of attorney’s fees in FDCPA action
On May 15, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit held a prevailing consumer’s request for $187,410 in attorney’s fees was unreasonable in a FDCPA action. In 2014, the consumer and a debt collector settled the consumer’s FDCPA related claims for $1,001 plus attorney’s fees of $4,500. Despite the settlement agreement, the debt collector continued to attempt to collect the debt, and the consumer sued a second time alleging violations of the FDCPA and FCRA. The consumer did not respond to multiple settlement offers from the debt collector, including one in March 2015 for $3,051, proceeding to trial on the FDCPA claim, and subsequently rejected a settlement offer from the debt collector of $25,000 and reasonable attorney’s fees. At trial, the jury only awarded the consumer the $1,000 in FDCPA statutory damages, after which he sought to recover $187,410 in attorney’s fees. The district court reduced his request to $10,875, concluding that the consumer’s rejection of “meaningful settlement offers precluded a fee award in such disproportion to his trial recovery.”
On appeal, the appellate court agreed with the district court that the March 2015 settlement offer of $3,051 was reasonable, rejecting the consumer’s argument that the settlement “was not substantial and therefore should have been disregarded by the district court in determining the fee award.” The appellate court also rejected the consumer’s argument that because the settlement offer disclaimed liability for the debt collector, his results at the jury trial were much better than the settlement as it yielded judgment on the merits. The appellate court noted that settlement offers regularly disclaim liability, and by operation, judgment against the debt collector would still have been entered under Rule 68. Therefore, the appellate court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion when reducing the attorney’s fees to $10,875 based on 29 hours’ worth of work at an hourly rate of $375 prior to the March 2015 settlement offer.